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Executive Summary of Findings and Synopsis of Recommendations 
D. Rick Van Schoik 
“Billion dollar bills are left strewn at the approaches to the internal land ports of entry” 
“This report and the recommendations herein reflect the interpretation and perspective of the author, 
Rick Van Schoik and/or NACTS” 
The Trilateral Border Summit was hosted by the North American Center for Transborder Studies at 
Arizona State University and the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary with sponsorship 
from Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, the Fresh Produce Association of Americas and the Canada Arizona Business 
Council.  Together, commissioned papers and subsequent talks created the substance of the findings 
and the details of the recommendations presented herein.  We thank both Ambassadors Doer and 
Jacobson and all authors/speakers for their attention an expertise presented here.   
The North American Century is before us:  
 We have enough energy to be self-sufficient including the oil sands, joint development in the 
Gulf of Mexico, and the prospect of directional drilling and hydrological fracturing yields from 
tight sources. 
 Our economies are growing as the middle class in Mexico is expanding as the growth rates in all 
three nations recover from the global recession with Mexico and Canada leading the way. 
 We are starting to recognize more and more that our security is a common security, and a 
common customs union and an external security perimeter are possible if not at the moment 
popular ideas. 
 Near-shoring and back-sourcing of jobs and advanced manufacturing can sustain joint 
production, which has been the hallmark of North American competitiveness 
The premise of the meeting was to that North American competitiveness was jeopardized by the 
transactional costs of internal borders.  We believe an investment at the ports of entry rather than 
merely between them will return many times the initial investment for many years to come. One 
conference participant described securitization of the border as a “hysterical reaction to the events of 
9/11” (Fry).  The Council for Foreign Relations estimated a $400 billion savings if we pursued the 
creation of a “seamless” North America. And NACTS estimates the cost of this seamless North America 
to be less than 1% of the value of trade. 
The advantage of proximity for just-in-time supply chains cannot be overstated nor can the completely 
disruptive nature of a short or local delay.  Not only is individual, corporate, and national productivity 
lost but so is economic and physical security. “An idling truck is a sitting duck” means the long waits and 
congested ports of entry are ripe for tampering with the lows by traffickers.  
Second, even though the two smart/secure border accords had a number of common objectives there 
was no scorekeeper or scorecard to track progress.  We believe metrics are as important as the 
programs themselves. 
Third, part of realizing the value of trade and therefore the value of our neighbors is to change the story 
about borders and cast off the stereotypes of Canada and Mexico in the United States. 
The conference participants realized and reiterated that just as “security was trumping trade” was 
replaced by “smart trumps security” it must now be replaced by “intelligent security can enhance 
trade”. This includes harmonization of risk management compatible information technologies and joint 
security operations. 
We border practitioners, scholars and specialists  need to win the argument, at the street level where 
the average citizen lives, about the benefits of trade, the overt success of NAFTA, and value of ports of 
entry, and how much productivity has been lost and how much efficiency can be recovered. The thought 
leaders accumulated at TBS urge reclaiming the story of the borders from the sensational press and 
media who only report the negative side of borders.   
The message is simple: As the U.S. and its neighbors seek to recover from the deep and persistent 
economic downturn they have no better bet than to jointly make and sell products to the world. U.S. 
Ambassador to Canada David Jacobson underscored that export trade sustained 10 million jobs in the 
United States.     
It's worth citing Ambassador Michael Kergin’s new-found orientation to border security. He claims he 
was once “a skeptic of looking at border security from a trilateral perspective” but realizes “the nature 
of the threats confronting our jurisdictions may still differ somewhat but sufficiently commonality exists 
for all three to benefit significantly from a cooperative approach… a more integrated approach, fostering 
the sharing of new technologies, intelligence and best practices, can only contribute to a more efficient 
trade flows and by extension enhance North American competitiveness in a challenging global 
economy.”   
Our vision includes ideas once thought unimaginable. At one time, NAFTA was a highly partisan issue 
but we now find broad support for it from all governors in Mexico, from both parties in the U.S. 
Congress, and from all major political parties in Canada. Just as an enhanced driver's license was 
unimaginable by some as a border crossing card we propose that those things which we recognize are 
not popular nor have political support but we see as necessary for the future of North America (such as 
a common customs union). 
We take this opportunity to fully support the North American Leaders Summit (NALS) efforts towards a 
more secure and prosperous life for all of our citizens. North America already has too many bilateral 
agreements and we encourage a North American “big bang” by 2020 and that you use NALS to 
announce it. No other mechanism exists for forceful action from the continent.   
The opportunity to address the sequester, to move ahead on trans-Atlantic and Pacific trade 
partnerships, and to imagine what we might accomplish in another decade gives us the authors and 
participants at TBS the optimism to suggest ways to recover the advantage of proximity  to enhance 
our collective competitive place in the world marketplace.    
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Participants made the following seven cross-cutting recommendations/observations: 
 Engage the local actor for optimum productivity 
 Public-private partnerships (P3) are a key way to invest in ourselves 
 Prevention, planning, preparedness, reaction, response and recovery (P3R3) from natural and 
human made disasters are the same 
 Interoperable communications must be mandated 
 Border revenue streams can be identified with minimal or no cost increase and potential savings 
 Invest first in each other before looking to other world markets 
 Encourage the role of universities as thought leaders and implementation action developers 
A summary of the other specific policy recommendations, organized into three domains: security, 
competitiveness, and energy is provided below along with an identification of the level of government 
that has power to act.  Trilateral coordination is implied in all recommendations. 
DOMAIN AND ISSUE RECOMMENDATION ACTOR 
SECURITY   
Terrorism threat Truly move security away from the border by finding terrorists 
where they live and not at the border, a last line of defense 
Federal 
External perimeter Establish a common external security perimeter that includes 
the whole continent 
Federal 
Joint risk assessment and 
management 
Harmonize threat assessment and risk management   Federal 
Border and port 
technology 
Increase automation at border checkpoints. Federal 
Joint operations Promote joint security operations, such as IBETS, Shiprider and 
mirrored enforcement.    
Federal 
Cyber attacks The three governments should establish clear processes for 
sharing of information on cyber threats and identify specific 
targeted entities. 
Federal 
Intelligence sharing Share real-time information and intelligence and use compatible Federal 
information technologies 
P3R3 Expand joint prevention, planning, preparedness for and 
response, reaction and recovery from natural and human events  
All 
levels 
C4ISR Use common frequencies to coordinate communications among 
law enforcement agencies on both sides of borders 
All 
levels 
COMPETITIVENESS   
Customs Union Negotiate a common customs union that includes a common 
external tariff 
Federal 
Economic commission Establish an economic commission to prioritize joint investment 
in our common future. 
Federal 
Port infrastructure Dedicate investment in gateways and corridors and forge a 
continental plan for multi-modal transportation and 
infrastructure  
All 
levels 
Stop protectionism  Afford a “Buy North America” provisioning in all levels of 
government procurement 
All 
levels 
Joint investment  Authorize joint inter-jurisdictional powers that will enable full 
investment in needed infrastructure 
All 
levels 
Trade in services Integrate services that we already trade (financial, healthcare, 
education, tourism, etc.) 
All 
levels 
Regulatory cooperation Create a single North American working group on regulatory 
issues. Streamline a regulatory cooperation from four tracks to 
one  
Federal 
North America passport Study creation of a North American passport and expansion of 
enhanced drivers licenses 
Federal 
Increase visas Increase number and length of visas. Expand professional 
categories and skills included in NAFTA visas and extend the visa 
duration 
Federal 
Integrate locally  Allow local integration. States and provinces should be 
permitted by the federal authorities to negotiate cross-border 
business 
 
Local 
Cabotage Permit cabotage on the east and west coasts of North America 
and the Great Lakes by bona fide North American shipping firms.  
Federal 
Labor mobility Adapt immigration policies to a wider labor market. Federal 
Trust Make anti-trust policies continental. Federal 
Invest in innovation Adopt a North American Innovation strategy. All 
levels 
ENERGY   
Regulations Harmonize environmental standards and fees for energy 
exploration, development and offsets. 
All 
levels 
Common energy market Negotiate a new energy framework that can tap cold, deep, and 
tight reserves with environmental stewardship. 
Federal 
Joint compacts Use inter-state compacts (ISC) to site, conduct environmental 
review and finance transmission and connection infrastructure.  
All 
levels 
Keystone Approve the Keystone XL pipeline if only for its symbolism. Federal 
Cross-border connections Improve the structure of electrical transmission fees so carriers 
have strong financial incentive to connect across borders. 
All 
levels 
Climate change Enable North American trading on greenhouse gas emission 
reduction credit as voluntary offsets.   
Federal 
 
Ambassadors David Jacobson and Gary Doer address the participants at the Trilateral Border Summit
1.0 Scenarios from our past  
Let me take you back to the month, weeks and days before 9/11 and our reaction to this event which 
created a securitization of the borders.  In August of that year, in an attempt to try to keep the wait 
times as near the 40-minute  average experienced during the rest of the year, during December private 
industry collected funds which were used to pay overtime for the port of entry agents in San Diego.  In 
the week before a workshop attempted to identify strategies to reduce the wait time to a 20-minute 
goal thought reasonable by both sides. Privatizing some infrastructure and operations (but not authority 
and standards) was the primary recommendation.  Finally in the days before the terrorist attack, 
Presidents Bush and Fox negotiated the “whole enchilada” or the framework for comprehensive 
immigration reform.  
Then 9/11… 
Securitization of the borders was oriented towards securing the often barren stretches between our 
more urban entryways to each other and our joint production and away from the forgotten necessity to 
facilitate flows at those ports of entry. Investment in the “three legs of the stool” (staff, infrastructure 
and technology) was dedicated to the open distances between ports rather than at ports.  
2.0 Trade in the post, post-9/11 world 
Now is the opportunity to define security as not only preventing the flow of illicit materials into all our 
any of the North American nations but towards that common security found in our economic prowess.  
Trade is grossly underappreciated and little understood. The reality behind the National Export 
Initiative (NEI) is that exports create new jobs and sustain old ones.  The NEI is on track to produce jobs 
not just in in the U.S. but in all three nations because each exports the others’ content. An estimated 
14% of US GDP is due to trade, and a whopping 31% of Canada’s and 32% of Mexico’s is attributable to 
trade claimed U.S. Ambassador to Canada Jacobson. Near-shoring and back-sourcing after the exodus of 
jobs elsewhere has immediate, mid and long-term universally positive consequences. 
                      
Trade of services within NAFTA approaches $100 billion per day after the setback of the recession  
3.0 North America shares competitiveness, security, energy stability and sustainability  
 
All this talk about border security before comprehensive immigration reform disses and misses many 
key policy points. The first is that security is political first and as The Economist recognized in a recent 
editorial “The border will never be truly secure and anything that smacks of making that a precondition 
risks becoming a way of ensuring that reform never happens.”     
While she was Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano was fond of saying that if we built a fence she 
knew human ingenuity would construct a ladder that was a foot higher. Part of what she recognized was 
that the financial push and pull to get in and to smuggle and traffic things in was not easily overcome by 
border security operations. 
Entering her second term as Secretary of Homeland Security, she knows more than anyone how 
ingenious the transnational criminals can be with tunnels, submarines, ultra-lights, quickly constructed 
bridges and even catapults. 
Our investment in border security has worked as determined by overall trends and by almost any 
measures publically and privately available. Two gross measures are the number of apprehension and 
deportations.  CBP reported far fewer irregular entries border-wide in 2012 (down to 85,000 from a high 
five years ago of over 600,000) and more are being caught and deported (a high of 400,000 in 2012). We 
are also catching more drugs, weapons, and cash that fuel much of the flow.   
At the same time much-accelerated development in Mexico makes it more likely they can find education 
and training and a job at home. Mexico’s economy has grown faster than the U.S. economy every year 
of the last decade except one! We are helping Mexico fight its narco-violence and transnational criminal 
organizations by training Mexican cops, lawyers, judges, forensic scientists and, in a separate program, 
special operations soldiers.  Finally, the cost and likelihood of success at being smuggled by a coyote has 
risen significantly. 
But our investment in security has taken a toll.  For the last, some say, “lost decade” we invested in the 
close-the-border mantra of staff, infrastructure and technology:  
 doubling the green-shirted Border Patrol officers that have deterred, deflected, detected, and 
apprehended to the point that some may patrol all day long and not catch anyone sneaking 
through;  
 building 650 miles of sometimes double fencing, walls and barriers; and  
 integrating a range of different technologies, mostly radar, cameras, motion detectors, license 
plate and biometric readers each tailoring to the terrain and vegetation of that station and 
sector.         
According to a recent report by the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, our $18 billion investment 
in enforcing the laws of immigration to pursue both irregular crossers and visa overstays outweighs all 
other federal law enforcement including the FBI and Secret Service put together.  We spent 50% more 
on immigration enforcement in 2012 than in 2006. One researcher claims that we’ve invested over $1 
trillion (a million million) in security and defense. 
I once asked Secretary Chertoff his definition of border security.  He responded to our largely academic 
crowd with a scholarly answer of a high probability of knowing what is crossing and where and being 
able to respond to it and a higher probability of knowing what was going to cross next and where and an 
ability to respond to that. 
We’re well on our way there, but with a few exceptions.  We know who and what is getting in (down to 
the last person from a nation of special interest) and where it’s getting in (we’ve moved much of it to 
remote and inhospitable sections of the desert and mountains) and we are able to respond in depth 
from as far away as the farm, factory an foreign origin to miles inside at mobile check points that catch 
some of the drugs that otherwise get in. 
But what we have not invested in is our mutual economic security. North America is the world’s most 
productive bloc because we are close, we complement each other (what one cannot grow or make 
efficiently the other does), and we make and sell to the rest of the world.  Because of the high level of 
U.S. content in products Canada and Mexico export to the world we were able to increase our exports 
massively during even the global recession.  In other words our downturn would have been worse if it 
weren’t for consumers in Canada and Mexico and for our collective competitiveness. 
 
In a recent OpEd in the Wall Street Journal Robert Zoellick, who knows from experience as head of the 
World Bank, US trade representative, and deputy secretary of state, claims “Taking the lead on trade 
and open markets can enhance global security, opportunity and prospects for liberty”.  He goes on to 
say the three NAFTA nations can gain the most from trade facilitation in “energy security, improved 
productivity, and an edge in manufacturing and other industries.” 
Moving border operations away from the border to ease congestion at the border is slowly being 
accomplished. Things can move from the farm, factory or foreign source across our borders is pre-
screened, inspected and approved.   
To continue to be productive and competitive we need more staff, infrastructure, technology and 
communications capacity at land ports of entry and investment in intermodal facilities and corridors 
from rail, sea and air ports.  We need to maintain our edge by ensuring we can move things around the 
North American manufacturing base with the ease we had pre-9/12 when we decided never another 
9/11. 
We share a history and a future. Our history is mostly bilateral (NATO, NORAD, North Command) but has 
integrated the third more and more. In 2003, already a decade old, NAFTA was still unpopular, but we 
were experiencing general prosperity. By 2013 persistent economic insecurity presents a fork in the road 
for a North America and its three nations as we can decide to decouple or to continue to promote joint 
production, more securitization or harmonization so that by 2023 we have achieved a truly free trade 
that NAFTA promised but was only able to deliver on reduction of tariffs.  
NAFTA has been an unmitigated success quadrupling and in some cases quintupling the amount of 
trade over 20 years to well over $1 billion a day just with Mexico. Our recent history on the southern 
border includes three new crossings and the first railroad crossing in over 100 years, Mexico's inclusion 
in the global entry system known as GOES, and binational master plans for port of entry infrastructure 
planning and prioritization.  
4.0 The North American leaders can start afresh defining the continent 
The three young leaders have a voter and self-imposed mandate to create jobs and time.  Prime 
Minister Harper has a majority government, President Obama has a second term and President Peña 
Nieto has an entire sexenio.   
North America is too big, amorphous, and obscure for most to identify with yet it is the economic bloc 
that matters most. North America is actually 99 federated governments (three federal; ten provincial 
and three territorial; 31 Mexican states and one federal district; and 50 U.S. states and one more federal 
district) and innumerable local, tribal and municipal jurisdictions.  They had an immense interest and 
knowledge about what would work across the border.   What we have found over and over is that what 
the federal governments fragment through inattention or inability to adapt, the locals can integrate, a 
term called fragmegration.   
Just as North America has had to shift from thinking east and west (highways and railroads) to north and 
south (trade, connective infrastructure) it must again shift back to east and west as each of the three 
nations together (Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP) and separately as the three negotiate free trade 
agreements with the EU (the subject of a related paper). The three NAFTA leaders can adopt a unified 
approach to trans-oceanic trade. A NAFTA perspective affords harmonization of regulations to be 
streamlined north and south as well as eat and west at the same time.    
Investment trends between ports of entry (green) exceeds investment at the ports (blue)     
Notes: Total appropriations between the ports include US Border Patrol and Fencing, Infrastructure, and 
Technology funding.  
FTE: Full-Time Equivalent Source: Marc Rosenblum (Congressional Research Service), Testimony on Measuring 
Border Security before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, 
U.S. Congress, May 8, 2012. 
5.0 Situation and how we got such thick, sticky and dense borders 
Only those who cross borders or live in the borderlands truly understand the dynamics of what is at 
stake there. As the below graphic from the Congressional Research Service depicts, both investment and 
staffing at the southern border especially between ports of entry has doubled if not tripled in what 
some described as a lost (productivity) decade. To accommodate this securitization United States 
Department of Homeland Security and its Customs and Border Protection agency responded with a 
number of programs to enroll trusted travelers and trusted shippers in precleared pre-inspected 
prescreen protocols. A secretive targeting score system allows fewer and less intensive inspections for 
those enrolled in the program and would enable enrollees to be the first back in line after alerts and 
closures. These ensured that just-in-time supply chains could continue. These voluntary programs have a 
cost both in enrollment and annual leave validations. The current hope is that CBP can do “a better job 
of marketing the program and perhaps eliminating some to bureaucracy” (Glick).  
 
 
Trinational panel outlines the basic issues focusing on the interdependent nature of economic success   
6.0 Strategies and tactics abound but mechanisms and institutions are lacking 
Except for the formal Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the informal North 
American Forum (NAF), North America has few formal means to promote its own good.  Both are 
powerless. However, the North American Leaders Summit (NALS) is both powerful and formal and 
(through this paper) informed about border issues. 
But the federal governments aren't the only actors in the borderlands. Subnational actors including 
states, counties, tribes, municipalities are important integrators in many cases in which the federal 
governments have fragmented transboundary issues. Successful transboundary organizations include 
the Pacific Northwest Economic Region, San Diego Association of Governments' borders committee, the 
British Columbia-Washington border incident communications protocol established during the Olympics, 
and others. 
The final major actor which is becoming increasingly more important is the private sector.  Public-private 
partnerships and identification of appropriate revenue streams to “operate” the border or pay for 
infrastructure may be the best evolving option.     
6.1 Critical infrastructure and its protection cross borders  
Because both sides of both borders are so interconnected, protection of the infrastructure that is 
determined to be critical by the United States government necessarily includes assessment of the 
extensions to and from Mexico and Canada. 
6.2 Border security operations and infrastructure can be shared 
Security operations both at and between ports of entry are described as risk-based but the threat, 
exposure and vulnerability assessment is unilateral when it could be jointly determined and thereby 
minimized, mitigated and managed in a trilateral manner. 
6.3 Energy integration is possible 
The 2010 decade is a window of opportunity to reinvent North America around energy and to reinvent 
energy in North America as renewable. To cite, finance, and perform environmental review on 
transboundary infrastructure we suggest interstate councils (ISCs). By strengthening regulatory 
cooperation on exploration and development and climate change minimization, mitigation, a self-
sufficient, interdependent North American energy sector is possible within five years according to 
various reports. To achieve this, the United States must approve the Keystone XL pipeline, and Mexico 
must permit some foreign investment in its energy sector. Together the United States and Mexico must 
jointly develop their transboundary carbon reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. 
7.0 Metrics are needed to measure progress 
Just as the border is a system of systems and not a line we must think about systemic metrics as well as 
line, corridor or “retail” metrics. Since trade and security are complementary the systems approach 
makes absolute sense. 
Ambassador Kergin asked two insightful questions and answered them. Why bother to measure? 
Because, one, we need to assure the population and the deciders and also the decliners that we can 
increase flow and still stem illicit flows. Second, because we want all our citizens to know that only 
domestic threats exist,  that all migration is regular, that risk and not just the threat is being managed, 
and finally that  we have trust and confidence in other jurisdictions. 
The second question is how do we measure? First, we do this by defining and classifying illicit flows. It's 
things like terrorists and narcotics and not the ingredients in Cheerios or jellybeans. Second, it’s by 
orienting success around the facilitation of trade and third, by lowering the profits of the transnational 
crime organizations. 
“One broad measure of economic integrity is the degree to which North American companies have 
developed and deepened cross-border supply chains” according to economist Stephen Globerman. 
Another is clustering, and the value of goods and number of visitors crossing the border annually. 
Clustering is a phenomena based upon the auto zone of Michigan and Ontario of co-locating support 
activities and expediting communication from those locations to their counterparts in the other three 
nations which is being accomplished for aerospace and to a lesser degree renewable energy.  
Another sometimes ignored metric is the number of people who die while traversing borders your 
regularly. As much as possible we should try to find ways to disconnect the constructed nexus between 
immigration and security. 
While there have been calls for significant joint action towards expediting trade and securing the 
borders the penultimate measure is actual implementation of the various mechanisms and the ultimate 
measure is three-way trade.  The primary actors are the Executive Steering Committees for Beyond the 
Border and 21st Century Border Interagency Policy Committees of the National Security Staff but 
coordination and consultation with local level or example the joint port of entry committees, joint 
infrastructure capital plans, cross-border resilience assessment programs, joint cyber security action 
plans, and border traffic disruption management guides.  
8.0 Recommendations are immediately achievable with high return on investment 
The first recommendation is to more broadly define security and to concertedly extend security away 
from the border to the farm factory or foreign source. The border should be a last line of defense not 
the first as we find terrorists and other threats at their sources.  
We propose neither the grandiose nor the platitude but recognize North America progresses through 
optimistic, pragmatic incrementalism that we hope can be accelerated and focused through this paper. 
As an example risk assessment in the past has been sovereignty-centered, war-focused, and historically 
embedded. In order to manage risk together we will need to first agree to assess risk together.  This in 
turn means assessing our joint vulnerability and exposure and not just the overt threats.  
The following cross-cutting recommendations are followed by ones in the security, competitiveness, and 
energy domains.  
8.1 Engage the local actor for optimum productivity  
Fragmegration is the term used to describe the ability of local actors to integrate what the federal actors 
have fragmented. Cities and states have a strong interest in making sure borders work well and can play 
a major role in both the border core door development as well as border resilience maintenance. 
8.2 Public-private partnerships (P3) are a way to invest in ourselves 
The model established between the governments of Canada and Ontario to help fund the Detroit-
Windsor Bridge with Michigan can be exported to other ports and other infrastructure projects. One 
from the southern border includes private sector investment from Mexico transferred to public agencies 
in Arizona to add lanes to and from the Lukeville port of entry with a promise that the federal 
government would increase the hours available for access. 
President Obama has suggested that border fees be imposed and most who cross the border recognize 
that time is money and are willing to pay for guaranteed crossing times and access to modern 
technology.  
The trusted shipper and trusted traveler programs are examples of assurances of fewer and less 
intensive inspections for a moderate investment in the preclearance process. 
8.3 Prevention, planning, preparedness, reaction, response and recovery (P3R3) from natural and 
human made disasters are similar 
The ability of first responders, including law enforcement, to react with the latest intelligence and 
information regardless if the disaster is natural or human caused. Strong relationships need to be in 
place before an emergency or disruption occurs. Just as threat is not risk, response and recovery are 
different. 
8.4 Interoperable communications must be mandated 
Not only is there intra- and inter-jurisdictional advantage of being able to communicate on one side of 
the border but the ability to provide real-time intelligence to the other side will prove invaluable as 
evidenced by a number of international border enforcement teams or IBETs. 
8.5 Border revenue streams can be identified with minimal or no cost increase and potential savings 
When the U.S. highway trust system was adequately funded through gasoline, diesel and other 
transportation fuel taxes, the coordinated border infrastructure program provided federal funds for 
ports of entry in corridors. This was matched by an effort in Canada with federal and provincial funding. 
Even Mexico stepped up its investment in ports during the colder own administration. 
While still controversial many of the participants at TBS recommended identification and tapping of 
revenue streams to fund infrastructure, technology and even staffing. Such funding includes user fees, 
congestion pricing, and other incentives to encourage more efficient use of limited resources. 
Just as UPS and FedEx pay airports and seaports for access to government facilities to facilitate the flow 
of just-in-time delivery, access to land ports of entry must be paid for as well. 
8.6 Invest first in each other before looking to other world markets 
Many development banks and investors realize investment is no longer strictly from the richer nation to 
the developing nation. Mexico invested twice as much outside Mexico as foreigners invested in Mexico. 
If we recognize that we can invest in each other's productivity--for example in inland ports and multi- or 
opti-modal facilities--we can increase the efficiency of the overall shared manufacturing base.  
 
8.7 Encourage the role of universities as thought leaders and implementation action developers 
Universities as knowledge bases and thought leaders have the potential to integrate, synthesize, 
innovate, evaluate, and otherwise promote sound policy development across borders. Often the role of 
the university as a boundary organization among disciplines, sectors of society, and levels of 
government can be helpful to what is typically thought as a purely federal government prerogative. 
8.8 Recommendations to enhance security range from the immediately achievable to medium-term 
hopes 
 The three nations urgently need to shift to a permanent perimeter philosophy for all three 
nations. Establish a common external security perimeter, one that includes Mexico. 
 Harmonize risk management.  Just as self-importance is no importance, self-assessment is not 
the same as assessment, as Gary Hufbauer reminded the event participants.  And threat 
assessment must be done in concert with neighbors. Only joint risk assessment can inform all 
parties about common threats, vulnerabilities, and exposures that need common attention and 
those risk components that need individual attention.   
 We need to truly move security away from the border. Finding terrorists where they live and not 
at the border, a last line of defense, is an unsustainable strategy. Sharing intelligence far ahead 
of time is the best way to manage risk. 
 Expand trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs to make them trilateral in inquiry and 
Continental in scope. Better utilization of C-TPAT could increase border security and flow as well 
as security for drugs, weapons and terrorists for all three nations. 
 Increase automation at border checkpoints. The use of noninvasive technology and single 
electronic filing or E-windows can enhance the sharing of information across borders and among 
different government agencies. 
 Promote joint security operations, such as IBETS and Shiprider along the northern border and 
examples like mirrored law enforcement efforts on the southern border.    
 Share needed cyber intelligence. Three governments should establish clear processes for 
sharing of information and cyber threats and identify specific targeted entities in any of the 
three countries 
 Share information and intelligence and use compatible information technologies especially the 
use of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. 
 
 
8.9 Recommendations to enhance competitiveness complement security 
 Establish an economic commission to prioritize joint investment in our common future. 
 Enhance North American supply chains by creating a common customs union that includes a 
common external tariff. 
 Create world-class ports of entry by investing in the corridors to and the ports of entry. 
Dedicate investment in gateways and corridors and forge a continental plan for multi-modal 
transportation and infrastructure. When possible to negotiate sovereignty bargaining, build and 
operate joint infrastructure projects.  
 Afford a “Buy North America” provisioning in all levels of government procurement. 
 Authorize joint inter-jurisdictional powers similar to some internal transit districts that will 
enable full investment of needed infrastructure. 
 Integrate services. Manufacturing is integrated so now it's time to integrate government 
procurement and the services that we trade (financial, healthcare, education, tourism, etc.). 
 Create a single North American working group on regulatory issues. Streamline a regulatory 
cooperation from four tracks (US-Mexico, US Canada, and Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) to one and include all three NAFTA nations in all 
future free-trade agreements.  Get the USTR to coordinate TPP and TTIP as NAFTA orientations 
not just US. Include intellectual property in all regulatory cooperation negotiations. 
 Study creation of a North American passport. Persuade Bill Gates Carlos Slim and David 
Thompson to commission past national leaders to study the issue of North American passport 
with, for example, Ernesto Zedillo Bill Clinton and Brian Mulroney. 
 Increase number and length of visas. Expand professional categories and skills included in 
NAFTA visas and extend the visa duration from 3 to 5 years, and allow the visa holder to change 
employers and create a fast track to citizenship. 
 Allow and encourage local integration. States and promises should be permitted by the federal 
authorities to negotiate cross-border business.    Open government procurement on a reciprocal 
basis. 
 Permit cabotage on the east and west coasts of North America and the Great Lakes by bona fide 
North American shipping firms.  
 Adapt immigration policies to a wider labor market.  
 Make anti-trust policies continental. 
 Adopt a North American Innovation strategy. 
 Identify appropriate revenue streams that facilitate access to preclearance another port of 
entry services to expedite flows across the border. 
8.10 Recommendations about energy attempt to integrate North American assets 
 Harmonize environmental standards and fees for energy exploration, development and offsets.  
 Negotiate a new energy framework that can tap cold, deep, and tight reserves with 
environmental stewardship. 
 Approve Keystone if only for its symbolism. 
 Improve the structure of electrical transmission fees to the carriers have strong financial 
incentive to upgrade and connect the grid across borders between states and provinces. Do the 
same for natural gas pipelines between Mexico and United States. 
 Encourage implementation of a North American greenhouse gas emission reduction credit 
(ERC) exchange as a voluntary offset program. This would allow United States consumers to pay 
a security premium for access to the oil sands, for Canada to buy ERC credits from Mexico and 
for all three to invest in cleaner energy development, efficiencies, and renewables. 
 Use interstate compacts (ISC) as a way to negotiate environmental review, optimum siting, and 
shared finance of transmission infrastructure and interconnections across the borders. 
 North American energy is about renewables, energy efficiency, and transmission as well as 
generation. 
9.0 A word about the sequester 
Commander Mitch Merriman of CBP declared “The sequester will be disruptive, destructive and will 
have cascading effects. Wait will go to 4 hours.” The joint field command established in the Tucson 
sector seems to be a smart integration of border and port security operations under one command. We 
need an independent assessment of its effectiveness, as interagency coordination is one of the weak 
links in the overall management of our borders. Ship rider is an example of a budget saver. Others 
include the goal of "inspect once except twice”, cross training and mutual assistance, sharing border 
security facilities and operations. Investment in walls and fences seems to have been a drain on budgets 
according to estimates of the expense needed to maintain the fences and repair the holes cut by 
irregular crossers. 
10.0 Conclusions   
The overwhelming realization of the Trilateral Border Summit was that difficult but possible solutions 
were available to assure continue growth in trade maintaining North America’s preeminent place in the 
world’s marketplace, to achieve mutual security from common threats, and to guarantee that the three 
nations enjoy energy interdependence guaranteeing the promise of NAFTA that co-production through 
advanced manufacturing, mining, and agriculture can bring prosperity to every of the half billion North 
American citizens.           
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Opening Keynote Addresses 
 
Moderator: Colin Robertson 
Panelists: 
Ambassador Gary Doer, The Ambassador of Canada to the United States 
Ambassador David Jacobson, The Ambassador of the United States to Canada 
 
 
Summary: 
 
In presentations that focused on the Canada-US relationship, the Ambassadors highlighted numerous 
Canada-US success stories including longstanding agreements such as NORAD and NAFTA as well as 
more recent initiatives such as preclearance at airports and the Shiprider program. Specific to the land 
border, irritants such as regulatory “nitpicking,” legal issues surrounding law enforcement jurisdictions 
and the potential impact of US sequestration were highlighted. It was agreed that the three NAFTA 
partners bring a great deal of experience and clout to the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (TPP) by 
working together. However, it was also noted that the US has a long way to go in terms of expanding its 
international trade (less than 1% of businesses in the US export anything). The Ambassadors speculated 
upon the opportunities and challenges in the North American relationship. They identified key 
opportunities in successfully developing “energy independence” and potential challenges related to 
climate change and water resources. 
 
 
Discussion: 
 
Questions and follow-on discussion included the suggestion that the US was “getting its swagger back,” 
with indications of increased optimism throughout the country. Both Ambassadors agreed that although 
the northern border is more secure since 9/11, what is needed now is a more “efficient” border. It was 
also pointed out that there are many risks beyond the traditional land border, such as those in the cyber 
realm, that require more attention. The proposed creation of a customs union among the three North 
American countries is not something either Ambassador sees in the short to medium term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 1: Setting the Stage – the Issues 
 
Chair: David Fransen, Consul General of Canada in Los Angeles 
Panelists: 
Thomas d’Aquino, Canada Co-Chair, North American Forum and CEO, Intercounsel Ltd. 
Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State 
Victor Manuel Treviño Escudero, Consul General in Phoenix, Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Mexico 
Simon Rosenberg, President, New Policy Institute 
 
Summary: 
 
The panel debated the extent of ongoing cooperation among the three North American partners as well 
as the best approaches to advance NAFTA. It was noted that North America once led the way in 
international trade relations with both the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1988-89) and NAFTA 
(1993-94).  However, it was argued that progress has stalled and NAFTA is “tired, unpopular and 
unappreciated.” A call for a reversal in the relative decline of a North American agenda was made along 
with a proposed declaration at the next North American Leaders’ Summit committing to a seven-point 
action plan by 2020 (see Mr. Thomas d’Aquino’s paper on this site for the action plan). “Incrementalism” 
(rather than a “big idea”) was defended by other presenters who argued that “pragmatic” progress on 
closer North American cooperation is indeed happening and may be the most realistic approach given 
the complexities of the North American relationship. The panel also pointed out the incredible progress 
and change in Mexico over the past several years. Mexico is now the 14th largest economy in the world 
with free trade agreements with 44 countries. It was argued that “partnering with Mexico is wise,” and 
areas for cooperation include: efficient borders, innovation, property rights, cross-border small- and 
medium-sized businesses promotion, regional supply chain integration and military cooperation. The 
panel agreed that North America has a great story to tell in terms of trade – but we have to do a better 
job telling it. 
 
Discussion: 
 
Discussion picked up on the theme of the neglect of NAFTA. Concern was expressed that the North 
American relationships are becoming more bilateral. Although bilateralism, when practical and 
pragmatic, was not criticized, an argument was made for the focus to be on getting “more bang for the 
buck” through  trilateralism. It was noted that all three countries will “leave potential on the table” if the 
strength of NAFTA as a platform for globally expanding North American trade engagement is not better 
utilized. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 2: Setting the Stage – Strategies for the Northern and Southern Borders 
 
Chair: Laura Dawson, Dawson Strategic 
Panelists: 
Colin Robertson, Vice President and Senior Research Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Institute and Distinguished Senior Fellow, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton 
University 
Duncan Wood, Director, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
John Maisto, Former Ambassador and Member of the Board, North Americans Center for Transborder 
Studies, Arizona State University 
Steve Globerman, Kaiser Professor of International Business and the Director of the Center for 
International Business at Western Washington University 
 
Summary: 
 
The panel discussed a number of themes for improving strategies on the northern and southern 
borders. It was noted that national governments spend the bulk of their time looking at big issues while 
it is the provinces and states who face the reality of day-to-day border concerns. Lower levels of 
government have concrete interests and, in many cases, the constitutional authority to deal with some 
of the border issues. It was recommended that more border management issues could be tackled, or at 
least initiated, at local or regional levels. Regional level success stories such as the Washington-BC 
drivers’ license initiative and the establishment of PNWER (Pacific Northwest Economic Region) were 
presented as examples. Other solutions for improving strategies for North America’s borders included 
the suggestion of working more closely with Universities (good laboratories for brainstorming solutions) 
and more private-public partnerships. It was also noted that Canada tends to be somewhat inconsistent 
about Mexico – swaying back in forth in its definition of North America – which sometimes includes, and 
sometimes does not include, Mexico. It was suggested that nothing is wrong with bilateralism, but a 
strategy of “pragmatic trilateralism” is worth considering. 
 
Discussion: 
 
Discussion included comments on substantive changes in Mexico and its importance to the trilateral 
partnership. For example, Mexico has spent a great deal on infrastructure over the last few years and is 
also beginning to implement domestic reforms including the breaking up of monopolies in television and 
telecommunications. Furthermore, the energy industry may open up to “some” private involvement. 
There is a sense that there is a “momentum” building with Mexico that will make it a much stronger 
partner in the North American project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 3: Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 
Chair: David Bercuson, Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Director of Programs, 
Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and Director of International Policy, the School of Public 
Policy, University of Calgary 
Panelists: 
Geoffrey Hale, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Lethbridge 
Don Alper, Director, Border Policy Research Institute, Western Washington University 
Chris Sands, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 
 
Summary: 
 
Critical infrastructure protection is an incredibly complex issue given the multifaceted ownership and 
management of the infrastructure. Furthermore, there are differences, including constitutional, that 
lead to a lack of symmetry in approaches to critical infrastructure protection. All panelists agreed that 
“one size fits all” or centralization will not work as a form of governance for North American critical 
infrastructure protection. The role of “multi-agency” partnerships was stressed: between and among 
different levels of government, private industry and societal groups. Another theme that was raised 
several times during the panel discussion was the usefulness of pilot projects as models. For example, 
the Pacific Northwest has initiated many projects involving border security and critical infrastructure 
planning in recent years, (i.e. Enhanced Drivers’ License and the First Trusted Traveler program). Such 
successful pilots could be models for other regions. It was also noted that the security of infrastructure 
at the actual points of crossing is key given the economic significance of cross-border trade and people 
flows to all three countries. There are 13 points of entry (of 106) that account for 85% of the value of 
goods that cross the two borders – and in terms of prioritization, these crossings should be the ports of 
entry that are the primary focus of efforts to ensure port infrastructure resiliency and security. 
 
Discussion: 
 
The challenges surrounding liability and ownership in critical infrastructure were discussed during the 
Q&A. Small- and medium-sized enterprises were identified as particularly vulnerable in terms of their 
infrastructure. It was agreed that all businesses have to behave responsibly in terms of security and it is 
the role of government to provide backup. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 4: Border Security Operations 
 
Chair: Edgar Ruiz, Executive Director, Council of State Governments West 
Panelists: 
David Moloney, Senior Advisor the Privy Council Office, responsible for Border Action Plan 
Mitchel M. Merriam, Deputy Commander, Joint Field Command-Arizona, Customs and Border 
Protection, US Department of Homeland Security 
Isidro Morales Moreno, Director, Escuela de Graduados en Administración Pública (EGAP), Gobierno y 
Política Pública, Campus Estado de México 
Damien Simonneau, Visiting Fulbright Scholar, North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona 
State University 
Earl Fry, Professor, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University 
 
Summary: 
 
The panel, which focused primarily on the US-Mexico border, noted that all three countries have work 
to do in terms of better facilitation of trade. North America was described as a platform for businesses 
to compete in a very competitive global marketplace. The key question that was addressed was how do 
we ensure a more efficient border? Greater efficiency will also mean better security. A key aspect of 
efficiency is getting information before goods and people reach the border so that there will be less 
need to inspect trusted trade and travelers. The panel also considered border security operations from a 
theoretical perspective by noting that the US and Mexico do not necessarily have the same definition of 
security and this affects how they both approach their respective borders (it was noted that this was not 
a problem with the US and Canada). It was also argued that discussions in the US on comprehensive 
immigration reform are frozen by the US mindset to “securitize” immigration. Discussions on whether 
the US border is “secure” or not tend not be helpful. Rather, the focus should be on “thinking outside 
the box” (while not denying that threats exist) and moving toward political agreements that actually 
tackle the issue at hand and are more achievable, such as VISA reform. An on–the-ground perspective of 
border security was presented with a discussion on the Arizona Joint Field Command concept, a 
localized organizational realignment that integrated border security, commercial enforcement, and 
trade facilitation missions to more effectively meet Arizona’s border challenges. Described as a “radical 
change” in the way the border has been managed in Arizona, where all assets related to the border 
were placed under a single chain of command, this initiative can serve as a model for other regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 5: Managing Trade and the Economic Impact 
 
Chair: Lance Jungmeyer, President, Fresh Produce Association of the Americas 
Panelists: 
Jack Mintz, Director and Palmer Chair, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary 
Gary Hufbauer, Reginald Jones Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute of International Economics 
Leslie Glick, Porter Wright 
Patrick Kilbride, Senior Director, Americas, US Chamber of Commerce 
 
Summary: 
 
The fifth panel considered trade and the economic impacts at the borders. Attendees were presented 
with a 2003 vs. 2013 North American comparison. In 2003 the continent was just coming out of 
recession and there was robust economic growth, while in 2013 there has been pronounced economic 
insecurity, debt overhang and “plodding” economies; in 2003 there was deepening North American 
integration and an acceptance of “big ideas,” while in 2013 the focus of each North American country 
has been on emerging economies, diversification outside of North America, and on Canada’s part, a 
partial turning away from the US. In fact, it was argued that there has been a “decoupling” of the US and 
Canadian economies. Increased protectionism in the US and energy future issues (for example, the 
Keystone pipeline debate in the US) present challenges to the bilateral relationship and are causing a 
certain amount of aggravation in Ottawa. The panel also suggested that a resurging US economy could 
perhaps spearhead bringing North America back into global prominence as a trade leader. Panelists 
presented a set of initiatives to improve the movement of persons, goods, services and investment 
within North America. These included a North American passport; the recognition of professional 
credentials; the creation of border infrastructure agencies; a better trusted trucker program; a single 
energy market; an international services agreement; opening of government procurement; extension of 
investment rights; and single North American agricultural inspection. The Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a voluntary program between US Customs and Border Protection and the 
private sector in the US, Canada and Mexico, was also discussed as an example of a successful on-the-
ground program that could be better utilized. 
 
Discussion: 
 
The discussion was moderately more optimistic about a future customs union among the three 
countries than the opening keynote on Day 1. It was mentioned that although there are always specific 
interest groups in each country that will not want a customs union, the issues are not insurmountable. 
However, the issues facing closer North American integration go beyond tariffs and each would have to 
be tackled separately. It was suggested that “NAFTA Plus” might be a better  term than “customs 
union”. Although there were several concerns expressed about a stalling of North American integration, 
the comment was made that forward movement can and should be made bilaterally, trilaterally, 
incrementally or in a “big idea” way – whatever path is most pragmatic and smart. It was agreed that 
there needs to be more enthusiasm, effort and promotion surrounding the economic benefits of trade 
within North America. The role of Mexico as the “lynchpin” for North American success was also 
mentioned during the discussions. Mexico, poised for significant growth, presents a huge opportunity 
for qualitative and quantitative change.  
 
 
 
Panel 6: Measuring Success 
 
Chair: Erik Lee, Associate Director, North American Center for Transborder Studies, Arizona State 
University 
Panelists: 
Michael Kergin, Senior Advisor, Bennett Jones LLP and Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and 
International Affairs, University of Ottawa 
Mariko Silver, Arizona State University and former Assistant Secretary, Department of Homeland 
Security for International Affairs 
Glenn Williamson, Founder, Canada Arizona Business Council 
 
 
Summary: 
 
The final panel of the symposium looked at how success at the borders can be measured. The first 
question addressed was why measure progress in border management to begin with? The primary 
reason is to reassure the population that their respective governments are managing borders properly. 
Measurement of success will also increase confidence among trade partners and this can lead to greater 
trust and prosperity. The second question considered was how to measure success. Panelists noted that 
both security and trade need to be measured, although metrics are more straightforward on the trade 
side. It was also pointed out that what we choose to measure must be based on what are goals are. 
Measuring can be broken down into retail and system metrics based on these goals, while keeping in 
mind that the border in not just a line, it is a complex system. Toward the end of the panel, discussion 
shifted away from the physical border to the virtual border. The example of the Arizona-Canada 
business relationship provided the context to consider cities and airports as borders (e.g. Toronto and 
Phoenix banking and financial relationships do not involve the land border). Panelists suggested the 
movement of money and services were the new frontier of cross border relations.  
 
Discussion: 
 
The challenge of finding and retrieving data on US-Mexico border transactions was discussed. It was also 
noted that Canadians frequently have banking troubles in their commercial and business dealings in the 
US. For example, many large Canadian transactions end up being executed in cash due to inter-bank 
bureaucracy on both sides of the border.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PRODUCTIVE BORDERS ASSURE A CONTINUED GLOBAL NORTH AMERICA 
D. RICK VAN SCHOIK 
 
NACTS Promotes Cooperation  
As the only multi-disciplinary North American center at a U.S. university, NACTS partners with key 
thinkers, advocates and policy makers in all three nations. NACTS approach includes a long view of the 
continent and after acknowledging that it has a common future regardless of borders NACTS then 
adopts an approach of optimizing and sustaining security and securing sustainability at the same time. 
Trade plays a key role as it manifests economic, security and sustainability issues concurrently.  
 
I have a pretty good library of books and reports on the status and direction of North America and its 
prospects for a prosperous century.  They fall into two distinct classes; those that urge greater 
cooperation and some even say integration citing the mutual benefit and those who lament all the 
reasons we are not more collaborative have not made more progress.  I have even written a few of 
each.  Their titles do not necessarily indicate which camp they are from. 
 
For every opinion on the value of North America as an entity of common endeavor and that productive 
borders can help us compete in the world marketplace, there is a countering argument that the borders 
divide us more than unite us.  For every article on how we three can accomplish a defense and 
securitization of the continent there is one pointing out the (persistent and at time pervasive and 
persuasive) arguments on why we can’t do more than we have.   
 
Objectives of the Paper are to Frame Issues For Action  
For the longest time and even after a firm southern strategy for borders was promulgated the northern 
was still without a formal strategy. No one was expected them to look like bookends but a startling 
difference between the two established an opportunity to compare and contrast not only the borers but 
our three governments’ approaches. 
 
The objectives of this paper and the conference are to identify the issues that the three nations need to 
cooperate more on to create and to sustain a Global North America into the 21ST Century by promoting 
economic development through trade as a continental common security.  This paper is intended to 
capture the moment and to cast a net for the greatest return on investment. What we risk and what we 
lose if we aren’t productive either through three bilaterals to preferably one trilateral is our common 
security. If we treat threats differently and if our different perceptions push us to different approaches 
to common defense we ultimately threaten our common value to each other. 
 
The Issues Overwhelm the Policy Capacity  
“Typically human creation: it is physically invisible, geographically a logical, militarily indefensible, and 
emotionally inescapable. An interval of resonance... An interface... in irritation... charged with 
intensities.” Marshall McLuhan, Borderline Case, 1977. 
 
Herein I provide just enough theory to frame the issues. First NACTS finds it advantageous when 
discussing borders to adopt the perspective that the border is a system of systems: economic, cultural, 
transportation, environmental hydrological etc. and that dynamics like migration, smuggling and 
trafficking do not occur the same at all places and at all times along either border. Second, Oscar 
Martinez classifies borders on a continuum from alienated, through coexistent and  interdependent to 
integrated and at one time each North American border has been each of first three classifications and 
question is: Are we moving from clearly in 3rd to 4th. “I have pointed to a very different dynamic: one in 
which borders are transformed rather than transcended, reconfigured rather than retired. A United 
States and Western Canada this has involved not only the physical reassertion of border controls but 
also an ideological redefinition of border functions -- reflected in new prominence of law enforcement 
and the policy discourse about borders.” Peter Andreas in Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide 
2000. 
 
Colin Robertson perhaps frames the relational issues best when talking about the US election. “The 
Canadian stake in the US election: a pipeline and a bridge as well as the perennials of trade, defense, 
and security, energy and the environment.” All borders relations, such as the ones Robertson cites, are 
“intermestic” meaning domestic issues are international and international issues are domestic. Geoffrey 
Hale clarifies some of the tension when he describes a continuum of policy relations from conflict, to 
independence to coordination, collaboration, and finally to harmonization. He also distinguishes 
between hard and soft laws or power and originates the term “fragmegration” to describe how local 
efforts can mend or reintegrate those fragmented by federal policy and politics (Borders and Bridges: 
Canada's Policy Relations in North America, 2010). Although sovereignty can be a separator and even a 
divider it can be overcome. “Canada is essentially closer to United States than it is to itself” claims Paul 
Krugman in Geography and Trade. 
 
“North America finds itself in paradoxical times. On the one hand, the continent's economic prosperity 
depends upon an open global system that facilitates the free movement of people and goods. On the 
other, worries over America's exposure catastrophic terrorist attacks have transformed American 
security into a Washington's leading preoccupation. Consequently there is a potential train wreck in the 
making. Moving in one direction are those with been keen to make national borders as porous as 
possible so as to spot greater economic integration. From the other are anxious US politicians who look 
to the border to hold back would-be terrorists, contraband, chemicals, and illegal migrants” writes 
Stephen Flynn in The False conundrum: Continental Integration Versus Homeland Security in the 
Reporting of North America Guide edited by Peter Andreas and Thomas Bierstecker 2003  
“Canada must overcome its attachment to the bilateral special relationship and be prepared to expand 
the agreement to other trading partners” states the Canada Institute. Laura Dawson claims “Economists 
estimate that up to 10% of the cost of a North American product goes to pay for the border and trade 
efficiencies of the US border with Canada.” I’ve heard numbers as low as 1% so whatever the meta-
number is still significant and in the tens of billions of dollars to the gross national economy and 
thousands of dollars for each and every Canadian. 
 
Background is Punctuated  
North America has a history of peace punctuated by violent disagreement but by the Second World War 
FDR and Mackenzie King had fixed the tone for the century of mutual respect and alliance between U.S. 
and Canada. That meeting was followed by joint collaboration on Distant Early Warning line, North 
American Aerospace Defense, NATO, and Permanent Joint Board on Defense.  Mexico has slowly but 
surely been integrated into nearly all aspects and is a full partner in the Northern Command.  The 
AutoPact was followed by CUFTA and that by NAFTA only to have the reactions to the terrorist attach of 
9/11 create a lost decade. But recent enthusiasm at the North American Leaders Summit, talks of a joint 
inter parliament, and moves towards both Trans-Atlantic and -Pacific Partnerships  lead us to conclude 
this is the North American Century or stated another way North America has arrived the shaper of the 
global marketplace. 
Finally it is important to mention the existing U.S.-Canada and Canada-Mexico security and defense 
organizations: 
  NORAD and NorthCom 
 Trilateral North American defense ministers meeting 
 Military Training Assistance Program 
 North American Maritime Security Initiative 
 Permanent Joint Board on Defense and it subcomponent the military coordination committee 
 Canada Mexico partnership 
 Anticrime capacity building program 
 Canada Mexico joint action plan 
 Canada Mexico political military talks 
 
Recently the U.S stepped up its military aid to Mexico by establishing a special operations training 
headquarters in Colorado at the Northern Command, quintupling the number of people trained from 30 
to 150. 
 
Regulatory cooperation can lead to manufacturing competitiveness, wholesale/retail efficiency, 
regulatory efficiency. US and Canada also have a regulatory cooperation Council joint action plan is 
meeting to promote 29 different harmonization work plans. President Obama issued an Executive Order 
entitled “Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation” and may and through July work plans were 
completed and posted.   
 
Equal in importance to all the political changes and the evolution of security in North America is the 
recently begun and not to be discounted phenomena of “near shoring” and “back sourcing”.  After a few 
short decades of jobs, services, manufacturing and production going to the cheapest bidder, meaning 
lowest wage nation, jobs and production is returning “reshoring” to North America. “After decades of 
sending work across the world, companies are rethinking their offshore and strategies. Firms are now 
discovering all the disadvantages of distance. Reassuring is doubling over the previous two years.” says 
Tamzin Booth in the (Economist January 19, 2013). The multiple reasons for this are: 
 
 Wages are increasing overseas, skyrocketing in some cases 
 Proximity matters especially if close to growing markets such as in Mexico 
 politics can be uncertain and some developing nations 
 Customs duties are imposed on for and value added 
 Companies are discovering the public relations plus of returning 
 The cost of educating the workforce is prohibitive 
 A steady stream of labor and low turnover is essential 
 Supply chain works and infrastructure exists 
 Advanced manufacturing techniques are evolving 
 Big unions in America are sometimes willing to let wages fall 
 The benefits of the co-location of R&D and production is being noticed 
 Foreign suppliers sometimes turn into competitors 
 Intellectual property is not respected in some parts of the  world 
 
Risks can be Managed 
“Threat or perceived threat is not risk” Rick Van Schoik in National Solutions to Transborder Problems, 
edited by Isidro Morales 2011. For those who think all the threats emerge from Mexico are advised to 
visit the threat analysis from US DHS which identifies the refugee policies of Canada as much more of a 
threat.  
 
United States acknowledge co-responsibility for arms trafficking and transnational crime also known as 
narcotics cartels but until the risk assessment is done truly jointly we will be separated by perceptions of 
threat and risk. For example we hear little about spillover now that the cartels have permanently 
infiltrated our fiber.   
 
Hezbollah is an active and growing terrorist presence in Canada. The RCMP thinks that the group is most 
technically capable of all domestic threats. “It is involved in logistics and operational support activities 
and fund-raising but the group has scouted targets in Canada and has a proven capability to conduct a 
mass casualty attack, target unguarded foreign nationals, strike at heavily guarded targets, and carry out 
multiple coordinated attacks” claims a June 2010 Canadian intelligence study obtained by the National 
Post. 
 
In a blistering report Bernard Brister thanks Canada should forget Al Qaeda and think more about 
Mexico. “One result of the prioritization could be a focus on several threats posed by the at anarchical 
environment that is increasingly dominating Mexico, a nation that has sometimes been characterized as 
a failed state and were regional politics is dominated by local entrenched strongman who often 
represents families who have been powerful since colonial times. Mexico has also been described as a 
state that is rapidly becoming the next Columbia.” 
 
Economics Remains Key  
The Canada-U.S relationship is by far the largest bilateral commercial relationship in the world. “More 
than $2 billion of commerce passes to the ports between US and Canada every day and the two 
administrations are committed to making exports more efficient while increasing security” says Paul 
Mackler at a recent US-Canada border conference. 
 
Canada is the largest energy supplier to the United States. In fact Canada exports more oil to the US 
than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait combined. The US sells more to Canada than to the UK, Germany, Japan 
and China combined. The Canadian market for US exports is bigger than that of the entire European 
Union. Every day more than 200,000 people cross the US Canadian border.  
 
According to the US geological survey at the length of the international boundary line of the US 
Canadian border excluding Alaska is approximately 4000 miles while the length of US Mexican border is 
less than half that length of the Alaska Canadian border alone is over 1500 miles long. 
 
The Hon. Ed Fast, minister of international trade provocatively said “Trade is the new stimulus. We need 
more trade, more investment and deeper partnerships to help strengthen the financial security of hard-
working Canadians and Americans alike. There is no better job creator or economic develop than deeper 
trade. That is why our government is continuing to seek steps to make the Canada-US partnership -- the 
world's greatest free trade success story -- even stronger in the years ahead.” 
 
In the meantime near shoring of jobs presents a very real opportunity to take advantage of real gains in 
education, transportation, etc. to capture the mantel trading bloc to the world.   
 
“The forging of a North American community is linked to adaptation to globalization. How the United 
States deals with the problems in North America will influence how the country is used outside the 
region can define America's ability to be a leader on the global stage. Encouraging public dialogue about 
North America and learning from conflict will facilitate the building of a community in North America. 
Development of a North American consciousness will likely come from increased trade and investment 
among the three NAFTA partners. However individual notions of identity and sovereignty in Mexico, 
Canada, and the United States will dictate the development and breath of such economic relationships” 
reports Toward a North American Community, joint report of the Canada and Mexico Institutes at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2002. 
 
When it comes to building bridges Joseph Dukert writing as well as he does about energy says “A 
complex energy bridge already exists between Canada and Mexico. It's called the United States of 
America.” However, “Cooperation between Canada and Mexico on both energy and environmental 
initiatives which themselves often intertwined will be limited in both scope and effectiveness however 
unless all three nations appreciate more fully its value” states Canada among Nations 2011 – 2012: 
Canada and Mexico's Unfinished Agenda edited by Alex Bugailiskis and Andre Rozental 2012. 
Indeed Canada’s role and number one supplier of energy in the form of uranium, hydroelectricity, 
petroleum, natural gas, and increasingly renewables is not to be discounted nor is the dynamic exchange 
of fuels between U.S and Mexico.  The next issue the three needs to deal with is the prospect of North 
America as a major energy exporter.    
 
Critical Infrastructure Cross Borders  
In The Council for Foreign Relations Global Hot Spots 2013 cyber-attacks on US CIP is ranked as a tier 
one threat, but by extension we need to realize our interconnectedness by infrastructures and secure 
CIP that naturally extends into Canada and Mexico: dams and canals, grid including generation, pipelines 
that supply energy, transportation and supply chain, even defense systems i.e. NORAD, DEW and 
common external perimeter. I was privy to studies conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy soon 
after 9/11 that showed the concern of some that our security is theirs and vice versa. However a 
“nationalization” of CIP studies and finding has drawn back from that promise. I recall Wikileaks cables 
about critical infrastructure in Canada and Mexico that conveyed the sense that the governments were 
aware though probably lacking a comprehensive strategy.   
 
The wiping clean of 30,000 computers in Saudi Arabia late in 2012 was a reminder of the intent of 
terrorist and extremists.  Recent international cyber-attack defense agreements have lessened the 
probability and impact from cyber-threat coming through one of the North American nations to 
another. 
 
Security Operations Can Be Pushed Away From Borders   
“The cumulative increase in expenditure on US domestic homeland security over the decade since 9/11 
exceeds $1 trillion is clearly time to examine those massive expenditures applying risk assessment and 
cost-benefit approaches that have been standard for decades.” writes John Mueller from Ohio State 
University. 
 
NACTS has long taken an approach that we need sustainable security or secure sustainability (i.e. the 
need to focus on prevention, preparedness and planning in order to respond, react and recover from 
natural and humna0borbe emergencies) and has written a paper on the similarities and differences 
between the two borders and the contrasting response of the three national to those in their border 
and port security operations.  Jordi Diez identifies several ways that Canada and Mexico can collaborate 
on security issues: focus on human security, joint peacekeeping operations, and more active 
engagement of Mexico by the Northern Command in Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North 
America 2004. The last is an approach detailed by Graham Turbiville in U.S. Military Engagement with 
Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging Future, Joint Special Operations University 2010. 
 
Stephen Globerman and Paul Storer in their book The impacts of 9/11 on Canada -- US trade in 2008 
identified estimated exports shortfalls to exceed 2 1/2 billion dollars because of securitization.  Recently 
CBP updated its approach to security away from the mantra of the three legs of the stools (technology, 
staffing and infrastructure) but differed in the ways it looks at northern and southern borders and 
funding for the three legs suffers at ports of entry as funding for the distances between the ports gets all 
the attention. 
 
“Finally, while the announcement of this plan is an important first step for the Peña Nieto government, 
there are many details still to be filled in and worked out.  Rather than a strategy, the six-point plan is, 
for now, a series of aspirations and governmental actions that, if fully implemented, can contribute to 
improved security for Mexico but which will also require greater focus and strategizing to effectively 
reduce the harms and violence the country has experienced during the past six years” writes Eric Olson 
of Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars commenting on new 
President’s security plan. 
 
U.S. and Canada have a beyond the border and external security perimeter action plan that emphasizes 
moving the risk of further away from either of us. The border action plan implementation report from 
late in 2012 really has few new things to report: 
 
 A joint entry and exit pilot project 
 A joint border infrastructure investment plan 
 A cross-border regional resilience assessment program 
 A cyber-security action plan 
 
Otherwise the report is updated of the acronyms that we've all known for almost a decade: FAST, C-
TPAT, NEXUS, BEST and IBETs. 
 
Perhaps the most important progress made in 2012 is the regular meeting and progress of the joint 
Executive Steering Committee that reports to the Interagency Policy Committee of the National Security 
Staff 
 
Strategies Must be Joint  
“We spend too much time fussing over internal borders, when our policies and programs should be 
pushing borders out to the perimeter of North America and, where it makes sense, offshore’” Anne 
McLellan in Canadian Perspectives on US Policy edited by Constance Smith 2007. 
 
Two notable trading opportunities exist for North America. First the Trans Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership, also known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, also abbreviated TPP is an effort to link the 
NAFTA nations with the Pacific Rim nations for trade. Both Mexico and Canada became full partners to 
the negotiations late in 2012. The other is a Trans-Atlantic Partnership that would link NAFTA to the EU. 
Public-private partnerships offer unique opportunities to build binational infrastructure. The new 
Windsor Detroit Bridge is an example of provincial and federal governments in Canada investing in a 
project that benefits both sides. 
Many of the relationships between the three nations are, in the words of Monica Gattinger, “managed 
under the radar”, that is with informal, semi-permanent, and a regularly scheduled initiatives where 
often the focus is neither pragmatic nor issue specific.  Efforts to formalize and institutionalize are 
encouraged. I think the US-Mexico CO River agreement is a good and recent example of a joint program. 
10.0 Metrics Are as Important as Strategies  
 
The GAO (GAO-13-25-2012) reports that CBP has neither the performance goals metrics nor milestones 
to indicate both its effectiveness and its cost effectiveness so Congress can provide oversight. NACTS 
together with partners at COLEF has established 16 metrics in four domains to measure progress across 
the U.S Mexican border. They are as follows. 
 
DOMAIN MEASURES 
Competitiveness Innovation 
Human Capital 
Accessibility 
Clustering 
Quality of Life Economic opportunity 
Education and Culture 
Healthy Life 
Community Vitality 
Security Primary Levels of Crime 
Secondary Levels of Crime 
Primary Crime Prevention 
Secondary Crime Prevention 
Sustainability Clean Environment 
Natural Resources 
Ecological Protection 
Green Economy   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
BEATING THE ODDS: ACHIEVING NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC PARAMOUNTCY 
THOMAS D’AQUINO 
 
The ground breaking Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 were triumphs of vision and political will.  They established an 
ambitious North American economic architecture and ushered in a period of business-led continental 
trade and investment expansion.  The effects of these agreements on the domestic policies of Canada, 
the United States and Mexico were considerable.  In the case of Mexico, in particular, the NAFTA was a 
powerful catalyst in the opening of the Mexican economy and in moving the country more decidedly in 
the direction of democratization. 
 
The initial exuberance about North American prospects admittedly began to fade somewhat in the late 
1990s prompting policy debates about ideas such as NAFTA plus, i.e. deepening and widening of the 
agreement.  But it was the tragedy of 9/11 that would deal a devastating blow to prospects for the 
NAFTA’s evolution and to the lofty dreams of a more integrated North America.   
 
The United States understandably reacted sharply to the deadly terrorist attacks and moved quickly to 
secure the homeland.  The most immediate impact was felt at the borders with the disruption of vital 
commerce.  The creation by Congress of the mammoth Department of Homeland Security followed and 
with it a “thickening” of the borders.  So-called “smart border” agreements negotiated by the United 
States with Canada and Mexico did relatively little to relieve the tightening. 
 
Some of us saw in the tragedy of 9/11 an opportunity to build a new North American paradigm driven by 
the imperatives of a dramatically changed environment.  This called for enhanced North American 
security cooperation and for a trilateral economic architecture that would transcend the NAFTA.  
Business leaders, heads of government and think tanks launched various initiatives in support of this 
direction.  For example, in 2003, we at the Canadian Council of Chief Executives tabled a plan for much 
closer continental economic and security integration titled the North American Security and Prosperity 
Initiative (NASPI).  It called for the elimination of barriers to the movement of goods and people across 
internal borders; the establishment of a North American security perimeter; maximizing economic 
efficiencies, primarily through harmonization or mutual recognition across a wide range of regulatory 
regimes; the negotiation of a resource security pact covering agriculture and forest products as well as 
energy, metals and minerals based on the two core principles of open markets and regulatory 
compatibility; sharing the burden of defense and security; and new institutional mechanisms for closer 
cooperation and coordination.   
 
In 2005, the leaders of Canada, Mexico and the United States adopted a Security and Prosperity 
Partnership of North America (SPP).  Under the umbrella of the SPP, a bold and comprehensive set of 
initiatives were launched that held out the promise of real and far-reaching change.  In the meantime, 
thinkers across the continent articulated a vision for a much more closely integrated North America.  A 
notable example was the work of the Council on Foreign Relations and the 2005 report of its trilateral 
independent task force titled Building a North American Community.   
 
What has become of all these bold ideas and plans?  Precious little, I regret to say.  The NAFTA, once a 
shining example of leading edge statecraft, now is tired, unpopular and unappreciated.  The grand 
design envisaged by the SPP has fallen into oblivion – a victim of partisan politics, bureaucratic overload 
and leadership neglect.  The North American Competitiveness Council (NACC), which grew out of the SPP 
and which annually brought the continent’s business leaders together with the Prime Minister of Canada 
and the Presidents of Mexico and the United States with the goal of advancing North American 
productivity and innovation, fell by the wayside. 
 
In painting this sombre portrait of lost opportunity, I am not oblivious to the fact that our respective 
governments represented at this Symposium by very able ambassadors and senior officials, have worked 
hard to keep the North American agenda moving forward.  For example, work continues in areas such as 
border facilitation, regulatory cooperation, health and emergency management.  From a Canadian 
perspective, I salute in particular the efforts of Ambassadors Doer and Jacobson, who are with us here 
today, in advancing the Canada-United States Beyond the Border and Joint Regulatory Cooperation 
initiatives.   
 
At the April 2012 North American Leaders’ Summit at the White House, our heads of government did 
discuss regulation, secure supply chains, energy and climate change, continental competitiveness, and 
citizen security.  And in 2012, for the first time ever, Ministers of Defense of all three countries met to 
discuss threats to the continent and pledged closer cooperation. 
 
However, the ambition of these discussions pale in comparison to what was envisaged and hoped for in 
the aftermath of 9/11.  This is not surprising given the United States environment where “security 
trumps trade” and where a sharply divided Congress tries to come to terms with the severe economic 
fallout of the recent great recession including a total debt burden now approaching 17 trillion dollars. 
 
In the meantime, the relative economic position of North America in the face of the rapid rise in power 
and influence of Asian emerging economies continues to deteriorate.  It is often said that the best 
defense is a robust offense.  I submit that the best offense that North America can muster at this time is 
to make up for a lost decade of opportunity and advance a comprehensive set of initiatives that will 
restore the continent to productive and competitive paramountcy. 
 
Our respective leaders are well positioned to launch the offensive.  President Obama begins his second 
term committed to effecting transformational change and restoring American competitiveness.  
President Nieto begins his first term promising to raise Mexican growth levels, open up the energy 
sector and deal with business monopolies.  In Canada, a seasoned Prime Minister Harper is eager to 
promote closer continental cooperation at all levels. 
 
As we go on the offensive, we are not without some powerful advantages.  The continent continues to 
be home to the world’s most innovative thinking and entrepreneurial spirit.  Demography is on our side 
and we benefit from a mobile workforce.  Our resource base is massive and recent technology offers the 
promise of continental energy independence within the decade.  Manufacturing is making a comeback 
as well, particularly in Mexico. 
 
Our three leaders need to think “big” and begin by identifying the overarching challenge to North 
America: the need to reverse our relative decline in the face of the soaring strength of the world’s 
emerging economies – notably China, and transform our slow growth continent into a global 
powerhouse able to exercise economic leadership well into the 21st century. 
 
A key element of such a strategy involves articulating a vision for North American cooperation that goes 
well beyond incremental change.  Building on constructive initiatives currently underway and harnessing 
many of the creative ideas articulated over the past decade, I would welcome the following declaration 
at the next North American Leaders’ Summit. 
 
With the goal of achieving the productive and competitive paramountcy of North America by the year 
2020, and raising the standard of living of all our peoples to the first rank among nations, we pledge 
our three countries to the following seven-point action plan: 
 
The creation of a North American customs union with the free flow of goods and services among us and 
a common external tariff;* 
 
The establishment of a North American Border Pass that will facilitate the free movement of our 
respective nationals subject to clearly defined economic and security parameters; 
 
The establishment of a single continental energy market with the free movement of all energy products; 
 
The establishment of environmental standards and regulations compatible across our three countries; 
 
The establishment of an integrated continental innovation strategy that will marshal the closest possible 
cooperation among our industrial, scientific and educational communities; 
 
The establishment of an integrated ground, air and sea transportation network linking our three 
countries; and 
 
The creation of a North American Joint Economic Commission to administer the integration process and 
to resolve disputes. 
 
The title of my paper contains the words “beating the odds” in recognition of the widely held view that 
moving towards a much more integrated North America faces overwhelming odds.  And yet we know 
from experience that where the benefits of change are manifestly positive to the body politic, change 
can be achieved.  The vital ingredient, of course, is leadership.  Without underestimating the complexity 
of this undertaking, I believe that joint action this year by Presidents Obama and Nieto and Prime 
Minister Harper can start the ball rolling in a serious way.   
 
In asking this of our political leaders, we as private citizens have a vital duty to fulfill as well.  The North 
America we envision will never come to be without the vigorous engagement of activists from all three 
countries working closely together.  This Symposium provides an excellent platform for reaching out for 
the compelling “big idea” that beckons from just over the horizon. 
 
The benefits of a customs union in reducing the impact and in some cases the relevance of internal 
borders for economic purposes is very significant.  A customs union with a common external tariff would 
also necessitate greater synergies among Canada, Mexico and the United States in the exercise of 
external trade and investment policies.  The engagement of all three countries in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement and steps by Canada and the United States to pursue closer links with the 
European Union (as Mexico has already achieved), pave the way for a beneficial North American 
“strategic convergence” linked to both the Pacific and Atlantic.  
 
 
SETTING THE STAGE – THE ISSUES 
ROBERTA S. JACOBSON 
 
I would venture that most participants in the Border Symposium have been thinking about North 
America for a long time, and I am grateful for this community of practitioners and thinkers.  This year I 
have been heartened, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, by the 
growing number of academics, economists, journalists, and political figures who recognize and highlight 
North America’s critical role in the changing global economy – and its contribution to economic 
prosperity here in the United States.  Recent opinion articles have highlighted North America’s potential.  
A great diplomat and friend of North America, Ambassador John Negroponte, joined by Representative 
Kay Granger and my former colleague, Ambassador Charles Shapiro, wrote in the San Diego Union-
Tribune that “rebalancing our global priorities will prove incomplete without a renewed commitment to 
our North American neighbors.  The Mexican and Canadian economies are not only our largest export 
markets, but also joint production platforms.  We build goods together, and we must do more to 
advance cross-border trade.”  In the Washington Post, former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers 
included North American energy as one element of a jobs-centered “Growth Agenda We Need.”  To 
achieve the greatest economic and environmental benefits, Summers emphasized that “the 
transformation of the North American energy sector needs to be accelerated.” 
 
North America’s Role in the Global Economy 
This resurgence of interest in North America’s role, two decades after the passage of NAFTA in 1993, 
should not surprise anyone.  As we continue to emerge from the economic downturn, our three deeply 
integrated economies – often called the “North American platform” – are key to the competitiveness of 
our hemisphere in the global economy.  The trade and investment statistics are well known and 
impressive:  Canada, the United States, and Mexico have the largest and most integrated trading 
relationship in the world, a testament to generations of hard-working, innovative citizens.  We are more 
than just good neighbors; we are partners in an integrated enterprise whose success in the larger world 
depends on our successful collaboration with one another.  In some ways, our continent’s “new” 
economy will look “old,” as rising wages in Asia spark a revival of manufacturing in North America.  Our 
leader-level border initiatives – 21st Century Border Management with Mexico and Beyond the Border 
with Canada – and our trusted cargo shipper programs facilitate the secure, efficient, rapid flow of 
goods that is crucial to North America’s economic competitiveness.  In the global marketplace, all three 
countries are looking to the Pacific Rim – both the American side and the Asian side – as important 
markets for the future.  All three governments have joined negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership 
– an ambitious, high-standard, regional trade and investment agreement among 11 nations – 
recognizing that the Pacific region includes some of the world’s fastest-growing economies, and nearly 
40 percent of world trade.  The TPP will allow our manufacturers to draw on the existing supply chains 
fostered by NAFTA to export goods to the other eight TPP countries and their 200 million consumers. 
 
Energy 
As with trade, changes are under way in the North American energy sector.  U.S. energy consumption 
historically has outstripped production, making the continent as a whole a net oil importer.  Given our 
new understanding of the natural resource endowments of the United States and its neighbors, it now 
appears that North America has the potential to become energy self-sufficient – or even to become a 
net energy-exporting region.  Canada has the third largest proven oil reserves in the world, 11 percent of 
the global total, due to its oil sands deposits.  Although recent years have seen a fall in Mexican oil 
production, Mexico’s substantial remaining oil and gas reserves can be developed with additional capital 
and expertise.  President Peña Nieto has made energy reform a priority for his administration.  If he is 
successful, the expected oil and gas production growth in all three countries will further strengthen 
North America’s energy security.  For our part, the Obama Administration looks forward to 
implementing a U.S.-Mexico trans-boundary hydrocarbons agreement that will benefit both countries by 
facilitating oil and gas exploration and development in the Gulf of Mexico and strengthening regulatory 
cooperation.  The emphasis all three countries have placed in recent years on renewable forms of 
energy – from expanding wind and hydropower in Canada to solar energy in Mexico – will further 
strengthen our energy security and create new business opportunities. 
 
The North American Leaders’ Summits 
The creation of the North American Leaders’ Summit has hastened North American integration.  Since 
the first summit in 2005, the two presidents and the prime minister have met about every year.  
Trilateral cooperation initially focused on security and prosperity, particularly on how to increase 
economic integration and trade while strengthening our common security in the post-September 11 
context.  Today, our North American partnership has extended into new areas, including regulatory 
cooperation, health, and emergency management.  The leaders also discuss security challenges in the 
Western Hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.  President Obama hosted his fellow leaders at the 
White House for the most recent North American Leaders’ Summit in April 2012, where they focused on 
regulation, secure supply chains, energy and climate change, continental competitiveness, and citizen 
security, among other topics.  We look forward to the next North American Leaders’ Summit, which 
Mexico will host. 
 
Fruits of Trilateral Cooperation 
Between summits, our governments pursue the objectives laid out by leaders. Our ministers of foreign 
affairs, health, trade, and now defense regularly meet trilaterally, and as these multiple trilateral tracks 
show, the potential for cooperation is vast.  North American economic competitiveness must remain a 
pre-eminent focus for our governments as we continue to grow our economies and add jobs.  
Regulatory cooperation is a component of this work, and has brought together our experts to ensure 
unnecessary differences in our rules do not hinder continental trade.  We should consider ways to 
support our private sectors and trade associations as they cooperate to advocate more effectively for 
their members.  Innovation is essential to North American competitiveness, so we should evaluate 
potential initiatives in the areas of science, technology, and education.  In the areas of energy and the 
environment, we have cooperated on renewables, energy self-sufficiency, and other common 
approaches to climate change, and we have collaborated on positions in the Major Economies Forum 
and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants.  In the area of public 
health, our cooperation with Canada and Mexico has been extensive and fruitful.  Our three countries 
are united in planning for infectious disease outbreaks, especially those of pandemic potential, and we 
continually exercise and improve our trilateral disease communications, surveillance, and response 
mechanisms, taking into account what we have learned from past outbreaks in North America.  Our 
security and defense cooperation has become even closer, and last year our leaders announced a new 
North American dialogue with the countries of Central America.  This year we continue to work together 
to advance the important initiatives that emerged from the 2012 Summit of the Americas, particularly 
the Small Business Network of the Americas, which will create a region-wide network of small-business 
development centers to increase trade opportunities and job growth.  Finally, as we look beyond our 
hemisphere, we consult regularly on global security challenges, and positions in international forums 
and multilateral institutions. 
 
 
Stakeholders 
This is an ambitious agenda, requiring sustained attention at all levels of our governments.  As we 
prepare for the next North American Leaders’ Summit, and as our ministers and other officials continue 
their regular engagement on ways to improve the quality of life in our region, input from experts, 
practitioners, academics, business owners, and others in the private and non-governmental sectors is 
valuable.  Some observers, such as Professor Robert Pastor at American University, have been vocal 
advocates of the “North American idea” for many years.  Others are just beginning to focus on North 
America’s potential, as global economic factors change, long-held views erode in the face of new 
realities, and new possibilities for engagement emerge.  Practical feedback from stakeholders, and input 
from North Americans across all walks of life on new areas for collaboration, are essential as the three 
governments capitalize on the evolving global economy, deepen cooperation, and ensure a more secure 
and prosperous life for all our citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BORDER AND REGULATORY REFORM:  STARTING AT STREET LEVEL 
COLIN ROBERTSON 
 
For a succinct aspiration of Canada-US relations, the best and, probably most repeated, summary was 
then delivered by John F. Kennedy to a Joint Session of the Canadian Parliament in May, 1962, when he 
said: “Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. 
And necessity has made us allies.”   
 
What is less cited is the next line: “Those whom nature hath so joined together, let no man put 
asunder.”  
 
Here the rhetoric does not match reality, especially since the imposition of security measures along the 
border in the wake of 9-11.  
 
In practical terms, there are now about four times as many guards and inspectors on the northern 
border today than there were on September 10, 2001. Austerity and sequester may reduce these 
numbers slightly but, for the foreseeable future, gone are the days of the ‘open door’ and ‘Pass Friend’.  
Congress has obliges these agents to inspect both people and good entering the United States. Then 
there are the drones and other technological devices designed to detect movement along the 49th 
parallel.  
 
Does the threat justify the deployment of resources? No.  
 
The Canadian side has made comparable investments for its part to create a ‘perimeter’ – a word once 
verboten – around North America. If you are not already a citizen then there is a good chance that you 
will be asked to provide some sort of biometric if you enter the perimeter. We share passenger lists for 
those travelling by air and sea.  
 
Our migration control policies, certainly in terms the security prism through which we filter prospective 
visitors, students and immigrants, are closely aligned.  
 
If you are a citizen and want ‘fast-pass’ access (i.e. NEXUS) then you voluntarily provide biometric 
information. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies work collaboratively, and through ship-rider 
and other programs, as closely as our perimeter air and maritime defense alliance. Canadian customs 
agents are now armed and there are a lot more of them.   
 
All of this means that there are now entrenched interests – unionized jobs as well as bureaucratic power 
- on both sides of the border whose livelihood depends on enforcement of new security rather than 
trade-based rules.  
 
We can and have repealed tariffs but lifting ‘security’ in an age of anxiety is unlikely.  
This is the real ‘thickening’ of the border and, as the Chinese observed centuries ago, nothing is more 
difficult to break than an ‘iron rice bowl’ especially when it is in defense of the security of the state and 
its citizens.  
 
 
 
So what can we do? 
We start with high favorability towards Canada. Gallup polls consistently place Canada as the nation 
Americans views most favorably – 91% in the February, 2013 survey. 
 
Business on both sides of the border needs to keep pressing their elected representatives for action. We 
need to press home the intellectual argument, voiced by Allan Bersin, Assistant Secretary of 
International Affairs and Chief Diplomatic Officer for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that we 
need to put aside the false choice between security and trade, and to view economic competitiveness 
on continental terms. 
 
The twin initiatives around the Border and Regulatory Cooperation are making progress on everything 
from new NEXUS lines to cargo inspection. While it is mostly beneath the waterline of media attention 
substantial progress towards meeting the commitments is being made and can be checked out on the 
US Embassy website. 
 
Beyond the Borders set up twenty binational port operations committees advisory councils. We should 
look to them and their informal private sector and community advisors to come up with local solutions 
to local problems. In some cases their ideas will have national application.  
 
The ‘smart driver’s license’ was an innovation championed by then Washington Governor Christiane 
Gregoire and British Columbai Premier Gordon Campbell and then advanced by the Pacific Northwest 
Economic Region. Initially, the Department of Homeland Security was against the idea but their grass-
roots efforts that eventually reached Washington, resulted in success.  
 
The framework agreement to make the border more efficient is in place. Real and meaningful progress 
will mostly likely now come through bottoms-up, practical regional innovation starting at street level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DRAMATIC INITIATIVES NEEDED TO PROMOTE FURTHER BILATERAL INTEGRATION 
STEVEN GLOBERMAN 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011, much of the attention of corporate 
executives, policymakers and researchers has focused on the “thickening” of the Canada-U.S. border 
subsequent to a tightening of security procedures. The available evidence, while not completely 
consistent, identifies a post-9/11 border thickening phenomenon that has harmed bilateral trade 
growth.1  Border security procedures have also apparently contributed to a reduction in cross-border 
shopping by tourists.2 The Canadian and U.S. Governments have responded to complaints about 
increased border – crossing costs and delays with several policy initiatives including the Smart Border 
Accord (2001) and Beyond the Border (2011).3  Indeed, there is evidence that the initiatives, particularly 
the implementation of trusted shipper programs such as FAST, have mitigated some of the adverse 
consequences of heightened border security procedures, albeit primarily for companies involved in the 
transportation equipment sector. Hopeful focus has now turned to streamlining and possibly 
harmonizing product regulations as an additional initiative to reduce the costs associated with bilateral 
trade. 
 
The broad claim made here is that post-9/11 border security developments and increased costs and 
complexities associated with the proliferation of customs procedures tied to government regulations, 
while significant, are not really all that important in the grand scheme of increased bilateral integration. 
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that bilateral integration began stalling out well before 2001, the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) notwithstanding. One might argue that the “low-hanging 
fruit” of tariff reductions, particularly the product economies of scale that were facilitated by tariff 
reductions, were largely harvested before the CUSTA was implemented, and that subsequent bilateral 
policies to promote further integration have amounted to fiddling at the margin, particularly in light of 
the emergence and growth of China and Mexico as major trading partners with the United States. In this 
context, serious discussion of bilateral integration initiatives going forward must encompass 
controversial policies including the elimination of all existing barriers to foreign direct investment, and 
the creation of a fully integrated labor market, especially for professional and technical workers. 
 
Some Data 
While it is impossible in this presentation to provide a comprehensive discussion of bilateral economic 
integration over the past two decades, it is possible to provide some selective and provocative data 
which support a contention that the Canadian and U.S. economies may be less fully integrated today (at 
least relative to the sizes of the two economies) than they were in 1990, and that security-related 
developments aren’t the main explanation. 
                              
1
 For some statistical evidence and a review of other relevant studies, see Globerman and Storer (2009). Sands 
(2009) offers a detailed identification and assessment of the border policy environment. 
2
 See Ferris (2010). 
3. On the other hand, the Western Hemisphere Travel Plan, implemented in phases beginning in 2007, is seen as 
increasing the costs associated with cross-border tourism, particularly same-day visits. See, for example, Bradbury 
(2013).  
  
 
 
One broad measure of economic integration is the degree to which North American companies have 
developed and deepened cross-border supply chains. Stephen Blank (2010), among others, has 
identified this phenomenon as a manifestation of the two countries “making things together.” While it is 
difficult to quantify the extent and nature of cross-border supply chain activities, one relevant proxy 
measure is the magnitude of bilateral trade in intermediate goods.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
total bilateral intermediate goods’ trade as a percentage of total bilateral trade (net of fuel products in 
both cases) was actually higher in 1990 than in 2010 (Globerman and Storer, 2011). 
 
Another broad measure of cross-border integration of production, and of industrial clustering more 
generally, is the degree to which bilateral trade is intra-industry in nature. Intra-industry trade (IIT) 
measures trade in goods within industries rather than across industries and reflects the importance of 
product specialization as a driver of bilateral trade. In the 1970s, Canadian economists in particular 
argued that the major benefits of freer bilateral trade would arise from increased product-level 
economies of scale associated with cross-border product specialization. Such specialization was, indeed, 
a major and planned consequence of the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact of 1965, and IIT was an increasingly 
large share of total bilateral trade throughout the 1970s and 1980s; however, IIT as a share of total 
bilateral trade was virtually unchanged when comparing 1990 (45%) to 2000 (44%), and in 2011, it was 
lower (at 41%) than in either of the earlier years (Globerman and Storer, 2013). 
 
Even very broad measures of the value of goods crossing the Canada-U.S. and the number of visitors 
crossing the border suggest that closer integration of the two economies began petering out years ago. 
For example, U.S. real exports to Canada in 2011 were lower than in 2000, while U.S. real imports from 
Canada in 2011 were only 8% higher than in 2000 (Globerman and Storer, 2011). In terms of tourism and 
cross-border shopping, the number of Canadian visitors to the U.S. peaked in 1991 at approximately 
73.4 million. In 2009, when the exchange rate was approximately the same value as in 1991, only 36.4 
million Canadians travelled across the border.4  Similarly, the number of American visitors to Canada 
declined over the same period from 28.2 million in 1991 to 14.9 million in 2009. 
 
While my discussion is focused on Canada-U.S. economic integration, my sense is that these broad 
conclusions also apply to economic integration between Mexico and the United States.  
 
Assessment 
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to what appears to be a long-run hiatus in the degree of 
economic integration between Canada and the United States. As mentioned above, a number of 
researchers have highlighted the growth of China as a trading nation as one reason for the hiatus. 
Simply put, Chinese trade with Canada and the U.S. displaced some bilateral trade. 
 
Another plausible, albeit less well discussed reason is the growing importance of services in the North 
American economy. Of particular relevance is the growth of services that are financed by government 
with health care as the primary example. In 1970, health care expenditures were about 7% of GDP in the 
U.S. By 2008, health care expenditures accounted for around 16% of GDP in the U.S. with over 50% of 
health care financed by major government programs, notably Medicare and Medicaid.  The relative 
growth of health care was somewhat smaller in Canada. In 1970, the share of total GDP accounted for 
by health care expenditures was approximately 7% and increased to around 10.5% in 2008. Most health 
                              
4
 The data are from Bradbury (2012). Obviously, individual Canadians, and Americans for that matter, made 
multiple border crossings. 
care in Canada is funded by government.  There is little direct or indirect trade in health care services, in 
part because patients using government funded insurance to pay for health care services have limited 
authority or incentive to shop for better quality or lower priced health care in foreign jurisdictions.  The 
higher education sector is also geographically balkanized by, among other things, differential tuition 
between in- state (or province) students and foreign students. Licensure and other regulatory 
restrictions, visa requirements and other institutional differences make it very difficult for medical 
doctors, academics and other professionals linked to these prominent sectors to provide services 
outside their home countries. 
 
In short, a substantial and growing share of the North American economy consists of services that are 
directly or indirectly isolated from any meaningful integration in the form of either trade or direct 
investment.  Many (albeit not all) medical services are currently untraded because the costs of shopping 
for and acquiring the services are high relative to geographic differences in prices and/or the quality of 
those services; however, this situation might well change with the growth of telemedicine and other 
innovations. Certainly online educational services are a growing phenomenon, as are in-residence 
degree programs where students spend individual semesters at different but affiliated universities. The 
limitations on the migration of health care service providers, educators and the like between the two 
countries are legal and regulatory in nature. The elimination of those mobility barriers would likely 
promote increased cross-border shopping for health care, education and other publicly funded services 
as consumers on both sides of the border became more aware of potential service offerings on the 
other side.  
 
To imagine a system where governments gave vouchers to citizens to acquire health care or educational 
services anywhere in North America is virtually science fiction at the present time. Certainly, differences 
between the two countries in the real costs of those services pose a huge political hurdle, particularly 
for governments in the “low-cost” country, although meaningful geographic integration of the markets 
for those services would contribute to some convergence in local prices. To the extent that North 
American governments are simply unwilling to consider initiatives that facilitate cross-border shopping 
for economically important publicly funded services, they are not really serious about promoting 
bilateral integration in the 21st century.  
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CROSS-BORDER AND NORTH AMERICAN COOPERATION 
ON BORDER AND TRANS-BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE 
GEOFFREY HALE 
 
The continued growth of trade and integrated supply chains within North America is heavily dependent 
on ongoing improvements in transportation systems and other forms of critical infrastructure linking the 
three countries and facilitating greater efficiencies and environmental sustainability in managing 
sectoral and regional interdependence in each country.  
 
Many industries operate on a North American or broader international scale that foster varying degrees 
of interdependence and intervulnerability -- the mutual vulnerability of interests in each country to 
political, economic, and natural/environmental shocks in neighboring jurisdictions.5 The notion of 
“protecting critical infrastructure” is merely one dimension of the effective operation of interrelated 
physical, technological, and administrative systems necessary to enable secure and efficient flows of 
trade and travel across national borders. However, these systems function in a context of extensive 
sectoral diversity, multiple and often asymmetrical (federal / state / provincial) jurisdictions in each 
country with corresponding differences in legal and regulatory requirements between and within the 
nations of North America. 
 
This paper addresses the conference organizers’ question: “how can we continue to ensure that we 
effectively process and promote the flow of legitimate travel and trade across the borders while 
safeguarding and maintaining our individual and shared infrastructure, assets and facilities?” 
 
Defining Critical Infrastructure 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines critical infrastructure as “the assets, systems, and 
networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, natural economic security, public health and 
safety, or any combination thereof.”6 Canada’s National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, released in 
2009, defines “CI” as “those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and 
assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or 
economic well-being of Canadians or the effective functioning of governments in Canada.”7  
 
Presidential directives have established 18 sectoral policy councils in the United States, most of which 
draw upon private sector as well as relevant governmental expertise. Comparable policies in Canada 
have established 10 sectoral policy councils – several of which are heavily dependent on the consensual 
negotiation of policy frameworks with provincial and territorial governments with varying degrees of 
policy capacity and effective autonomy. Up to 85 percent of critical infrastructure in each country is  
                              
5
 Charles Doran Fin (1984), Forgotten Partnership: Canada-US Relations Today (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press), 8, 53-66; Geoffrey Hale (2011), “Nobody’s Partner: Canada and Congress,” in Greg Anderson and 
Christopher Sands, eds., Forgotten Partnership Redux: Canada-US Relations in the 21
st
 Century (Amherst, NY: 
Cambria Press), 269-301. 
6
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2012), “Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Month,” 
(Washington, DC: December); online at: www.dhs.gov/cipr-month-2012; accessed 8 January 2013. 
7
 Public Safety Canada (2009). National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure (Ottawa); online at: 
www.publicsafety.ca.ca/prg/ns/ci/_fl/ntnl-eng.pdf; accessed 8 January 2013; see also Graham, Canada’s Critical 
Infrastructure. 
owned and operated by the private sector or by provincial, state and/or quasi-governmental authorities. 
As a result, these policy frameworks – and the ways in which they are reflected in or integrated with the 
operations of critical infrastructure – can vary widely from one sector to another. In addition, very 
different regulatory structures in the United States and Canada generally ensure that cooperation on 
critical infrastructure planning and protection is subject to varying domestic political and legal 
requirements in each country. Historically, this reality has been even more evident in constraining cross-
border cooperation between the United States and Mexico.  
 
Even in sectors in which national or federal governments have primary jurisdiction, such as border-
related infrastructure, the development of cooperative bilateral or trilateral policies are heavily 
dependent on the extent to which specific government agencies, as well as regional/local economic, 
social and political interests perceive their own interests to be positively (rather than negatively) 
associated with the development of cooperative and complementary policies. As a result, framing 
effective policies for the development, operation, renewal and protection of border infrastructure – as 
with other forms of critical infrastructure – requires an awareness of similarities and differences in 
operational conditions and requirements along U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders.  
 
Northern and Southern Borders: Similarities and Differences 
Border infrastructure on the U.S. northern and southern borders differs significantly in at least five 
major ways:  
 the number and geographic dispersion of border crossings; 
 differences in the nature and intensity of traffic flows; 
 relative traffic concentration on land borders; 
 regularity and seasonality of traffic flows; 
 variations in levels and types of border enforcement. 
 
There are 121 U.S. land border crossings with Canada along a 5,525 mile border, 3,987 miles with the 
lower-48 states, compared 47 with Mexico, including a recently opened automated crossing, along a 
1,969 mile border.   
 
Infrastructure and related services along the U.S.-Canada border are organized to facilitate local border 
crossings by area residents, many of whom have developed a “borderlands” culture of extensive 
interaction and interdependence, even in relatively remote areas of western and northern Canada. For 
example, 69.4 percent of the 85 DHS reporting areas8on the U.S.-Canada border reported fewer than 
500 daily passenger vehicle crossings in 2011, accounting for 8.7% of such crossings. In addition, 66.3 
percent of DHS reporting areas reported fewer than 50 daily truck crossings in 2011 – and 5.1% of 
overall truck crossings on the northern border. 
 
By contrast, security measures on the U.S.-Mexican border funnel traffic through a much smaller 
number of ports-of-entry, mainly located in or close to major urban areas. Only 1 of the 25 DHS 
reporting areas on the U.S.-Mexican reported fewer than 500 daily passenger vehicle crossings in 2011, 
accounting for 0.02% of such crossings; only 3 of 18 reporting areas had fewer than 50 daily truck 
crossings accounted for 0.5% of U.S.-bound crossings.  
 
                              
8
 Reporting areas in more densely populated areas may involve more than one port-of-entry – e.g. the Buffalo-
Niagara and Detroit-Windsor corridors. 
a) Differences in the Nature and Intensity of Traffic Flows 
Trends in cross-border travel by individuals across the land borders with Canada and Mexico have been 
even steeper than reductions in passenger vehicle traffic noted in Table 1, dropping 40.6% and 41.2% 
respectively between 2000 and 2009 – although entries from Canada had recovered to 65.7% of 2000 
levels by 2011, compared with a further decline to 46.3% from Mexico.  
 
However, these aggregate statistics mask significant regional differences in trends and volumes of cross-
border travel and truck shipments on both borders – particularly since the end of the 2008-09 recession. 
Personal vehicle traffic increased 18.4% on the U.S. northern border in 2009-11, despite falling even 
more rapidly than traffic from Mexico between 2000 and 2009. Northbound traffic from Mexico 
dropped an additional 13.0% during the same period.  
 
Table 1: What effects from economic recovery since 2009? 
 
 Passenger Vehicles % chg  Trucks % chg 
2000 2009 2011 
2009-
11 
 2000 2009 2011 
2009-
11 
U.S.-Canada Total 100.0 72.3 85.6 + 18.4  100.0 71.2 77.9 +  9.4 
* East of Lakehead 100.0 66.1 73.1 +10.6  100.0 69.2 76.0 +8.1 
* West of Great Lakes 100.0 92.5 125.9 +36.1  100.0 78.7 85.0 +9.8 
U.S.-Mexico Total 100.0 76.2 66.3 -13.0  100.0 113.4 108.4 +13.4 
* California 100.0 85.2 79.2 -7.0  100.0 108.1 107.6 +8.1 
* Texas 100.0 70.7 57.7 -18.4  100.0 116.4 106.7 +16.4 
* Arizona 100.0 71.7 65.2 -9.1  100.0 103.1 103.0 +3.1 
* New Mexico 100.0 170.3 150.5 -11.6  100.0 181.4 220.9 +21.8 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics; author’s calculations. 
 
By contrast, truck traffic has increased on both borders since 2009 – 13.4% from Mexico and 9.4% from 
Canada. However, above average growth in “inbound” U.S. truck traffic is notable in New Mexico (21.8% 
- from a small base), Michigan (17.4%), Texas (16.4%), Montana (14.4%), Minnesota (11.6%) and Idaho 
(11.3%). 
 
One major implication of these diverse patterns is the need for different regional planning processes, as 
recognized by the U.S.-Mexico 21st Century Border Management process initiated in 2010, and in the 
need for different strategies for the effective management of major regional ports-of-entry and smaller 
(and more remote) ports – as recognized in the U.S.-Canada Border Action Plan of December 2011.9 
 
b) Relative traffic concentration (Land Borders) 
The seven (28%) busiest U.S.-Mexico border crossing areas processing more than 10,000 passenger 
vehicles daily accounted for 71.2% of U.S.-bound passenger vehicle traffic and 84.8% of U.S.-bound truck 
traffic. The six (7.1%) busiest U.S.-Canada border crossing areas (with 3,000 passenger vehicles or more 
                              
9 
United States and Canada Beyond the Border Action Plan: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness – Action Plan (Washington and Ottawa: U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Privy Council 
Office, Government of Canada, 11 December 2011), 17-18; online at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/wh/us-
canada-btb-action-plan.pdf. 
daily) accounted for 54.7% of U.S.-bound vehicle traffic and 71.1% of U.S.-bound truck traffic (see Table 
3).  
 
Although this concentration of traffic points to the importance of cross-border cooperation in 
developing both capital funding and operational strategies that focus a larger share of available 
resources on the busiest crossings – as with the Canadian government’s “Gateway Strategy” of recent 
years, the highly regionalized nature of much border traffic also suggests the importance of ensuring 
that investments in border modernization also flow to crossings which account for a disproportionate 
share of traffic in their respective regions.  
 
c) Regularity / Seasonality of Traffic Flows  
Most U.S.-Mexico border crossings are characterized by very limited monthly variations in passenger 
vehicle traffic, with a standard deviation of 5.8% in monthly averages, along with modest variations in 
truck traffic – suggesting relatively high volumes of local and other regular users. Only 4 of 25 reporting 
areas report standard deviations of more than 10% in passenger vehicle or truck traffic. 
 
U.S.-Canada border crossings are characterized by a much greater range of seasonality. Major regional 
crossings along the Michigan-Ontario border, Pacific Coast region, the Maine-New Brunswick border, 
and the Alberta-Montana border are characterized by limited seasonal volatility (less than 20 percent 
for passenger vehicles; less than 10 percent for trucks). However, some regionally significant crossings 
and many smaller border crossings are characterized by much higher levels of seasonality. 
 
d) Enforcement Actions 
Enforcement levels along the U.S. southwestern border with Mexico border have always been 
substantially higher than on its northern border with Canada. Tighter border and workplace 
enforcement since 2000 and a substantial decline in illegal immigration since the 2008-09 recession 
have been noticeable on both borders – although the discrepancy between enforcement action at ports 
of entry between the two borders has usually been significantly less than in enforcement actions against 
non-U.S. citizens in other sectors. 
 
Recommendations 
The most important priority for the strengthening and protection of border infrastructure is for all three 
governments to focus on the implementation and extension of current bi-national border modernization 
initiatives: the U.S.-Canada Beyond-the-Border Action Plan and the U.S.-Mexico 21st Century Border 
Management process. The agendas and stakeholder networks of the two processes are complementary 
in some areas, but are also sufficiently distinctive in engaging issues specific to each border and border 
region to warrant the continued development of their separate agendas. 
 
Specific recommendations for improving infrastructure management include:  
 The development of clear parameters for prioritizing investments in each sector, involving both 
national and bi-national collaborative processes; 
 The development of innovative approaches for internal and cross-border funding partnerships 
to provide increased leverage for federal funding in each country;  
 The development of incentives for more efficient use of resources including targeted user pay 
methods, congestion pricing, and sharing of ‘best practices’ in traffic management and 
conservation techniques; 
 Clear deadlines and regular reporting mechanisms to provide greater transparency and 
operational accountability, and provide mechanisms for the sharing of best practices (“retail 
metrics” as well as “systems metrics”)10  among stakeholders on both borders. 
 
It should be recognized that the use of such methods are part of a broader toolkit for the effective 
management of border infrastructure and related systems that require adaptation to the specific 
circumstances of individual projects and ports-of-entry.   
 
Implementation of promised land-preclearance pilot projects on the U.S.-Canada border is a vital 
complement to the ongoing modernization and efficient management of border infrastructure – 
especially in areas with locational constraints on expanding border facilities. Officials of both 
governments should seek creative approaches to the challenges of managing different border settings, 
and reconciling differences in each country’s legal requirements and immunities which have created 
barriers to more effective cooperation in this area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________ 
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INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE STRATEGIES  
FOR MAJOR LAND CROSSINGS 
DONALD ALPER 
 
 
Problem and Context 
The enormous volume of cross border trade and people flows is a major economic driver in North 
America. The economic data, widely known, is powerfully impressive and will not be repeated here. 
What is perhaps less widely understood are the ways North American economic flows relate to border 
infrastructure, particularly major land ports of entry which handle most commercial and people 
transactions? Key aspects of these relationships are discussed below: 11  
 
Funneling of Freight Flows: Both Canada and Mexico are leading import and export markets for the US. 
Trucking is by far the dominant surface mode for transporting goods, which means most trade flows 
through land ports. Only with regard to imports from Canada to the US does the rail mode make up 
more than one-sixth of the surface borne freight. Water borne and air modes make up a very small 
portion of the total. Simply put, cross border trade among all three countries is overwhelmingly 
dependent on the movement of freight-bearing trucks traversing land ports of entry.  
 
The vast preponderance of cross border flows is handled at a small number of ports. Thirteen ports 
handle 85% of cross border freight flows, which means that the other 93 ports handle just   15% of the 
total flows.  Overall, ninety-five percent of the trade that crosses the two land borders is accommodated 
by just 20 ports. At the Canada-US border, five of the eight largest crossings are bridges.  If cross-border 
trade vitality is dependent on well-functioning bridges, then the incapacitation of one or more of these 
bridges is a serious threat to Canada-US trade. The problem is compounded by the relatively long 
distances that would have to be traveled to cross the border at alternative sites. From a critical 
economic infrastructure perspective, a relatively small number of ports should be the primary focus of 
efforts to ensure port infrastructure resiliency. 
 
Paramount Role of Key States in Cross-Border Trade 
On the southern border, California and Texas serve as major trip beginning points and endpoints for 
cross border trade. Texas is the origin of 82 per cent and 86 per cent respectively of the exports moving 
south through El Paso and Hidalgo. California is the origin of 92 per cent of exports, and the destination 
of 86 per cent of imports flowing through Otay Mesa. On the northern border, no state plays such a 
commanding position in sourcing or receiving cross border trade.  However, California and Washington 
State are highly significant beginning and end points for trade spanning the west coast corridor and 
traversing the northern border at Blaine. Similarly, Michigan, Pennsylvania and New York all are major 
source and destination states for freight crossing at ports of entry in Detroit, Buffalo and Champlain. 
Ports of entry are closely linked to the economies of the states in which they are located. For this  
___________________ 
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 Data and figures are taken from Davidson, David and Austin Rose, “Cross Border Freight Flows at the Two Land 
Borders.” Border Policy Brief (Volume 6, No. 1), published by the Border Policy Research Institute, Western 
Washington University, Winter, 2011, retrievable at http://www.wwu.edu/bpri/publications/border-policy-briefs-
2011.shtml. All the figures use 2009 data from the North American Transborder Freight Database, maintained by 
the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, retrievable at 
http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/ 
 
reason, states have a major stake in the efficiency of these ports and state governments, in coordination 
with their cross border neighbors, should take the lead in infrastructure planning and resiliency.  
 
North-South Trade Corridors 
A close analysis of freight flows reveals a mid-continent region heavily associated with manufacturing. 
Integrated manufacturing supply chains extend from Ontario and Quebec, through the Midwest to 
industrial and manufacturing zones in the Mexican borderlands. Detroit and Laredo serve as “bookends” 
for this important corridor. Large border states—Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York and Texas account 
for a very large proportion of exports and imports traversing the northern and southern borders. A 
similar pattern is found on the west coast where north-south trade flows through key ports in California 
(Otay Mesa) and Washington (Blaine). All three countries have a strong stake in the maintenance of 
efficient north-south corridors which are dependent on well-functioning land ports of entry that serve as 
gateways to them.  
 
Recent Canada-US Border Frameworks 
Border frameworks since 2010 have made trade facilitation and protection of critical infrastructure 
central to the strategic mission of homeland security12
Specifically, the Beyond the Border Action Plan (BtBAP) and the Northern Border Strategy (NBS) stress 
themes aimed at enhancing cross border trade and commerce, and facilitating greater collaboration on 
public safety and resiliency. One of three strategic objectives in the NBS, released in June 2012, is to 
“ensure community safety and resiliency before, during, and after incidents, including terrorist attacks 
and natural disasters (NBS, 13).” The NBS refers to the importance of safe and secure border 
communities to the nations’ economies, and states that one of the strategic objectives of DHS is to 
“enhance the ability of communities to recover quickly and resume essential services and economic 
activity in a timely fashion (NBS, 15).” Part IV of the BtBAP points to the need to “mitigate the impacts of 
disruptions on communities and the economy by managing traffic in the event of an emergency at 
affected border crossings (BtBAP, 29).” Since publication of the BtBAP, DHS and Public Safety Canada 
have released the guide, Considerations for United States-Canada Border Traffic Disruption 
Management (December 2012), that outlines best practices for land border traffic management to 
support resumption of business activity at the border following an emergency.    
 
These recent border frameworks are also important for how they conceptualize borders.  The NBS 
articulates three different interrelated conceptions of borders—as jurisdictional lines and physical 
checkpoints; as secure flows; and as shared communities and infrastructure (NBS, 7).  The latter two 
conceptions highlight important commercial and sociological aspects of borders.  From this perspective, 
borders have critical transactional functions as connectors of economies, people, communities and 
infrastructure. Strategies for securing and managing borders and border environments are guided by 
federal governments pursuing national security missions, but their efforts must be meshed with the  
________________ 
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 DHS’ Quadrennial Homeland Security Report, released in 2010, wove trade and commerce functions with the 
traditional primary focus on combating terrorism. “we must work with our international partners and with the 
private sector to prevent the exploitation of the interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems 
that move people and commerce throughout the global economy and across our borders. At the same time, we 
must also work with those same partners to ensure the security and resilience of those systems in order to 
expedite and reduce unnecessary encumbrances to lawful trade and trade that may impair economic vitality. 
DHS. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, February 20, 2010. 
 
realities of communities, regions and states where shared community, commercial and infrastructure 
concerns are most manifest.  
 
In particular, given the economic and social importance of border crossings, border traffic flow 
strategies are key elements in critical border infrastructure planning and resilience. In the BC-
Washington region (as in other cross border regions) there is strong interest in developing disaster 
commerce resumption/recovery strategies to ensure cargo and other commerce can cross the border 
during and after an incident.1 3 Such goals are implied in emergency management protocols, but actual 
operational plans such as dedicated special lanes or systems for quickly prioritizing freight movements 
have not materialized. 
 
Recent Efforts in the Pacific Northwest 
The Pacific Northwest has been a focal point of many initiatives involving border security and critical 
infrastructure planning in recent years, including pilot projects spelled out in the Beyond the Border 
Action Plan. The region, home of the Enhanced Drivers’ License (EDL) and the first trusted traveler 
program (PACE), is well known as an incubator of border policy innovation. The region has a long 
standing Pacific Northwest Emergency Planning Arrangement (PNEMA) going back to 1998, linking the 
states of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, and the province of British Columbia and The Yukon. 
PNEMA’s mission is coordination of emergency preparedness, response and recovery through a regional 
approach. As a proven and effective regional binational entity, it is viewed nationally as a model for 
broader North American mutual aid agreements.  
 
Security planning for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in Vancouver, British Columbia  
was another model of successful region-led, bilateral security and infrastructure collaboration, involving 
more than 40 Canadian and US federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. An Olympics Security 
Committee, initiated by Washington state officials 4 years before the event, and funded through state-
federal funding partnerships, helped facilitate engagement of federal, state and local officials on both 
sides of the border.  
 
A broader effort to plan for critical infrastructure disruptions throughout the region has been led by the 
Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER) in partnership with several federal agencies.  “Blue 
Cascades” exercises to inform and prepare infrastructure owners, operators and government officials 
and other stakeholders about recovery issues after a disaster, have been held since 2002. Topics 
covered include cyber security, earthquake recovery, pandemics and supply chain resilience. In 2012, 
PNWER was contracted by the US Coast Guard to run the Canada-US Maritime Recovery Strategy pilot 
project that is part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan. The effort resulted in progress toward 
implementing a multi-agency, multi-jurisdiction communications and information sharing protocol and 
identification of specific action steps to improve regional maritime resilience. An important expected 
outcome from this pilot is a maritime recovery annex to the PNEMA, which along with similar 
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 A major research report on developing state-level freight resiliency plans conducted by the MIT Center for 
Transportation and Logistics makes the point that there are important difference between the response to an 
incident and recovery during and after the event takes place. The report defined response as “actions taken 
before, during, or after an incident with the objectives of (1) saving lives, (2) minimizing damage, or (3) enhancing 
long-term recovery. Recovery, on the other hand, are actions taken after an event to return vital economic 
systems to minimum standards (in the short term) and all economic systems to normal or improved levels (in the 
long term)(2008, p. 47). For our purposes, this distinction is important in developing mechanisms to ensure border 
ports of entry remain as functional as possible during natural or manmade disasters. 
agreements in the Great lakes and Atlantic regions could form part of a comprehensive bilateral 
agreement.  
 
A BC-Washington Border Incident Communications Protocol (BICP) for exchanging information in the 
event of incidents leading to border closures was created in 2005.The protocol, partnering federal, 
state/provincial and local transportation and law enforcement agencies, spells out specific notification 
and other information required by agencies initiating, or affected by, a border shut down. As part of the 
implementation of the Bitmap, Canada and the US have jointly published a best practices guide—
Considerations for United States-Canada Border Traffic Disruption Management—to help regional 
authorities develop plans for specific points of entry and conduct cross-border regional exercises. 
 
Although not cross-border in scope, the Washington Department of Transportation (WDOT) joined with 
the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics (2008) to produce a comprehensive report on 
developing a freight resiliency planning process that can be used by any state. The report drew heavily 
from the planning experience in Washington State where, for example, a prioritization scheme 
determines which type of traffic gets preference in the event of road slowdowns or closures.  
 
Summary and Recommendations 
 
DHS has defined its border security mission to encompass shared border infrastructure assets spanning 
cross border communities.  This more expansive conception of border security highlights northern and 
southern border crossings as vital economic and social assets. Protecting and restoring these assets is 
recognized as an important aspect of border management.  
 
Critical border infrastructure planning should be tailored to varied geographical settings, cultural 
dynamics, economies, and regional political assets. It goes without saying that the Canada-US (and US-
Mexico) borders are really several border regions with different vulnerabilities and political capabilities. 
Crossings served by bridges have different requirements than ports accommodated by surface roads. 
Commuters comprise large crossing populations at major southern POEs, but are generally insignificant 
at most northern crossings.  The composition of freight shipments is quite different in the Midwest 
manufacturing corridor compared with the Pacific west region. Cross border institutions and stakeholder 
forums also vary in capabilities and efficacy. All this means that critical infrastructure planning must 
have a strong regional, cross border orientation.  
 
The subnational level should drive critical infrastructure planning, but within a context of partnerships 
involving federal security and public safety entities and private sector stakeholders. State governments 
in particular are well positioned to exert leadership because of the importance of major POEs to states’ 
economies, and the states’ responsibilities for managing and funding transportation systems, law 
enforcement and emergency management entities. On the northern border, state-provincial forums and 
other arrangements have evolved for dealing with regional cross border transportation and safety 
problems. These arrangements can be usefully leveraged as has been the case with the national Joint 
Transportation Executive Committee (JTEC) that is part of the Washington Governor-BC Premier annual 
meetings. 
 
Neutral forums should be created to facilitate engagement of federal and subnational authorities on 
both sides of the border. Several models exist. Port Operation Committees (POEs) set up by the Beyond 
the Border declaration in 2011 could be expanded to include transportation and emergency 
management officials and private sector stakeholders, and tasked to help plan and implement 
contingency planning. Perhaps the most impressive model for this kind of forum is the International 
Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC) in Whatcom County, Washington, which regularly convenes 
cross border government, business and border enforcement entities to promote transportation and 
security improvements for the four border crossings linking Washington State and the Lower Mainland 
of British Columbia.  
 
Strong relationships need to be in place before an emergency or disruption occurs.  Over the years there 
has been considerable investment by both the US and Canada in building a culture of cross border 
collaboration in the Pacific Northwest.  Stakeholders in this region know each other and many public-
private frameworks exist for building and fostering informal relationships.  US security planning for the 
2010 Vancouver Olympics was significantly aided by the existence of a rich web of cross border law 
enforcement and emergency management connections in place prior to the time the respective federal 
governments became fully engaged in Olympics’ planning. Such relationships are vital for building trust 
and opening effective communication channels for navigating different administrative systems and 
overcoming turf issues.   
 
Response and recovery are different.  During the response phase of an emergency or disaster, law 
enforcement and emergency aid personnel are in charge. The mindset is that of apprehension (catch the 
perpetrators) or abate the damage (put out the fire). The recovery phase shifts the focus to resuming 
economic and other cross border activity. Companies, transportation personnel and local officials are 
important for this effort.  Effective contingency plans for POEs would integrate these two phases. 
 
Develop and validate (through exercises) a Pacific Northwest framework for resumption of land border 
commerce at the Cascade border crossings.  Like the Maritime Commerce Recovery pilot, a framework 
for resuming commerce at ports of entry should be developed, attached to the PNEMA and made 
exportable through existing emergency management protocols to other border regions, north and 
south.   
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BORDER SECURITY ISSUE 
DAVID MOLONEY 
 
Security is a touchstone issue when talking about borders. Yet comprehensive border management must 
not only secure the border but also facilitate legitimate movements of goods, services and people.  The 
traditional framing of border management in terms of a trade-off between these two objectives is 
unproductive and misleading. The true challenge is how to enhance border efficiency, which delivers on 
both objectives and is arguably the only way to sustainably deliver on either one. We need to work at 
shifting perceptions and discussions of border management -- at the public, political, bureaucratic and 
operational levels – on to this frame.  The DHS 2012 Northern Border Strategy is explicitly based on this 
preferred premise.  However, making this a day-to-day guide remains a work in progress on both sides 
of the Canada – U.S. border. 
 
Canada and the U.S. have a long-standing bilateral partnership on border management, as do the U.S. 
and Mexico. Both of these partnerships have been increasingly formalized since the mid-1990s.  Canada 
and the US have worked together on the “Shared Border” approach in the 1990s, on the “Smart Border 
Accord” of the 9/11 era, and are working now on the “Beyond the Border Action Plan” that was 
launched in 2011.  The U.S. and Mexico agreed to their own Smart Border Accord after 9/11, and agreed 
to the “U.S.-Mexico 21st Century Border Management Plan” in 2010.  The sole trilateral attempt in this 
space to date has been the “Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America”, from 2005 to 2009. 
These border partnerships have been tailored to the twin challenges of public safety and economic 
competitiveness, in continual evolution as perceptions have evolved of security threats and of economic 
needs and opportunities.  While the security challenges differ between the two borders, the trade 
facilitation objectives of the Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. border partnerships are increasingly similar. 
This should not be surprising as the accelerating flow of goods, services and people among Canada, the 
U.S. and Mexico is creating immense economic benefits for all three countries and is essential to 
maintaining and improving North American competitiveness in a tough global marketplace.  More often 
than not, specific trade facilitation initiatives on one shared border, such as trusted travelers and trusted 
trader programs, build on experience and learning on the other border.   
 
Analysis of trade and travel flows post 9/11 demonstrates quite clearly that an overwhelming focus on 
security outcomes does reduce flows of both commerce and travelers.  Recent analysis also 
demonstrates that the detailed operational parameters of attempts to move towards more efficient 
border management, via trusted trader and trusted traveler programs for example, affect both the 
volumes and the nature of trans-border flows, to the point of affecting business decisions on the 
location and nature of investment and production, as well as decisions on personal travel. 
 
Opportunities/Obstacles 
Much of the security work in the Canada-U.S. border relationship over the last ten years has been 
anchored in broader Canadian and American counter-terrorism efforts, specifically  how Canada and the 
U.S. could better work together to detect, deter and respond to terrorist threats from abroad.  This 
meant (a) strengthening domestic anti-terrorism legislation, including Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, to 
provide more tools to police, intelligence and border agencies; (b) strengthening capacity of public 
safety, intelligence and border agencies; and (c) improving information-sharing.   
 
Fundamentally, however, improve security through more efficient border management going forward 
will come by “pushing the border out”.  This means managing and mitigating the risks inherent in 
enormous and growing flows of people and cargo before they reach the shared border and, increasingly, 
before they reach our shared perimeter. 
 
The 2011 “Canada – U.S. Beyond the Border Action Plan” represents a very significant evolution of 
Canada-U.S. cooperation in this regard, establishing as one of its core building blocks a perimeter 
approach to screening travelers and goods from outside North America, whether they be destined for 
Canada or the U.S. The BTB Action Plan comprises four key pillars: Addressing Threats Early, Trade 
Facilitation and Economic Growth, Cross Border Law Enforcement, and Critical Infrastructure, 
Emergency Preparedness and Cyber security.    
 
The Plan commits, inter alia, to greater information sharing, to working together on addressing the 
threats of homegrown violent extremism, and to building on similarities on visa and document 
requirements, advance passenger requirements and national targeting centers to enhance screening 
methodologies for travelers into North America.  
 
The challenge is to not allow this expanded frontier of active risk management to become an additional 
layer of screening and inspection.  Efficiency requires that we not add elastics and hockey tape to the 
belts, braces and suspenders that have come to typify border management.  Pushing  the  border out 
efficiently means that we share domain awareness and risk assessments, manage and mitigate risk early 
and jointly.  Gather information ahead of time, assess it and then manage flows according to those 
assessments, unless new information changes our assessments.  In sum, screen once, accept twice or 
even three times.  
 
Policy Options 
The Beyond the Border Action Plan is the prime, shared policy lever established by Canada and the U.S. 
to advance not only our shared economic interests but our shared national security objectives in respect 
of   the Canada-U.S. border, recognizing the intertwined nature of our two economies and societies. 
While Canada and Mexico do not share a common border, obviating any imperative to have a bilateral 
border accord, Canada does have fundamental interests in the success of the effective management of 
the U.S.-Mexico border given our security and economic interests in North America.  This argues very 
much in favor of a role for increased trilateral cooperation on specific security issues.  These include:  
sharing of intelligence with U.S. and Mexican authorities on issues related to terrorism and transnational 
crime organizations; working with U.S. and Mexican officials to build on growing military-to-military 
cooperation; and working with US and Mexico to strengthen the public security institutions of Central 
America and Caribbean countries as they combat transnational criminal organizations.  
 
Conclusion 
Canada, the US and Mexico share an integrated market, built on the foundation of NAFTA, which must 
serve as our shared platform to compete in the global economy.  We need to learn from our respective 
experiences in making our borders more open, effective and efficient. 
 
Finally, it is always worth remembering that borders are not a first line of defense, but the last.  Border 
management represents only one component of national security management, which must be 
addressed in a comprehensive fashion: nationally, bilaterally and trilaterally. Appropriate policies, 
strategies and institutions to deal with national security and public safety issues, trust and cooperation 
between agencies in our three countries, and lastly enhanced cooperation on the perimeter are the best 
guarantees of North American security. 
 
THE MEXICO-US LINE. IS SHARED RESPONSIBILITY POSSIBLE? 
ISIDRO MORALES 
 
 
The Dual Function of the US-Mexico Border 
The inception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enhanced and expanded material 
and human mobility across the North American region, legal or not, and challenged cross-border 
governance mechanisms prevailing in the region for dealing with transnational circulation. Parallel to 
the enhanced mobility spurred by regionalization trends, the regional bloc also witnessed a “thickening” 
of inner or outer borders, an overall retooling of strategies and technologies gearing to a redefinition of 
social distances, and the enhancement of deterrence and confinement. It is as though the more mobility 
is exacerbated by the abatement of economic and technological barriers, the more state agencies and 
governments seek to reclassify and differentiate the capabilities of those people and material goods that 
are entitled to move from those who don’t.  
 
However, strategies enhancing mobility or deterrence are not a sign of an “anomaly”; they rather 
complement one another and have become intimately intertwined. The two integrate a sort of 
circulation regime, the goal of which is to exacerbate those flows considered legal and beneficial for 
specific purposes according to states’ policy and political preferences, while at the same time targeting 
undesirable, illegal, or risky movements that must be confined. Within the North American space the 
mobility side of the circulation regime has been earmarked by  NAFTA and the economic 
interdependence exacerbated by the regionalization trend, while the confinement side has been 
epitomized by the prosecution of “illegal” material transactions or “unauthorized” moving of people, 
and after September 11, by “suspicious” and “risky” flows of any kind. The governance of mobility in 
North America is moving rapidly from the enforcement of deterrence to the governance of risk. 
 
Ideally, the NAFTA regime in place since 1994 aimed at building a sort of “borderless economy”, the 
great metaphor dominating the ideology and narrative of global markets. This metaphor reflects well 
the spirit and backbone of the trade regime: to enhance and empower the circulation of goods and 
investment in the hands of firms and markets in order to boost wealth, productivity, and efficiency 
throughout North America, and to discipline state intervention in the economy. Nonetheless, the 
building of this circulation regime had to be accommodated with the reality of political enclosures and 
strategic imperatives of security. The creation of a borderless economic space has remained a metaphor 
since territorial and non-territorial borders were not barred nor banned by the NAFTA agreement. In 
fact it provoked the opposite, i.e. a progressive “securitization” of the Mexico-United States border once 
unauthorized migration and illegal trafficking exacerbated.  
 
The Flaws of the Mobility Regime between Mexico and the US 
According to the Obama administration, the southern border has become more secure than in the past 
20 years. To support this, the US government highlights that the Border Patrol is better staffed than at 
any time since it was created, that investigative resources have escalated, that surveillance mechanism 
have stepped and that “shared responsibility” mechanisms with Mexico have developed. Indeed, Border 
States and cities in the US side are quite secure. While it is difficult to establish the link between 
violence, crime and drug trafficking organizations (DTOS) activities, official data show that crime rates in 
major border US cities have in fact lowered compared to the national average, and that in spite of the 
violence spurred in border Mexican cities there is no evidence of “spillover” violence to the other side of  
 
the line. The border region in the US side is indeed secure: what has become insecure is the Mexican 
side.  
 
However, the question should be raised whether a militarized and barricaded border has helped to 
deter illegal mobility coming from the south. Officially, one of the major goals of the staff, police and 
army based at the US southwest border is to stem and interdict the flow of drugs and illicit proceeds.  
Local and federal agencies normally assess the soundness and success of their activities by measuring 
drug seizures and human apprehensions and deportations. Following those standards, the record of the 
past years looks good: From 2005 to 2010, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine seizures coming 
from Mexico have increased while seizures of cocaine declined. From 1991 to 2000 the amount of 
human apprehensions peaked above 1.6 million people to severely decline to little more than 300 000 in 
2011. But those figures say nothing about drug consumption behavior in the US, or migrants’ recidivism 
to US deportation. The decline in cocaine seizures of the past years means that Americans are 
consuming less of this drug or just substituting it with other drugs, explaining consequently the increase 
in seizures of heroin or marijuana? There are no records attempting to make the connections. Since the 
disruption of drug trafficking coming from Mexico is affecting prices and quality of illegal drugs 
consumed in the US, to what extent this reduces consumption, or simply consumption patterns adapt to 
the new circumstances. Though the Obama administration has accepted the demand side of the 
question, we don’t know to what extent American people is becoming less addicted to illegal drugs. 
 
The case of human smuggling and unauthorized traffic is much complicated. The more barricaded the 
southwest border became, the more illegal aliens trespassed the line. From the early nineties up to 
2007, non-authorized population jumped from 2.5 to peak 12 million. This amount has declined to less 
than 11 million today, but no connection can be established between border deterrence enforcement 
and illegal human mobility. In fact, similar to what happens in drug markets, US demand for cheap, non-
unionized and politically unprotected labor is commanding the cycle of illegal human mobility. The deep 
financial crisis witnessed by the US during 2007-2009 doubtless help to explain de decline of the non-
authorized population. Deportations and a stricter surveillance in working sites explain as well part of 
that decline, but most probably the illegal flow will recover if the US economy witnesses a new boom 
similar to that of the nineties.  
 
And then, of course, we have the “unattended” consequences of a barricaded line. The US border 
remain secure, with no “spillover” violence in border cities in the US side, but it has become highly 
unsafe and violent in key border cities of the Mexican side, i.e. Juárez, Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey. 
Disruption of illegal drugs coming from Mexico, fueled by Mexico’s own strategy to combat drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs) with the army, has spurred violence at the border and in many other 
cities and regions where territorial disputes arise among drug barons. Illegal migrants have become 
more vulnerable to US enforcement measures (assessed by the increase in their death toll), to 
smugglers, and to new risky routes they have to take in order to trespass the line. They also have 
become more stigmatized in the US, as witnessed by the proliferation of xenophobic legislation passed 
by state legislatures.  
 
Furthermore, the thickening of the border has strained US relations with Mexico, making apparent the 
asymmetric conditions on how borders operate. While the trespassing of illicit drugs and people has 
become riskier and more expensive, but impossible to cancel since a demand of drugs and of 
cheap/unprotected labor is fueling the flux, illegal guns and money is being trafficked or smuggled from 
north to south. This illegal money and arms only fuel the violence and military capabilities of DTOs when 
they are combatted by the Mexican army or rival warlords. It is very recently that the US has accepted 
that they are part of the problem but it is not yet clear how a “shared responsibility” will be translated in 
workable solutions. While the Obama strategy on drugs is to reduce consumption and treat it as a public 
health issue, the states of Washington and Colorado have already liberalized the consumption of 
marijuana, and other states seem to band wagon. The US has also become committed to pursue gun 
smuggling into Mexico, but operations such as “Fast and Furious” only highlight the complexity of the 
problem and how unilateral the so-called “shared responsibility” operates. More recently, President 
Obama has invited Congress to make a vote for regulating more severely the gun market in his country, 
but still this is done taking into consideration a raise on fatal shots among US citizens, and not 
considering the security and strategic consequences that an unregulated market has had for Mexicans.   
 
Will Mexico and the US Agree in a Common Definition of Risk? 
After September 11 U.S. border politics rapidly shifted from the sovereignty-centered border game 
of protecting and exercising the monopoly of the state in deciding on the legal transit of “aliens” 
and goods in its territory, to a rather war-centered paradigm in which protection of the homeland, 
not only its borders and territory, but also its population, resources, and all their interconnections 
with the “outside world”, was at stake. This “war-centered” paradigm did not substitute the 
“sovereignty-based” one; they overlap and reinforce each other. The “historically embedded” 
territorial border is still to be protected against illegal aliens and drugs, but the focus shifted to 
those criminal aliens potentially linked to or exploited by terrorist purposes.  
 
It is in this context that “smart borders” were conceived, as moving and changing checkpoints whose 
technology and knowledge-intensive mechanisms for screening and profiling suspicious or risky people 
aims at building a threat assessment for the homeland. According to Washington, “smart borders” and 
transport are intertwined, in the sense that every community in the United States, be it small or large, is 
interconnected with a worldwide transport infrastructure. Harbors, railroads, airports, highways, energy 
grids, virtual networks, and any flow conveying people or commodities are currently considered to be 
part of that “world-wide transportation infrastructure”. In other words, smart borders were not devised 
for deterring and confining peoples or goods, a task accomplished by barricaded lines. The tactical goal 
of these moving, flexible supervision checkpoints is not to interrupt or dislocate, but to enhance mobility 
for helping to differentiate risky movements from those that are not. In contrast with territorial borders 
embedded in historical national narratives and identities, smart borders are constantly moving and 
changing; they could be an embassy or consular premise; they function at customs clearance or 
preclearance; they could be activated when a cargo in a container is being registered in advance; they 
are in airports and aircrafts, in shipping routes and pipelines.  Smart borders have thus the goal to 
promote, by using modern screening technology—digital analysis of fingerprints, irises and other 
biometrics—the “efficient” and “safe” transit of people, goods, and services across the homeland and its 
interconnections.  Framed in those terms, Mexico became a de facto extension of the U.S. homeland 
and regained its strategic position as a “buffer area” whose main goal is to filter any potential threat or 
risk to US security and interests. 
 
Though Hillary Clinton has considered DTOs operating in Mexico as “terrorist insurgencies”, there is no 
evidence of terrorist groups or activities operating in Mexico having as targets US citizens or a part of 
the American territory. Though Janet Napolitano has warned of potential spillover violence at the 
border, towns and cities along the US line remain safe and peaceful. The risk to the US is potential, but 
the way it is combatted has made of Mexico a risky space. The unattended consequence of all this is that 
the Mexican State risks of being “captured” by DTOs interests or becoming devastated by corruption 
and violence triggered by drug barons. Furthermore, Americans should raise the question on how the 
fragmentation of DTOs operating in Mexico is going to modify the way DTOs operate in the US. 
Mexicans should also assess whether it still makes sense to combat DTOs whilst legalization of certain 
drugs, such as marijuana, is progressively legalized in the US.  
 
Some policy options 
Cooperative border games between Mexico and the US should move from a unilateral deterrence 
approach to a shared vision and assessment of what is a common risk for the two nations.  
 
However, Mexico should strengthen the Mexican side of the border in order to anticipate the smuggling 
of guns and bulk money. A replica of the US-made barricaded border is not the alternative (very costly 
and highly inefficient), but the strengthening of cross-border cooperation with US agencies and 
programs in order to trace, in US territory, the illegal mobility moving bound to the southern line. 
 
What is a common threat to both, let alone, the three North American nations? If terrorism and 
terrorist-related activities is the common threat, barricaded lines are useless to cope with the problem. 
The two (three) countries should move for building a common threat assessment framework from which 
specific policy goals and targets should be defined. If DTOs and drug-related violence is the common 
threat, Mexico and the US then should move towards a revisited paradigm on drug abuse, consumption 
and prohibition. As the scientific record suggests, not all illicit drugs are equally dangerous and toxic. 
Tobacco or alcohol could be more harmful to health, if abused, that say, marijuana. The scientific 
evidence and medical gaze should be internalized in the discussion and policy making of the problem.  
 
At present, the “war” against illicit drugs has emphasized the destruction of production and the 
disruption of their mobility, regardless of the changing behavior in consumption, and the changing 
behavior in the global supply. A similar pattern has dominated, although with the differences of the 
case, the mobility of non-authorized people. In the latter case, a bipartisan proposal has been 
announced to the American congress by the Obama administration. The proposal is not to enlarge or 
thicken the border line, but to decriminalize and make more transparent the circulation of people. A 
similar approach should be followed with the circulation of drugs -with all the caveats involved in this 
case. 
 
If the liberalization of marijuana has been initiated at the state or subnational level, the three countries 
of North America should gradually converge on a common approach towards reclassifying the toxicity, 
and consequently the health risk, of psychotropic drugs, in order to top down the level of prohibition 
and bottom up tolerance. 
 
At present, the risk of illicit traffic is being socialized in a discriminatory way. The war on drugs has killed 
drug barons but a great amount of non-criminal citizens. It is time to move part of the risk of drug abuse, 
to the individual abuser. As President Obama has recognized it, at the end of the day drug consumption 
is a public health problem. 
 
In spite of the regional trends that are reshaping the North American landscape, territorial borders will 
persist. Needless to say, however, the debate in which public agencies, officials, social and individual 
stakeholders are involved should shift from the escalation of deterrence to the analysis and assessment 
of common risks, be it local, cross-border regional, North-American or global. 
 
 
 
 
AGREEING ON METRICS OF “BORDER SECURITY”:  A POLITICAL PIPE DREAM 
DAMIEN SIMONNEAU 
 
The problem: In Current Debate over C.I.R., Measuring “Border Security” is a Political Pipe Dream 
In post 9-11 western countries, the dominant security mindset is to securitize immigration. Indeed 
immigration, mostly an economical phenomenon, is constructed through the lens of national security 
and public safety. In the U.S.A., this process began in the late seventies and was accentuated after 9-11. 
For instance, the nexus between security and immigration is validated in the terms of the current 
debate to adopt Comprehensive Immigration Reform - C.I.R. The leaked White House proposal from 
February, 17th emphasized expanding border enforcement even though without seeming to tie it to 
legalization of undocumented immigrants. In the “Bipartisan Framework for C.I.R.” released by the 
‘Gang of 8’ on January, 28, 2013 the prominent pillar is the one dealing with border security stressing 
the contingency of creating paths to citizenship for “unauthorized immigrants” upon securing the 
border. Thus set, it clearly appears that the “enforcement-first” strategy is and will be the dominant 
political strategy to tackle border and immigration issues considered together. This Op-ed will argue that 
discussions on C.I.R. are frozen in this nexus immigration-security where the main debate is how to 
reach an agreed-upon view on border security to open the way to immigration reform. It will overlook 
and criticize the mainstream metric to measure border security (C.B.P. figures) as a contribution to think 
border security ‘out-of-the-box’.  
 
Obstacles and Opportunities: How to Measure Success in Achieving Border Security?  
Immigration trends are mostly based on economic factors as the reduction of the Mexican migration to 
the U.S. exemplified caused in priority by the last recession. Border security depends on perceived 
threats and risks and fundamentally also on who defines it. In the current Federal government, D.H.S. 
controls and is in charge of assessing threats and risks. This importance of perception is a characteristic 
of most security policy and allow for a political appreciation. In the current debate between advocates 
of immigration reform first or enforcement first, bureaucratic and political perceptions of the border 
impact on the evaluation of security. These different perceptions are competing between themselves. 
Local issues relevant and differentiated between each segments or corridors of the border also impact 
on the evaluation.  Local policies such as Arizona ‘attrition through enforcement’ influenced the terms of 
the debate and the national perception of the issue. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer on a statement 
released on January, 28, 2013 explains: “Immigration reform will not succeed unless we have achieved 
effective border security” emphasizing the importance of feeling of security from those living at ‘the 
frontlines’. Her model of success in border security is the sealed Yuma sector. On the other side of the 
political spectrum, Democrats and Janet Napolitano first maintain and claim that the “border has never 
been more secured” in U.S. history. This claim is justified on the record amount of resources dedicated 
over F.Y. 2012 to militarization of the border: 17.9 billion dollars as demonstrated by a recent report by 
the Migration Policy Institute. Currently on the eve of discussion on C.I.R., it is also clear that the main 
showdown between Republicans and Democrats at the Congress has shifted from the question of “does 
the federal government have the ability to achieve border security?” to “how to measure and agree on 
success in border security so as to deal with undocumented legalization?” The problem of the metrics is 
thus particularly relevant but a pipe-dream to divert from solving issues at the border.  
 
Policy Options: C.B.P.’s Metric and its Critics  
The often-cited indicators of progress on border security are C.B.P. statistics. One of the goals of C.B.P. is 
to tackle threats to national security defined as “all types of illegal entries” of people, weapons, drugs 
and contraband. This is measured thank to the different numbers of apprehensions of unauthorized 
migrants, of drugs, money and firearms. The top-priority has been to deny entry to would-be terrorists. 
No reported cases of terrorist attacks in the U.S. that involved passage through the Southwest border 
has been reported which could be considered as a success. Actually, there is a lack of precise measure of 
terror activity except the “Aliens from Special Interest Countries” (ASIC) designation that does not only 
imply that the person is involved with terrorism. This risk is a potential rather than actual nature. 
However, illegal flows of drug continue in significant amounts. CBP officers and agents seized more than 
4.2 million pounds of narcotics across the country in FY 2012. In addition, the agency seized more than 
$100 million in unreported currency through targeted enforcement operations. This steady trend must 
maybe question that the source of the problem of drug smuggling is to be encountered on the side of 
the regular demand emanating from within the U.S. Concerning “illegal entry of unauthorized aliens”, in 
F.Y. 2012, attempts to cross the border illegally totaled nearly 365,000 nationwide, representing a nearly 
50 percent decrease since FY 2008 and a 78 percent decrease from their peak in FY 2000. These metrics 
are not sufficient to analyze the impact of enforcement outcomes. However, political communications is 
based on these figures which need to be more sophisticated. Indeed, C.B.P. is releasing the figures that 
its mother-department D.H.S. comments in a closed circle. For instance, when the flow of 
undocumented immigrants rises, border security advocates declare success because detentions by 
C.B.P. increase too proving the effort deployed by C.B.P. When the flow diminishes, success is also 
declared because detentions correspondingly decrease. Significant improvements in border control 
relies primarily on metrics regarding resource increases and reduced apprehensions levels, rather than 
on actual deterrence measures such as size of illegal flows, share of the flow being apprehended or 
changing recidivism rates of unauthorized crossers. Regarding the decrease of the number of 
apprehensions of undocumented migrants which are mostly debated in C.I.R., many other factors has to 
be taken into consideration such as the effect of the recession, the structural changes in the Mexican 
booming economy next to border enforcement by C.B.P.  Another important point is the fact that these 
figures rely also on a decade of rising enforcement practices, namely more prosecution showing that 
immigration laws are being more strictly enforced today than before. This can be verified in the rising 
number of “removals” rather than “returns”. Figures also have to be clearly specified according to each 
border corridors. For instance, a G.A.O. report released last December examines the apprehensions and 
data B.P. collects to inform changes on border security in the Tucson sector in particular. In Tucson 
sector, the decrease in apprehensions was by 68% from F.Y. 2006 to F.Y. 2011. However, the report 
noted “in the Tucson sector, there was little change in the percentage of estimated unknown illegal 
entrants apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years, and the percentage of individuals 
apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined across the southwest border by 6 
percent from F.Y. 2008 to 2011”, thus showing and concluding that CBP has to ensure to “develop 
milestones and time frames for developing border security goals and measures to assess progress made 
and resource needs”, namely sophisticated statistics. The new B.P. plan for 2012-2016 has still to come 
out with these new milestones, since nothing particular is presented in the new plan.  
 
Two other metrics can also testified on progress of border security. The first one could be the number of 
deaths or recovered human remains in the border areas to measure “unauthorized entries” through 
remote areas. For instance, Coalicion de Derechos Humanos compiled these numbers for the Pima and 
Santa Cruz counties to measure the effectiveness of deterrence. Their figures inform that 179 bodies 
were recovered in 2011-2012, compared to a pick of 282 in 2004-2005 but not really different from 183 
in 2007-2008 or 2010-201. The second one would be the measure of violence on the U.S. side of the 
border as measured by the F.B.I. showing the relatively low level of violence in major U.S. Border cities 
especially El Paso (facing deadly Ciudad Juarez) and San Diego. The metric used and its design tend to 
condition the political speech on border security. Despite global tendencies, everything and its contrary 
can be said politically about border security. A metric can be criticized and not be agreed-upon. Looking 
for an agreement on this at the Congress is a pipe-dream. It is certainly time during this debate on C.I.R. 
to think ‘out of the box’ regarding border security.  
 
Rationale and Recommendations: Alternative Metrics on Border Security or How to Rethink Border 
Security?  
Thinking out-of-the-box in border security is not denying the threats and issues affecting the lives of 
borderland people. Above all, it is a way to disconnect the constructed nexus immigration-security, 
especially in the way it is framed by politicians and Medias thus influencing perception of the border. 
Part of the “unauthorized entries” problem is due to the fact that previous enforcement strategies 
pushed thousands of economic migrants from Mexico and Southward into remote area in Arizona 
especially jeopardizing their life by pushing them in the hands of criminal organizations such as drug 
cartels. Straddling the  borderland allows to envision a global aspect of border-games not only focused 
on U.S. self-defense against perceived “invaders”, and to isolate key factors resulting in the 
“unauthorized crossings” of people, drugs, money and firearms.  
 
The first recommendation for instance would be to tackle the issue of creating way for migrants to enter 
legally otherwise they will continue to cross illegally. Eric Olson and David Shirk in this regard 
recommend creating more legal avenues to enter the country legally by widening the gates with more 
elastic quotas for work visas. This added to a modernization and proper staffing at Ports of Entry would 
allow Border Patrol agents to fully concentrate on activities by drug cartels across border.  Thierry 
Goddard, former Arizona Attorney General, is in favor of targeting functioning criminal organizations 
rather than the migrants arguing that “until the cartels are not eliminated, the border cannot be 
considered secure, period.” According to him, the strategies of smuggling by the cartels have to be 
understood and fought not only at the border but also in hub cities inside the U.S. He also proposes to 
better scrutinize flow of money from the U.S. to the cartels in Mexico by monitoring wire transfers 
southbound of the border.  
 
Political agreements on visa reform or on means and allocations to fight cartels’ activities are likely more 
achievable than debating on if or not the U.S. border side is “secure” or not. In that sense, the current 
debate on global view of what a secure border means is just a political pipe-dream that will not solve the 
roots of the issues structuring the border games.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOMELAND AND BORDER SECURITY PROGRAMS ARE ROADBLOCKS TO U.S. AND 
NORTH AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 
EARL H. FRY 
 
In February 1999, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine referred to the United States as a “hyper 
power,” meaning a country that “is dominant or predominant in all categories.”  In December of 2000, 
President Bill Clinton proclaimed that if the U.S. continued with its pace of economic growth and 
government surpluses, all publicly-held U.S. government debt would be paid off within a decade.  At the 
time, this debt totaled 3.4 trillion dollars.  In 2000, the U.S. accounted for over 31 percent of global GDP.  
During the eight years of the Clinton administration, 22.7 million net new jobs were created and in 
January 2001, the unemployment rate stood at 4.2 percent.  NAFTA trade was flourishing and Americans 
were not required to carry passports in trips to Canada or Mexico.  At many rural checkpoints along the 
border with Canada, U.S. agents would put orange rubber cones along the roadway and then go home 
for dinner. 
 
Fast Forward to January 2013 
During the 12 years of the Bush and Obama administrations, a total of 4.8 million jobs were created and 
the unemployment rate in January 2013 stood at 7.9 percent.  In the month before 9/11, 115 million 
people were working in the non-farm private sector, compared with 114 million in early 2013, even 
though the U.S. population had grown by 30 million.  There were more full-time jobs in August 2001 
than January 2013 and the median real net worth of American families in 2010 plummeted back to the 
levels of the early 1990s. 
 
Publicly-held U.S. government debt skyrocketed to 11.6 trillion dollars in 2013, with Washington’s total 
debt burden standing at 16.5 trillion dollars.  The U.S. share of global GDP has fallen by almost one-third 
over the past decade, with the United States in 2011 accounting for 21.4 percent of GDP in nominal 
terms and only 18.5 percent using the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) index.  Most Americans have 
experienced a lost decade since 9/11, whereas the Asian Development Bank recently trumpeted that at 
the current pace, Asia in 2050 will account for over half of the global population, GDP, exports, and 
direct investment. 
 
What Went Wrong? 
9/11 was one of the watersheds in modern U.S. history, but it is notable not only for the loss of almost 
3,000 innocent lives that day, but also for the colossal missteps made by the U.S. government in reaction 
to this specific terrorist attack.  Over the ensuing decade, America went abroad in search of dragons to 
slay, and at home it turned inward and adopted a Fortress America mentality.  The defense budget 
swelled by 218 percent between fiscal year 2001 and 2013, the intelligence budget by 267 percent, and 
over a half trillion dollars have been earmarked for “homeland defense.”   
 
In an effort to show it would do something about 9/11, a panicked Congress created the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, resulting in the most massive restructuring of executive agencies since 
1947.  DHS is the epitome of multi-level bureaucratic layering, bringing together 22 disparate agencies 
ranging from the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and FEMA to the Coast Guard and Secret Service.  
With 240,000 employees and annual expenditures of 59 billion dollars, DHS is a labyrinthic nightmare 
incapable of making creative and decisive decisions in real time. 
 
As Washington’s policies steered the nation inward, the government began to distrust all foreigners and 
even many Americans.  Borders with Canada and Mexico were tightened dramatically, and certain 
prominent leaders even claimed erroneously that some of the 9/11 terrorists had come from Canada.  
Americans themselves were forced by Washington to procure passports in order to travel within North 
America, and today about two-thirds cannot even make day-trips to Vancouver, Montreal, or Tijuana 
because they do not possess passports or enhanced driver’s licenses.  Over the past decade, the United 
States lost out on tens of millions of visits by foreign tourists because of onerous visa restrictions and an 
image that the welcome mat had been removed for foreigners.  Ruefully, the U.S. tourist sector began 
to refer to the war on terror as a war on tourism.   
 
Cross-border commercial flows have also been significantly disrupted.  Component parts for vehicles 
being assembled by GM, Ford, and Chrysler’s sister plants in Michigan and Ontario now face an average 
of six border inspections before the vehicle is fully assembled. This cross-border movement adds 
hundreds of dollars to the cost of a North American car because of border delays and extensive 
paperwork, meaning home-grown automakers are placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
European and Asian automakers which endure only one border inspection when they ship cars to the 
U.S. 
 
The “security trumps commerce” ethos of DHS and other agencies has helped diminish the overall 
competitiveness of the United States in a rapidly changing world characterized by trans-Atlantic drift 
and a global shift to Asia and other emerging markets.  This compartmentalized way of thinking has also 
caused serious damage to NAFTA, the efficiency of global and regional supply chains, and the overall 
quest to make the North American region more competitive on the global stage. 
 
Since 9/11, the number of U.S. agents at the Canadian border has increased by six-fold to 2,200, and the 
number along the Mexican border by five-fold to 18,500.  Fences have been built, drones and Blackhawk 
helicopters deployed, and panoply of electronic sensors and other equipment installed.  At the end of 
the day, the GAO estimates that U.S. agencies have managed to make less than two percent of the vast 
5,500-mile border with Canada and less than 50 percent of the 2,000-mile border with Mexico “secure.”  
Tragically, as the U.S. has been transfixed with homeland and border security and going deeper in debt 
to secure the quixotic goal of complete safety from small terrorist cells, Asia and other regions have 
passed it by in terms economic competitiveness and job creation. 
 
What Needs to Be Done? 
The United States must rid itself of its near hysterical reaction to the events of 9/11, especially toward 
its closest neighbors to the north and south.  It must trumpet its own strengths and those of its North 
American partners and begin to reenergize the North American economic and commercial community.  
The three NAFTA countries rank number one, eleven, and fourteen in the world in terms of GDP.  
Together, they annually produce more than the 27 nations which comprise the European Union, and 
their combined population of 460 million is only slightly smaller than the EU’s 500 million.  In 2012, the 
United States exported more to Canada with its 35 million people than to the entire European Union, 
and exports to Mexico were more than twice as high as U.S. exports to China.  The U.S. and Canada have 
for decades maintained the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world, and U.S.-Mexico bilateral 
trade is now the third largest globally. 
 
Nevertheless, the North American partnership has lost momentum, in large part attributable to 
misguided U.S. homeland and border security policies. 
 
The following changes are needed: 
 
U.S. government leaders and the American public in general must cast off stereotyped images of Canada 
and Mexico.  Canada is not a quaint little country to the north.  Rather, along with Australia, it has 
experienced the fastest economic growth among all Western countries over the past decade.  Canada 
accounted for 19 percent of the value of total U.S. goods exports in 2012 and bilateral trade sustains 
eight million U.S. jobs.  Canada is also the number one foreign supplier of energy to the U.S. and its 
remarkable performance during the Great Recession can teach both Washington and Wall Street some 
invaluable lessons.  
 
American images of Mexico start and end with drug cartels and illegal immigration.  Both are serious 
problems, but Mexico is well on its way to becoming one of the ten largest economies in the world.  Its 
GDP growth rate is outpacing its neighbors, and over the past 15 years almost half of all Mexicans have 
entered the middle class.  Mexico was the second leading destination for U.S. goods exports in 2012 and 
bilateral trade provides six million jobs for American workers.  Moreover, when Canada and Mexico 
“export” merchandise to the U.S., these goods contain respectively 25 percent and 40 percent U.S.-
made component parts, compared with only 4 percent found in Chinese exports to the United States. 
 
Washington should recognize and embrace the economic success of its neighboring countries and “thin” 
its two borders in order to facilitate North American-wide commerce and prosperity; 
 
 Dismantle DHS and either eliminate some of its component agencies or transfer them to more 
pertinent departments.  DHS is an unfortunate symbol of ill-advised U.S. policy priorities in the 
aftermath of 9/11; 
 As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has advocated, create a “world-class border” by modernizing 
ports of entry and halting the gridlock which is harming the movement of goods and people. 
Insure that special lanes for trucks carrying commercial goods and cars transporting FAST and 
NEXUS-qualified passengers can proceed at a brisk pace.  Expedite the building of the new 
Windsor-Detroit Bridge, a structure which will be paid for in the short-term by the Canadian 
government;  
 Cease the build-up in the number of Border Patrol agents and recognize that the northern and 
southern borders are very distinct and should be treated much differently.  Criminal activity at 
the northern border with Canada is roughly one percent of similar activity at the southern 
border with Mexico. 
 
Cross-border drug trafficking should remain a major priority and is potentially much more dangerous for 
the average American family than terrorist activity centered in the Middle East.  Hollywood often gives a 
benign and even alluring image to illegal drug use, but this contrasts markedly with the frenetic 
weekend activity in hospital emergency rooms across the country, as medical personnel struggle to 
preserve the lives and well-being of young people who have overdosed on illegal drugs.  Education and 
rehabilitation of users, not incarceration, are the best answer to the problem on the U.S. side of the 
border.  Furthermore, a prohibition on transporting assault weapons and ammunition to members of 
the drug cartels in Mexico would lessen the barbarity of drug-related skirmishes which claimed 50,000 
Mexican lives over the past half-dozen years. 
Supervision in this area should be concentrated in the hands of law-enforcement, intelligence, and 
military personnel.  The DEA, FBI, and other federal, state and local authorities must assume the 
leadership position and the Merida Initiative should be strengthened. 
 
The Border Patrol must focus on the entry of illegal immigrants, but even this role may subside over 
time.  In 1960, the average Mexican woman had 7.3 children, compared with 2.4 in 2010.  The number 
of young people entering the work force is declining as a result of Mexico’s dramatic demographic 
changes.  Moreover, the Mexican economy is growing faster than either its U.S. or Canadian 
counterparts.  There has been no net entry of Mexican migrants into the United States over the past few 
years, even though 10 percent of all people born in Mexico and 15 percent of working-age Mexicans 
currently reside in the U.S.  If border impediments are eased and regulatory standards harmonized, 
global supply chains will be strengthened in Mexico and more jobs will be available for young people.  In 
addition, if the North American countries are jointly successful in negotiating free trade accords with the 
Asia-Pacific nations and the European Union, this liberalization of trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic ties 
should bolster Mexican job prospects; 
 
Proceed at a brisk pace to create a self-sufficient North American energy sector.  President Obama 
should approve the Keystone XL pipeline and President Peña Nieto should encourage the transfer of 
appropriate foreign technology and permit some foreign ownership in Mexico’s energy sector.  Mexico 
has huge potential to be a major energy exporter but its current performance leaves much to be 
desired.  The development of shale oil and natural gas respectful of environmental standards, the 
modernization and expansion of electrical grid systems, and the promotion of a variety of renewable 
energy sources can lead to North American energy independence within a generation.  Furthermore, the 
presence of abundant and relatively cheap energy sources will prompt growing in-sourcing of 
manufacturing facilities in all three NAFTA countries, plus accelerated inward direct investment from 
other parts of the world, helping to create well-paying jobs and easing the temptation to cross the two 
borders illegally.   
 
Take advantage of the fresh starts in all three countries—Harper’s recent majority government, 
Obama’s reelection, and Peña Nieto’s new presidency—and come together in a true partnership.  
Resolve to improve the border-crossing infrastructure and harmonize border programs and commercial-
related regulations in general.  Michael Hart has long lamented the “tyranny of small differences” which 
has perennially plagued cross-border collaboration and the rationalization of North American-wide 
commercial activity.  This needs to change and must be spearheaded by the Obama administration.  The 
2011 Beyond the Border Declaration and the Regulatory Cooperation Council pieced together by 
Stephen Harper and Obama will be the true test case.  If it works in a timely fashion, then it could later 
be extended to Mexico, resulting in a major surge in continental commercial ties.  In terms of the 
movement of people, Canada and the United States might contemplate a Schengen-style arrangement, 
and this could also be expanded to include Mexico at a later date. 
 
Obama and Peña Nieto should also move quickly to implement a temporary worker agreement, 
patterned in part after the current program between Canada and Mexico and incorporating some of the 
suggestions made by former Mexican President Vicente Fox.  This would be of major benefit to U.S. 
farms and ranches and help to ease illegal trafficking into the United States while maintaining a steady 
flow of remittances back to Mexico.  
 
Frankly, I am fearful that Beyond the Border and related commitments and timetables will be hamstrung 
by inattentiveness and budget pressures in Washington.  Canada would then be relegated to its not 
atypical Rodney Dangerfield status vis-à-vis the United States.  If this transpires, Beyond the Border will 
go the way of the Dodo bird and the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America, 
leading to a major setback in cooperation spanning both borders. 
 
On the other hand, I am hopeful that the three national leaders will eventually recognize the urgency of 
going beyond NAFTA and forging an arrangement closer to a customs union.  The World Bank calculates 
that North American economic integration is currently approaching 50 percent, far behind the EU’s 73 
percent and, surprisingly, even behind Asia’s 50 percent.  So much more can be done to enhance North 
American economic competitiveness in an extremely complex and interdependent world. 
 
Ideally, Washington will take the first concrete step by swiftly revamping its disjointed homeland and 
border security programs, starting with its antiquated Maginot-Line treatment of U.S. frontiers with 
Canada and Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANAGING TRADE AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACT: 
PROVOCATIVE IDEAS FOR 2030 
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER 
 
NAFTA has reached an age where, if it were a person, it could vote, drink, drive and join the military.  
What will this creature do as it matures into its thirties and forties – supposedly the most productive 
years of human existence?    
 
This short essay offers several ideas, all intended to be provocative.  They are guided by a single vision: 
in 2030, the movement of persons, goods, services and investment should not be much more difficult 
between Mexico, the United States and Canada than it is today between Sonora and Chihuahua, or 
between Arizona and California, or between British Columbia and Alberta.  
 
To keep my feet closer to the ground, at the end of each provocative idea, I suggest a more immediate 
actionable measure.  
 
North American Passport 
Qualified citizens of each country should be eligible for a North American passport, renewable every 10 
years.  What privileges would this document bring?  The holder could cross the borders through 
dedicated speed lanes (all equipped with Global Entry style electronic machines).  She/he could be 
employed in each country (including government employment except for positions reserved on a 
negative list) or hold political office, without the need for an additional visa.  She/he would be eligible 
for public benefits, such as medical care and adult training.   
 
The definition of “qualified” is critical.  In addition to the normal criteria of law-abiding, economically 
secure, reasonably healthy and linguistically fluent for holders, the passport might be launched with 
numerical quotas for each country (to be expanded over time). 
 
Actionable measure: Persuade Bill Gates, Carlos Slim, Bill Gates and David Thomson to sponsor a 
commission past national leaders to study the issue – say Ernesto Zedillo, Bill Clinton, and Brian 
Mulroney.   
 
Recognition of Professional Credentials 
A tripartite federal body should be created to encourage and, if necessary after consultation and 
deliberation, compel mutual recognition of credentials issued by various federal, state and provincial 
licensing authorities.  This thorny task will take years, but greater labor mobility for skilled professionals 
is the starting point for creating a single North American labor market.    
 
In combination, the combination of a North American passport and mutual recognition of professional 
credentials can be seen as the “great leap forward” from today’s NAFTA TN visas.  
 
Actionable measure:  For NAFTA TN visas, expand the listing of professional categories and skills, the 
visa duration (say 5 years rather than 3), allow the visa holder to change employers, and create a fast 
track to citizenship.   
 
Border Infrastructure 
Congestion and inadequate investment are the norm at major border crossings.  The Ambassador Bridge 
saga is perhaps the worst example, but the San Diego/Tijuana crossing is a nightmare all its own.  This 
set of problems should be addressed by creating border infrastructure agencies, mandated to ensure 
adequate bridges, roads, footpaths and inspection stations for speedy crossings, and empowered to levy 
fees and exercise eminent domain over territory within their jurisdiction.  Each agency would be 
managed by a board, appointed by the governors and prime ministers of adjacent states and provinces.  
The respective federal governments should make annual financial contributions to the agencies, 
determined by an appropriate formula. 
 
Actionable measure:  Create a real-time website, updated hourly, that posts the average border crossing 
duration for each of, say, 20 major border cities. 
 
Trusted Truckers 
The big idea is to make trucking, rail and air freight firms responsible for the contents of their cargo 
shipments, with random checks and audits by government officials.  Responsibility means enforcement 
of product standards, guarding against contraband, payment of taxes (e.g., VAT and GST), etc.  Speed 
lanes for qualified shippers already exist at several crossings, but these should be enlarged.  Border 
checks should be reserved for a diminishing number of non-qualified shippers. 
 
Actionable measure:  Dramatically improve crossing times at the trusted trucker lanes on the 
Ambassador Bridge. 
 
Single Energy Market 
Free flow of all forms of energy – petroleum, natural gas, wind, solar, nuclear, and  electricity  itself – 
should become the North American goal.  As well as connecting their pipelines and power grids, the 
three nations should work to harmonize their climate policies.  This means common carbon taxes and 
common abatement standards for reducing CO2 and methane emissions.  The last thing we need is a 
complex set of border adjustment to compensate for different climate measures in North America.  
 
Actionable measures:  Approve the Keystone pipeline.  Improve the structure of electrical transmission 
fees so that carriers have a strong financial incentive to upgrade and connect the grid across borders 
(and between states and provinces).  Do the same for natural gas pipelines between Mexico and the 
United States.  Provide incentives for foreign firms to engage in deep water and shale drilling in Mexico. 
 
Services Trade   
The United States and Canada are service economies to a much greater extent than their self-images as 
frontier farmers, hard rock miners, and steel workers would recognize.  Mexico is moving in the same 
direction.  Behind the border barriers to service barriers, especially Modes 3 and 4 (through FDI and the 
movement of natural persons), should be demolished.  Many barriers reside in state and provincial 
legislation: national treatment should be rule except for service activities scheduled in negative lists, 
which must be far shorter than those agreed in NAFTA. 
 
Actionable measures:  All three countries should energetically promote the International Services 
Agreement.  On a reciprocal basis, the United States should allow Medicare dollars to be spent for 
health care provided in Mexico and Canada. 
 
Government Procurement 
The states, provinces and federal governments effectively reserve considerable amounts of government 
procurement to local firms, both for goods and services (e.g., road construction, data processing, and 
training programs).  NAFTA and the WTO Government Procurement Agreement made limited inroads 
but the exceptions exceed the coverage.  The US “Buy America” restriction linked to stimulus funds (the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) was particularly offensive.  In 2030, open 
procurement should be the rule, not the exception, and a speedy dispute panel should be established to 
enforce the agreement in real time.   
 
Actionable measures: States and provinces should be permitted by federal authorities to negotiate 
cross-border compacts to open their own government procurement on a reciprocal basis. 
 
Investment Rights 
Citizens of each country, and their beneficially owned business firms, should have equal investment 
rights, including in “sensitive” sectors, such as media, airlines, shipping, mining and coastal real estate.  
These rights should extend both to establishment and mergers and acquisitions: public scrutiny for 
competitive or security issues should be no greater than for citizens or domestic companies. 
 
Actionable measures:  National ownership requirements should be eliminated for North American 
airlines.  Cabotage should be permitted on the east and west coasts of North America and the Great 
Lakes by bona fide North American shipping firms.   
 
SPS Standards and Agricultural Inspectors 
To facilitate agricultural trade, the countries should establish a single commission with the delegated 
power to promulgate common sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards for meat and produce crossing the 
borders.  When common standards cannot be agreed, mutual recognition should be second alternative.   
 
North American agricultural inspection should be conducted by a single agency, recruited from all three 
countries, and based some distance from the capital cities (the NORAD model).   
 
Actionable measures:  COOL should be replaced by a North American label. Common meat standards 
should be agreed. The agricultural inspection forces should delegate larger numbers to serve in partner 
countries (following the pattern of crop inspection in Mexico and meat inspection in Canada).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM: A WAY TO ENSURE 
EFFICIENT TRADE FLOWS WHILE ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY 
LESLIE ALAN GLICK, ESQ. 
 
One topic that immediately came to mind that covers all of these issues is the Customs Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which is a voluntary program between U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and the private sector that serves not only the U.S. private sector but the Mexican and 
Canadian private sector as well. This program is a good example of how the government and private 
sector can work together to increase trade flow at the border and, at the same time, ensure supply 
chain security. The program grew out of September 11, 2001, which directly impacted CBP.  Outside of 
its headquarters in Washington, CBP's largest operation was in the Port of New York located at 6 World 
Trade Center, a building that was demolished during the events of September 11. CBP had to find a new 
location and for many months, its operations were severely hampered due to destroyed records and 
disruption to their activities. CBP came to the realization that if the borders were going to be secure, 
CBP could not do this by themselves with their limited resources without a new approach. CBP only can 
inspect 2% of all the containers that enter the United States. We have learned from September 11 that 
we must think outside of the traditional box, that things like airplanes or cargo containers can become 
weapons. Every potential container that enters the U.S. could be a weapon of mass destruction or 
contain chemical or biological substances. Faced with this daunting task, CBP developed the C-TPAT 
program. 
 
This was truly a partnership and in the early days, there was actually a document that was signed by the 
Commissioner of CBP and the company as a partnership agreement. As the program grew, it became 
more computerized and perhaps a little less personal and we no longer have the signed agreement. 
Today, the program has 10,500 members and more than 55% of the goods entering the United States 
are from C-TPAT-certified and validated companies. The large majority of C-TPAT members are 
importers. However, exporters in Mexico and Canada are eligible and have great incentives to join the 
program, but have not joined as fast as might have been expected. The program, theoretically, is quite 
simple. It is really a risk assessment program. 
 
CBP uses a somewhat secretive targeting scores system to determine which entries to inspect. 
Inspections delay the movement of cargo and can be costly, particularly for companies that are on just-
in-time inventory. They also pose additional problems for refrigerated and perishable goods. Off-loading 
your container at the border in the 110 degree heat of Laredo, Texas while CBP inspectors and dogs are 
going through it for several hours or more is not conducive to speeding up the delays at the border. One 
of the advantages of C-TPAT membership is that it lowers your targeting score. C-TPAT has various levels 
of membership targeting score lowers and your likelihood of inspections goes down. More importantly, 
even those companies targeted for inspection under C-TPAT are likely to be chosen for the less intrusive 
methods of inspection through x-rays. This x-ray equipment is very expensive, but it is faster and 
definitely less expensive and less time-consuming than having to unload 20 or 30 pallets with a forklift. 
The C-TPAT members are the ones that get priority going through this x- ray equipment in the larger 
ports where it is available. This is a distinct advantage for C-TPAT members. 
 
In addition, C-TPAT members get other advantages, one of which is hard to duplicate, which is the 
commitment of CBP that in time of national emergencies or so-called red alerts, the first cargo that 
come into the ports belong to C-TPAT members. What this means is that our friends in Canada and 
Mexico will have a clear priority in moving their cargo into the U.S. over those coming from China, a 
country that is not eligible for C-TPAT certification, or, in fact, from Europe and other countries that are 
not C-TPAT-certified. However, we have seen a movement toward reciprocity and Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU's) with some other countries that have equivalent programs to the U.S.'s C-TPAT 
program that is tending to give some advantages to these other exporters in some countries that they 
have not had in the past. 
 
One particular advantage of C-TPAT that has been a motivating factor to at least some of my clients is 
another program called Free and Secure Trade (FAST), which allows companies to use the fast lane at 
the border. We all know that delays at the border can be lengthy. The FAST Program is only open to C-
TPAT-certified exporters, importers, and carriers. All three must be in C-TPAT, which makes the program 
a little bit more difficult to achieve. However, it is also a good motivation for people to join C-TPAT. As 
an attorney dealing with clients in a downward economic environment, it is hard to convince companies 
to spend time and money joining a voluntary program that they are not being forced to join by the 
government. However, economic pressures from customers can be a factor.  
 
For example, a large company that produces and exports auto parts was not a C-TPAT member. 
However, their largest customer in the U.S., Chrysler, was. One of the aspects of C-TPAT that is 
interesting is that each C-TPAT member is committed to using other C- TPAT members as its suppliers 
and as transporters in its supply chain in order that it can ensure the integrity of its supply chain. 
Chrysler told my client that they wanted them to join C-TPAT and, particularly, get into the FAST 
Program so they could speed up movement of the parts to Chrysler's factories and help implement their 
just-in-time inventory.  This resulted in the company asking how they could join C-TPAT.  Despite this 
factor, only a small percentage of Mexican manufacturers and exporters or truckers that could be 
members of C-TPAT, have actually joined the program. Out of the 10,425 companies that were C-TPAT 
members as of December 2012, only 1273 were foreign manufacturers. This includes both Mexico and 
Canada. We know there are a lot more companies in Canada and Mexico that are exporting to the U.S., 
so there are a lot of strides that can be made in increasing the participation in this program. Of course, 
any program, whether voluntary or not, with the U.S. Government proposes burdens.  There is a fear, 
particularly among foreign companies, that they don't want to get involved with a commitment to CBP 
that might put obligations on them and limit their flexibility. 
 
Any C-TPAT member must meet minimum security standards. This usually involves such things as 
physical security, fences, cameras, alarms, guards, etc., as well as supply chain security, knowing your 
customers, tracking your shipments, doing verifications of your own suppliers' security, etc. In the 
course of 20 or more years of being a customs and trade lawyer, I have had at least three occasions 
when I have gotten that feared phone call from my client that their truck has been stopped in Laredo or 
Juarez, Texas and that they found drugs on the truck. Generally, CBP requires that you undergo an 
investigation and there is a special process when this happens to a C-TPAT company. In almost all of the 
cases, I have found that it was never the manufacturer or exporter from Mexico that was involved, but 
usually the trucker, the driver, or the so-called drayage companies, where the driver and cab change at 
the border for short hauls between Mexico and Texas. One of the problems is that the truck sometimes 
goes off of the radar screen for some time, where drugs are placed in the container. Techniques such as 
lifting off the entire rear doors of the truck without removing the seal have been developed by the drug 
cartels and in many cases, it is simple intimidation or bribery of the truck driver or often he or she is a 
participant. Greater use of GPS technology and efforts to track shipments is one way to deter this and is 
part of what CBP requires under the C-TPAT program. 
 
Another area that CBP requires is cyber security. Obviously, knowing when shipments are going to leave 
and arrive, and having details about truck and container numbers, etc., makes it easier to interdict and 
introduce contraband. This information is easily obtainable in most computer systems of companies that 
import and export. Therefore, CBP stresses certain cyber security as part of the C-TPAT protocol. Some 
companies have objected that this is costly, although in my opinion, most of these are programs that 
companies would want to participate in regardless of C-TPAT attempts at their own security insurance 
premiums, etc. 
 
Although C-TPAT is a "voluntary program," once a company joins, they are subject to annual validation 
visits and revalidation visits to maintain C-TPAT status. Also, they are required to do annual updates of 
their company security profile and of their partner compliance. This latter requirement has been an 
issue with some companies that prefer not to have to send letters and make visits to their suppliers and 
business partners to ensure that they are C-TPAT compliant. 
 
Also, despite its voluntary nature, Congress in the SAFE Port Act gave C-TPAT some formal legal status by 
setting some standards and appeal provisions before a company can be removed from C-TPAT. 
 
Conclusion 
The C-TPAT program is helping resolve the dual problems of border delay and security, but it is 
underutilized. This is due to inertia on the part of companies to spend time and money on a voluntary 
program not required by the government, and perhaps some fear element by Mexican and Canadian 
companies of becoming formally engaged in a partnership with U.S. Customs. 
 
To move forward, CBP needs to do a better job of marketing the program and perhaps eliminating some 
of the bureaucracy that goes with it, making compliance more user friendly and providing more 
flexibility on their regulations (e.g., substituting cameras for fences when fencing is not feasible or too 
costly). The trend toward acceptance and recognition of other countries' programs similar to C-TPAT is 
increasing the effectiveness of the program in speeding cargo through the sea and airports since C-TPAT 
is focused more on land traffic between the three NAFTA countries. 
 
More incentives for companies to join would be welcome. One frequent complaint about C-TPAT is that 
more requirements are added each year, but not necessarily more benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING IN THE 
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION 
ERIK LEE AND CHRISTOPHER E. WILSON 
 
Trade and Competitiveness 
Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great—yet underappreciated—success 
stories of the global economy. In fact, in 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade reached the major 
milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition.14 The United States is Mexico’s top 
trading partner, and Mexico—which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class 
over the last two decades—is the United States’ second largest export market and third largest trading 
partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border 
region is literally where “the rubber hits the road” for bilateral relations. This also means that not only 
California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and 
secure border management. 
 
Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals 
entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population 
growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding 
costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as 
a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. 
Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The 
development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has 
yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled.  
 
Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, 
as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal 
budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, 
improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs 
(i.e. SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT, Global Entry) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited 
passage across the border. Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could 
increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing—all while strengthening 
security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals 
and shipments. 
 
The border region tends to organize itself in terms of north-south trade corridors as a natural result of 
the cross-border relationships that facilitate the flow of goods. This phenomenon manifests itself in the 
development of everything from interest groups to regional border master plans. Without a doubt, 
economic development and competitiveness in the region is anything but uniform, ranging from the 
great wealth of San Diego to the pockets of severe poverty in the Rio Grande Valley, from the aerospace 
cluster in Baja California to the vast deserts of Sonora and Coahuila. Despite this tremendous diversity 
and even a fair bit of competition to pull trade flows into one’s own region, border communities have 
more than enough common interests to warrant border wide planning, stakeholder organization, and 
the sharing of best practices. Recently, crime and violence in certain Mexican border communities has 
dominated the national perceptions of the region in both the United States and Mexico. To the extent 
                              
14
 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Census Bureau, 2012. 
that the border communities and border states speak with a unified voice, they will have a better 
opportunity to put forth their own narrative about the region and to call for appropriate revisions to 
national border policies.   
Security 
 
Increasing Federal Investment—and Involvement—in a Complex Binational Region 
The state of security along the U.S.-Mexico border  easily ranks as one of the most highly charged topics 
of public discussion and debate in both the United States and Mexico during the past several years.   
Concerns about global terrorism, potential threats posed by those entering the United States illegally, 
and fears that skyrocketing violence in Mexico might “spillover” into the United States have led to 
dramatic policy shifts and significant new investments by the U.S. to “secure” the border.   Yet 
discussions about border security cannot be fully extricated from or effectively addressed in isolation 
from other policy areas such as trade and the environment.  As demonstrated elsewhere in this report, 
the promise of free trade and increased commerce between both countries has never been stronger, 
but ironically, concerns about border security have also slowed economic integration and had a divisive 
effect on border communities. 
  
Addressing the complex inter-play between security and prosperity at the border is further complicated 
by the confusing mosaic of overlapping networks of federal, state and local agencies charged with 
keeping the border area and two nations safe.  Diverse policies such as  the U.S.’ war on global 
terrorism; free trade agreements such as NAFTA and the pending Trans-Pacific Partnership; U.S. 
immigration policy; the Mexican federal government’s strategy to confront organized crime; the Merida 
Initiative; police  and judicial system reform in Mexico; a rapidly changing governmental architecture;  
building interagency and cross-border collaboration and trust; border management and trade 
facilitation all play out in some fashion at the border sometimes effectively and productively, and in 
other instances very inefficiently.  All of this has taken place in a context in which U.S.-Mexico bilateral 
relations have become both more collaborative and more controversial at the same time. 
 
Ironically, many of these policies have little to do with the border per se but reflect broader domestic 
concerns regarding national security and public safety in the U.S. and Mexico. In large part, the border 
region is where these often controversial landmark international accords such as NAFTA and national 
policies “bump up against” stubborn on-the-ground realities in ways that are particularly challenging. To 
take just one example, there were no new land ports of entry built on the U.S.-Mexico border between 
2000 and 2009, posing huge challenges for both commerce and security. 
 
A snapshot of security issues at the U.S.-Mexico border reveals increasing though always controversial 
federal involvement in a region that has historically maintained a cultural and political independence 
from both national capitals. The unprecedented U.S. security buildup along the border post-9/11 stands 
out as a key feature of the increased federal role and is exemplified by the buildup in federal personnel. 
The U.S. Border Patrol now has over 21,000 agents assigned to the various border patrol sectors, a 518% 
increase in staffing since the early 1990’s.  Additionally, investments in  infrastructure (fencing) and 
technology between the land ports of entry stands in stark contrast to the multi-billion dollar deficit in 
ports of entry infrastructure15 that hampers both legitimate trade and travel as well as effective security  
___________________ 
 15 Mikhail Pavlov, Customs and Border Protection, DHS, “Meeting Land Port of Entry Modernization Needs in 
Constrained Budgetary Environment,” presentation to the Joint Working Committee, March 14-15, 2012, 
http://www.borderplanning.fhwa.dot.gov/filemanager/filemanager.aspx. 
operations.  
 
North-South and East-West Asymmetries 
Security asymmetries abound along the U.S.-Mexico border. As measured by Federal Bureau of 
Investigation crime statistics, U.S. border cities rank among the safest in the United States, and stand in 
stark contrast to the fragile-though-improving security situation in major Mexican border cities such as 
Ciudad Juárez. The disparity in crime and violence across the border is explained in part by the vast 
difference in institutional capacity (police, courts, etc.), yet this is not the only explanation.  This paper 
underscores the remarkable difference between the relatively peaceful western end of the Mexican side 
of the border (which includes the states of Baja California and Sonora) and the four eastern states 
(Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas) that have suffered numerous high-profile, horrifying 
and deeply tragic mass homicides that have left a lasting impact on public sentiment and the public 
debate in both countries. 
  
What is Needed Most? Creativity, Capacity-building, and Collaboration 
As the economies, cultures, and destinies of both nations become increasingly intertwined, both federal 
governments, the border states and communities will have to find new, creative and robust ways to 
increase public safety in the U.S.-Mexico border region. This will require greater capacity at the state 
and local level as well as greater creativity and patience at the federal level. Even though both countries 
have continued to strengthen cross-border collaboration—codified in official policy with the remarkable 
May 19, 2010 Joint Declaration on Twenty First Century Border Management by President Barack 
Obama and President Felipe Calderón—the U.S. and Mexico have only recently begun to make real 
progress on a bi-national security regime that is sustainable and “built to last.”  
 
Lasting progress in U.S.-Mexico border security can only come from increased bilateral collaboration and 
independent domestic progress on key issues affecting security in the United States and Mexico.  
Significant progress has been made in increasing and improving bilateral security collaboration between 
federal agencies on both sides of the border.  While a welcome development, these federal advances 
can, in some cases, weaken the long-standing cooperation between local U.S. and Mexican law 
enforcement agencies. While it is important to continue strong federal coordination, encouraging local 
collaboration can also yield significant and important dividends in fighting crime affecting cross-border 
cities.    
 
Improved border management, a challenge during normal fiscal times, is particularly difficult in the 
United States’ constrained fiscal environment and thus requires increased attention and creative 
solutions.  For example, the two governments—in close collaboration with border communities— 
should focus their efforts on making the land ports of entry from San Diego to Brownsville as safe and 
efficient as possible to enhance both our physical and economic security.  Technology (principally in the 
form of various types of detection equipment) offers some hope in this area.  While this technology has 
been deployed on the border between the ports of entry, the governments have not yet deployed 
technology in a game-changing way that could convert the ports of entry themselves into true platforms 
for economic security rather than highly congested and bureaucratized nodes in our North American 
commercial network. 
 
Depressurizing and innovating in the border region 
Security in either country does not depend solely on what happens at the border.  Rather, the more the 
two governments can push key security processes away from the border, the better. For example, 
disrupting illegal bulk cash transfers or firearms trafficking can be done more effectively through 
investigations and intelligence operations away from the border than via random vehicle checks at the 
border.   
 
Much work remains to be done in strengthening overall law enforcement capacity in both countries to 
challenge cross-border trafficking and criminal activity.  For example, fully implementing justice reform 
and advancing police professionalization in Mexico, as well as disrupting the organizations engaged in 
migrant smuggling, human trafficking and moving illicit substances northward into the United States 
would be important steps forward. Likewise, the United States needs to demonstrate greater political 
courage and creativity to fulfill its commitments to reduce the demand for illegal drugs at home and 
disrupt the flow of weapons and money that exacerbate the violence associated with drug trafficking.  
Enhanced collaboration to fully implement justice reform in Mexico—the shift to an effective oral 
adversarial system of justice—would represent a critically important element of what the two countries 
might achieve together to create better security generally and in the border region in particular. What 
stands out about justice system reform in particular is that landmark constitutional reforms were passed 
by Mexico’s Congress in 2008 with an 8-year transitional period established. Yet progress on 
implementation of the reforms has been slow, with no procedural reforms adopted at the federal level 
and only a handful of states fully implementing the reforms.  Interestingly, border states such as 
Chihuahua and Baja California stand out for their implementation of reform and are in the vanguard of 
this fundamental change. 
 
Additionally, progress in modernizing and professionalizing Mexico’s multiple police forces and 
improving public trust in law enforcement will be critical to creating a safer U.S.-Mexico border region.  
The Calderón Administration made some progress in this area at the federal level but there is room for 
much more improvement at all levels of law enforcement, particularly at the state and municipal levels.  
As President Enrique Peña Nieto’s begins to articulate his government’s new strategy it is evident that 
he will continue and deepen some of the institutional reforms, seek to place greater emphasis on 
combating the most violent criminal activity – which tends to be local rather than transnational – and 
devote more resources to crime and violence prevention programs through greater social investments 
in the. 
 
Ultimately, while the U.S.-Mexico border region enjoys a long history of independent thinking, new and 
innovative approaches will be needed to ensure the border area remains safe while also facilitating the 
enormous economic potential that exists between and among both countries. Achieving the delicate 
balance between federal and local needs, and economic versus security concerns, will require greater 
patience in the form of a more realistic (longer) policy implementation timeline, improved leadership, 
and creative thinking by all parties. 
 
A framework for measuring border security: key objective and subjective factors 
The purpose of this paper is to begin to set a base line for measuring border security between the 
United States and Mexico.  Our plan is to re-examine these issues on a semi-regular basis, making 
adjustments to both the methodology and criteria as needed.  To initiate this process, we have chosen 
to focus on four major areas to evaluate related to border security.  These include incidence of terror 
related activity and warnings at the border; levels of violence on both sides of the border and an 
assessment of how these might be linked; seizures of dangerous drugs, money and firearms at the 
border; and efforts aimed at apprehensions of undocumented and unauthorized migrants.   
 
In addition, border security is characterized not only by objective measures such as the above, but also 
by a broad spectrum of subjective factors including key U.S. and Mexican government strategies and 
policies in response to border security challenges. These include efforts such as the 21st Century Border 
interagency initiative in the U.S. and Mexico and efforts to upgrade land ports of entry along our shared 
border. More specifically, national efforts include a broad range of rule of law efforts in Mexico, the new 
U.S. Border Patrol Strategic Plan 2012-2016 and anti-drug efforts in the United States and particularly 
Mexico. President Enrique Peña Nieto’s security strategy will include a continuation of reforms for law 
enforcement, a re-focusing of the strategy on the most violent crimes and municipalities, and an 
increased focus on prevention programs as outlined in the recent National Plan for the Social Prevention 
of Violence and Crime that emphasizes social investment in 250 of the country’s most violent 
municipalities.  Finally, we make special mention of the impact of technology in border security, which 
has seen ups and downs over the past several years but which promises to change how our shared 
border is managed in the future. 
 
A Note on the Transborder Development Index 
The Transborder Development Index (TDI) is the backbone of the Transborder Information System, a 
joint project between the ASU’s School of Transborder Studies and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte 
intended to support decision makers in the public, private and social sectors. The TDI tracks four 
dimensions that are crucial for the integral development of the U.S.-Mexico transborder region: 
competitiveness, sustainability, security and quality of life. 
 
The TDI aims to gauge the effectiveness of public policies, public-private partnerships, and citizen-based 
initiatives in moving the region toward higher development grounds and closing north-south and rural-
urban development gaps observable along the border. It also aims to provide a platform to evaluate and 
envision policies and strategies capable of moving the region quicker along a trajectory of 
comprehensive development.   
 
The TDI is a composite index comprised of sixty-four indicators grouped in four fully embedded and 
complementary sub-indices: competitiveness, sustainability, quality of life, and security. After an 
extensive assessment of existing data sources in Mexico and in the United States, a group of variables 
was selected to construct the indicators. As the building blocks of the index, variables had to meet the 
standard of theoretical relevance, as well as the conditions of temporal, spatial and conceptual 
comparability required for an index able to compare directly states and municipalities across and along 
the border. The final selection of variables and indicators was the result of a systematic evaluation 
process, guided by the goal of producing a measurement tool conceptually and methodologically robust, 
while maintaining an appropriate level of simplicity and transparency for its use in the public, private 
and social sectors. 
 
The index provides a panoptic view of the current status and progress of the U.S. states of Arizona, 
California, New Mexico and Texas and the Mexican States of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo 
León, Sonora and Tamaulipas, as well as the sixty-four counties and municipalities contiguous to the 
common international boundary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEASURING SUCCESS 
MICHAEL KERGIN 
 
Introduction 
Since September 12, 2001, when security was exponentially increased at the US’ southern and northern 
borders, policy makers, aided by security officials (“defencemen”) and shippers (“forwards”), have 
searched for the Holy Grail of border management: that fine balance between assuring the security of 
their citizens and facilitating legitimate cross border trade, so important to national prosperity. 
But this search contains a conundrum: security is infinitely elastic (“you just can’t have enough of it”), 
while trade is highly inelastic (subject to the tyrannies of time and costs of moving product across 
jurisdictions).  
 
Can policy makers find the sweet spot between security and facilitation? 
 
This paper will briefly examine some of the obstacles and opportunities associated with the 
management of the US’ northern border (with which the author is more familiar). Some policy options 
will be suggested on the premise that any short term costs can be justified by the strategic benefit of 
enhancing North American competitiveness in the global economy. 
 
Security 
In the context of border management, security is a relative concept, never an absolute (i.e. no measure 
can guarantee 100 percent security). As with the philosopher’s arrow, one can infinitely half the distance 
leading to the target of perfection, but the target itself will never be reached. 
 
One can, however, measure the arrow’s progress towards the target during its trajectory. 
The most obvious metric of enhanced security, of course, would be a comparison of the number of 
incidents measured over a continuum of time. To be meaningful, incidents must be carefully defined 
and catalogued by class of transgression. Principal types would be illegal transfers of people, including 
everything from child smuggling to undocumented workers; movements of illicit products, from 
materials of mass destruction and illegal drugs, at one extreme, to unregulated food products (e.g. sugar 
coated Cheerios), at the other; and crimes committed in the host jurisdictions directly traced to 
unauthorized entries. Each of these general types would need to be divided into sub categories. 
 
The cataloguing of incidents should be accompanied by identifying, to the extent possible, the location 
of the border transgression so as to assess the weaknesses of specific crossings. 
 
Defining and classifying incidents of illicit movements and transnational criminal activities, and their 
location, over particular time frames, will assist in measuring the effectiveness of current programmes, 
indicate failures by type of threat and suggest a rational re-allocation of resources by border location. 
Two qualifiers, however, should be factored into this essentially quantifiable model: 
 
1. The degree to which the severity of the threats may vary over time. The demand for a given 
contraband, be it an undocumented labourer or a banned narcotic, may fluctuate so that the 
incidence of apprehensions may be unrelated to the relevant border countermeasures. 
2. The second “known unknown” is the extent to which current border measures may act as a 
deterrent. In this case, illicit activities may decline simply because the risk of apprehension by 
the security services has become too great. While this should be counted as a success for border 
security, it cannot be easily quantified. How do you prove a negative? 
 
Accountability for the protection of each NAFTA member’s citizens, of course, rests exclusively within 
the jurisdiction of the respective country. Cooperation among the three partners, however, enhances 
not only their collective security, but also improves their respective security. 
 
Furthermore, the old slogan that “security trumps trade” must be replaced by the more forward looking 
dictum that “intelligent security can enhance trade”.  In this regard, a few implementation levers are 
suggested by way of example: 
 
 Harmonization of risk management criteria; 
 Information and intelligence sharing at the border and overseas; 
 Compatible information technologies among the three partners; 
 Increasing automation of border check points; 
 Joint infrastructure projects at key border crossings; 
 Pre-clearance pilot projects; and 
 Joint security operations such as IBETs and Ship Rider. 
 
Building on these efficiencies and extending their application will depend directly on the level of trust 
and confidence attained among the security policies and services of each of the NAFTA partners. For 
example: 
 
 Can the US DEA afford to share highly sensitive intelligence with its Mexican partners, or the 
Canadians, for that matter? 
 Can Canada and Mexico have confidence that US firearm regulations will be tightened 
sufficiently to reduce cross border weapons trade? 
 Can Mexico have any expectation that its NAFTA partners will loosen prohibitions on selected 
illicit narcotics, thereby undercutting transnational crime profits? 
 
Positive answers to some of these questions should result in less pressure for maintaining higher levels 
of border security with a corresponding easing of impediments to trade. The results should be 
measurable.  
 
Trade 
As stated earlier, trade is elastic insofar that it is subject to quality, price and reliability. The latter two 
attributes are relevant to this discussion because each is determined by the product’s ease of access to 
market. 
 
Security obligations can impose the following obstacles to delivering goods to the buyer in another 
NAFTA jurisdiction, thereby reducing productivity and competitiveness: 
 
 Timeliness: delay at the border adversely affects just in time delivery and ruins perishables; 
 Transport: idling at the border wastes energy, pollutes the environment while increasing 
carrying costs; 
 Transaction costs: customs filings, user fees and portable security devices add to the bills to be 
paid by the shipper or client; and 
 Tariffs and quotas: inefficient administration by border security personnel will adversely affect 
product pricing. 
 
Developing performance standards to assist in determining the extent to which innovations are 
contributing to trade facilitation is more challenging than a similar exercise on the security side of the 
border equation. A larger number of variables, independent of border management factors, will affect 
product acceptability with respect to price and reliability. For example, prices set by the manufacturer, 
quality and adherence to specifications, after sales service etc. 
 
To the extent that some performance standards can be established, they might consist in establishing 
cost curves which compare two sets of identical products, one manufactured in-country, the other from 
another NAFTA jurisdiction. Using graphic representations, it may be possible to plot whether the 
comparative advantage of the cheaper (imported) product is outweighed by the incremental transaction 
costs of moving the product to the partner’s market. This model assumes that there are no rules of 
origin issues.  
 
Similarly, it may be possible to calculate whether reductions in border impediments have resulted in 
bending cost curves downwards for a given set of NAFTA products over a defined time frame, net of 
inflation, increased labour costs or currency fluctuations. (Comparisons might also be made between 
models of automobiles made in Korea going through one clearance procedure at Long Beach, California, 
against similar autos jointly manufactured by Canada and the US in the Windsor-Detroit area which 
cross the border six to eight times during the manufacturing process). 
 
Conclusion 
In full disclosure, I had long been a sceptic of looking at border security from a trilateral perspective. The 
types of threats and level competencies were so diverse between the US northern and southern borders 
that it seemed detrimental to Canadian interests for us to be included in trilateral security discussions. 
We were better off working exclusively with the US. 
 
My views have changed of late. The nature of the threats confronting our jurisdictions may still differ 
somewhat, but sufficient commonality exists for all three to benefit significantly from a cooperative 
approach. In addition, the level of competency of the security services in Mexico appears to have 
evolved over the past decade. A more integrated approach, fostering the sharing of new technologies, 
intelligence and best practices, can only contribute to more efficient trade flows and, by extension, 
enhanced North American competitiveness in a challenging global economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NORTH AMERICAN BORDER PROCESSES AND METRICS 
MARIKO SILVER 
 
On May 19, 2010 President Obama and President Calderón issued the Declaration on Twenty-First 
Century Border Management and created an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to oversee its 
implementation.  
 
On February 4, 2011 President Obama and Prime Minister Harper announced the U.S.-Canada joint 
declaration Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness 
and created a Beyond the Border Working Group (BBWG) to craft an action plan.  
 
Each declaration addresses a fundamentally different lived-experience of a U.S. border.  What they have 
in common, however is that both describe a new understanding of the movement of people and goods, 
reframing the relationship between security and trade at the border.  
 
In the U.S. - Mexico relationship there has long been a focus on the border both as a line on the map 
and as the lived experience of that line.  The line is a defining issue in discussions of sovereignty and a 
figural matter in the development of policy stances in each country.  The relationship is larger than that 
line, to be sure, but the line itself has persisted as a focus of discussion, and as a locus of tension.  The 
contemporary U.S.-Canada relationship, by contrast, has largely not focused on the physical point at 
which our two countries touch.  We have long thought of Canada and the U.S. in the same security 
sphere (as evidenced for example by NORAD16) and in the same trade sphere.  In fact, there is a sense in 
the U.S.-Canada relationship that, while sovereignty is deeply important, before 9/11 the line itself 
mattered little if at all.   
 
Beyond the Border: 
Following the events of 9/11 and the United States’ resultant intensified focus on borders and border 
security to prevent terrorism, many felt the traditional U.S.-Canada border relationship had been 
whittled away and the border “thickened.”  Where previously in many locations there had been, 
effectively, no border—that is, a line accompanied by minimal enforcement—now there was increased 
enforcement.  Where people had crossed relatively easily between the two countries for work or 
leisure, now the border was a (largely unwelcome) presence in their lives.  The shift in the border 
experience, and in communities’ perceptions of the border, was perhaps best exemplified by the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) which requires all citizens of the U.S. and Canada to 
present a passport or other WHTI compliant document that indicates citizenship and identity in order to 
enter or depart the United States.  WHTI implementation became a perpetual point of tension in U.S.-
Canadian policy conversations. 
 
In Canada, where 90 percent of the population lives within 100 miles of the border, this shift was felt 
particularly acutely and brought into question for many the overall relationship, deep friendship, and 
long-held trust between the two countries.  The idea that terrorists would come to the U.S. via Canada 
made most Canadians bristle (though before 9/11 the “Millennium Bomber” did plan to get to his 
target—the Los Angeles International Airport—by crossing into the U.S. from Canada via ferry).  There 
was certainly border enforcement by both countries prior to 9/11.  Both countries had monitored the 
movement of people and goods and enforced the laws governing both, but in the years following 9/11 
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there developed an increasing sense that the border was more than a line on a map and that the 
relationship between the two close neighbors was becoming securitized in a way that was unfamiliar.  
There was community concern and economic concern (the U.S. and Canada enjoy the world’s largest 
bilateral trading relationship) about this “thickening of the border.”  Beyond the Border (BTB) sought to 
reframe the policy conversation and the public conversation about the relationship between the two 
countries and the roles of security and trade, as well as of the border, in that relationship. 
 
The core of the Beyond the Border declaration is its mutual commitment to “pursue a perimeter 
approach to security and accelerate the legitimate flow of people, goods, and services between our two 
countries.”  The declaration proposed to do this partly by the two countries working together to 
“address threats within, at, and away from our borders, while expediting lawful trade and travel.” This 
articulation of the concept of perimeter security—once a forbidden term in Canadian policy circles—
embraces Canada and the U.S. in the same security sphere as well as in the same economic sphere, and 
seeks to protect both from security as well as economic threats through strategic integration while 
maintaining clearly each country’s sovereignty.   
 
Unlike most previous post-9/11 efforts to reframe the security and economic conversation between the 
two governments, BTB did not originate as a top down agenda.  Rather, it grew from an agency-initiated 
dialogue on both sides (starting with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Public Safety 
Canada (PSC)) begun with mutual recognition that policy discussions around the border and related 
issues had stagnated.  The goal was to come up with a new way to think about the relationship, and the 
border as part of that relationship, in order to refresh our ideas of what projects, programs, and 
initiatives the two countries could jointly pursue.  As this DHS-PSC conversation developed, other 
agencies were brought in and high-level leadership on both sides expressed interest in broadening the 
effort while raising its profile. 
 
Once the declaration was issued each country set up teams drawing on capabilities and expertise from 
across each government that comprised the bilateral Beyond the Border Working Group (BBWG) to 
build and execute an action plan that focused on the following four areas:  
 
 Addressing Threats Early 
 Trade Facilitation, Economic Growth, and Jobs  
 Integrated Cross-Border Law Enforcement  
 Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Security  
 
Under each of these areas there are now multiple ongoing activities and efforts to harmonize or build 
compatible procedures, and share information in order to assess and mitigate risks.  But this is not just a 
consultative process between two governments.  The BBWG process was designed to incorporate the 
views and concerns of communities and industry as well. 
 
The BBWG has since become an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) chaired by the National Security 
Staff (NSS) Senior Director for Transborder Affairs and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere on the 
U.S. side and a Senior Advisor to the Privy Council Office (who is also responsible for the work of the 
Regulatory Cooperation Commission) on the Canadian side.  This bilateral ESC and its subgroups 
continue to pursue a range of initiatives to align and make more compatible Canadian and U.S. 
processes, protocols, and programs while also developing new initiatives including immigration and 
entry-exit related information sharing, integrated law enforcement, and establishment of shared privacy 
principles 
 
(For a more detailed 12/12 update sees 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/btb_implementation_report.pdf).   
 
The BTB process established a new frame for the U.S. and Canada’s joint responsibility for the security of 
our shared communities and shared economic sphere, including the perimeter, a necessary condition 
for advancing economic prosperity.   
 
The U.S.-Mexico Declaration on Twenty-First Century Border Management also focuses on what many 
now call co-responsibility, but in this case it is quite specifically co-responsibility for the management of 
the border itself (not the perimeter)—and the secure movement of legitimate trade and travel across 
that border.  This is a significant departure from previous border conversations, as the border had long 
been considered a U.S. law enforcement problem, not a shared challenge for which both countries 
should take responsibility.  The Twenty-First Century Border declaration emphasized the importance of 
the Mexican government and U.S. government counterparts working together to manage and guard the 
border.  The declaration focuses heavily on the border itself and hinges on the “desire to fundamentally 
restructure the way in which the shared border between Mexico and the United States is managed” 
recognizing that “joint and collaborative administration of their common border is critical to 
transforming management of the border to enhance security and efficiency.”   
 
The declaration does also engage issues that reach into the interior of both countries, including the need 
to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations, and to shift some screening and 
inspection activities away from the line itself so that the physical border need not be the locus of all 
border related enforcement activity.  This element of the declaration complements the larger U.S.-
Mexico work on security collaboration, for example through the Merida Initiative. 
 
Like the BTB declaration, the Twenty-First Century Border declaration sets up a binational mechanism 
for implementation, the Executive Steering Committee (ESC), which draws high level participation from 
agencies across both governments and is tasked to focus efforts in four areas: 
 
 Enhancing economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trade, while preventing the transit of 
illegal merchandise between their two countries, 
 Facilitating lawful travel in a manner that also prevents the illegal movement of people between 
their two countries, 
 Sharing information that enhances secure flows of goods and people, and 
 Disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal organizations and punishing their members 
and supporters. 
 
The ESC is the first such high level mechanism between the U.S. and Mexico that takes a holistic view of 
the border, and its relationship to the interior.  It is the first time that the two countries have gotten 
together to discuss the border and its management in a comprehensive way that brings together all of 
the relevant government agencies on both sides.  It is, in a sense, the bureaucratic embodiment of co-
responsibility.  The participating agencies and departments are even listed in the text of the declaration.  
This group was able to further parse the four areas in the declaration to define specific projects and 
programs (some of which are listed in the declaration itself) that need to be addressed.  The group 
houses these issues under three main working groups, all of which include representatives not just from 
the principal U.S. and Mexican counterpart agencies, but from all relevant U.S. and Mexican agencies.  
The working groups are: 
 
 Border Infrastructure Planning  
 Secure Flows  
 Corridor Security  
 
The titles of these groups, particularly the last two, also tell us something significant about the process 
that the ESC is overseeing.  As in the BTB discussion with Canada (though confronting very different on 
the ground circumstances), the Twenty-First Century Border declaration reframed the previously 
understood dichotomy and antagonistic relationship between trade and security.  Instead, it pairs 
security and economics by emphasizing a risk-based approach to improve the allocation of resources 
and increase the efficiency of the flows of legitimate people and goods across the shared border.  Rather 
than viewing enhanced security as only dependent upon increased scrutiny (and therefore slower 
traffic) at the line itself, the new approach emphasizes the need to segment traffic based on risk, 
thereby moving known, legitimate travelers and cargo faster and more efficiently across the border, and 
thus giving law enforcement the capacity to focus on those travelers and cargo that are unknown or 
higher risk.  Additionally, it embeds the idea of corridors and flows into ongoing policy development and 
discussion as ways of thinking about (and making policy regarding) the way we travel and trade. This 
expressly ties the border-as-line to a border-as-conduit concept and ties what goes on at the border to 
what goes on in the interior of both countries.    
 
The BBWG and ESC processes and their results embody a rethinking of each of the United States’ land 
border relationships.  While the circumstances at each border are very different—as are the 
relationships the U.S. has with each neighbor—both efforts indicate recognition by the parties that 
borders are shared spaces of flows, not just lines on a map (or in the sand).  The borders, and the 
relationships we build with contiguous land neighbors, provide opportunities for law enforcement 
interventions and economic exchange, as well as community development,  that enhance the prospects 
for all three countries.  Mexico now has a new administration in place and all indications are that the 
ESC process has already proven valuable enough to continue through this political shift.  The U.S.-
Canada process continues to evolve and to be an important engagement in the bilateral relationship.  
When looked at together with the work of the Regulatory Cooperation Councils (there is a U.S.-Canada 
RCC as well as a U.S.-Mexico RCC called the “High Level RCC” or HLRCC) these declarations and the work 
that has flowed from them paint a clear picture of efforts to make the borders loci of trade facilitation 
that encourage shared prosperity as well as points of security and enforcement.  This view that, as the 
DHS Northern Border Strategy states, “Security and lawful trade and travel are mutually reinforcing” 
requires intensive cooperation between neighbors and shared responsibility for the security and viability  
Of both the borders themselves and of the flows that connect us. 
SETTING THE STAGE - STRATEGIES FOR THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN BORDERS 
DUNCAN WOOD 
 
As my colleague Chris Wilson has laid out on a number of occasions, the border is a line between the 
two countries that serves to divide but also unite. In many ways the border is the nexus between the 
two economies and societies that brings them together through commerce, investment and 
communications, yet also serves to separate the one from the other.17 As an artificial line in the sand, 
the border marks where one society ends and another begins, but of course that is an entirely false 
distinction, as the border region has always been a collection of unique societies in their own right, 
sharing much more in common with their counterparts immediately on the other side of the line than 
with the rest of the country.  
 
At its most basic level, the challenge on both sides of the border centers on controlling and facilitating 
flows. This means putting in place infrastructure, procedures and cooperative mechanisms that block 
the majority of unwanted flows yet allow legitimate and necessary flows to cross the border as freely as 
possible. When we observe the progress that has been made over the last decade, it is impressive to 
observe how much investment has taken place along the border. Much of this stems from the vision 
that was laid out in April 2010 when the governments of Mexico and the United States issued a 
Declaration of the 21st Century Border, which stated that: ‘’a joint and collaborative administration of 
their common border is critical to transforming management of the border to enhance security and 
efficiency.’’ The focus in the 21st Century Border project on the need for infrastructure spending, new 
measures to speed border-crossings and to relieve pressure on the border by enacting policies and 
programs away from the border, such as pre-clearance, increasing the number of visas for legal workers, 
employment pre-verification, and trusted traveler programs all hold great promise.  
 
What’s more, the joint declaration by Presidents Calderon and Obama’s that “A key component of our 
global competitiveness is creating a border for the Twenty-First Century” struck exactly the right now. 
By focusing on the competitiveness theme, the Presidents recognized that the border is more than a 
problem; it is also an opportunity. The Presidents called for development and management of the 
border “in a holistic fashion and in ways that facilitate the secure, efficient, and rapid flows of goods and 
people and reduce the costs of doing business between our two countries”. 18  
 
The problem is that not nearly enough resources have been devoted to the project. While cross-border 
trade is five times what it was two decades ago, most major border ports of entry have “experienced 
major expansion or renovation since they were built several decades ago”.  According to Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) an extra $6 billion in infrastructure investments are needed to fully modernize 
the border. This seems like a huge sum, but when we consider that “In the year that ended Sept. 30 
(2012), the federal government spent $18 billion on immigration-enforcement programs, dwarfing the 
combined budgets of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Secret Service by about $3.6 billion”.  
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This contrast in spending figures gives us a clue about the somewhat misplaced priorities of the U.S. 
(and Mexican) government when it comes to the border. Massive spending on border fencing, patrols 
and arrests has responded to political concerns about security and illegal immigration rather than a 
strategic vision of how to best manage the border in the best interests of the economy, national 
security, and quality of life for those who live in border communities. Instead, as a 2006 study 
estimated, in the San Diego area alone, “the total local economic impact of border congestion is $2.259 
billion in production losses (about 1.2% of the regional output) and 31,454 lost jobs (about 1.7% of the 
regional labor force)”. 
 
The consequences of this under-funding of the 21st century border have been made particularly acute in 
recent weeks with the implementation of the Federal government fiscal sequester. Customs and Border 
Protection is being hit with around $512 million in cuts in 2013 alone, and by early March had already 
issued furlough notices to its 60,000 employees. This will clearly impact on both border crossing wait 
times and on the ability to control illegal crossings. 
 
In light of this chronic underfunding, and the acute situation facing us today, it is crucial that the two 
governments work on reenergizing their focus on the border. Several priorities emerge. 
 
Focus on border crossings rather than the spaces between them. The intensive focus on the illegal 
immigration “problem” is recent years has resulted in enormous spending on patrolling the border 
between crossings, rather than devoting those funds to improving border crossings themselves. Such 
improvement would center on adding new infrastructure, new CBP agents, and new technologies that 
would speed border crossings while increasing controls over illegal flows of drugs, weapons and 
humans.  
 
The need for a focus on border crossings cannot simply involve the U.S. government. It is high time that 
Mexican authorities devote resources to improving infrastructure on its side, with increased security, 
improved checks on southbound goods and people, while at the same time providing more lanes for 
northbound traffic. There are encouraging signs early in the Pena Nieto administration that the new 
government is willing to spend on infrastructure and recognizes the importance of the border.  
 
Funding this new infrastructure will be a challenge, particularly in view of the fiscal problems in the 
United States. Public private partnerships at the border, involving fee-based border crossings, make 
more sense than ever before, and could provide a much needed boost for bridges, and express lanes. 
 
Mexico’s southern border is more important than ever, and joint action between the U.S. and Mexico 
there is crucial. It will be impossible to patrol the border effectively along its length, but strengthening 
formal border crossings will help to regularize traffic. Given the problems with violence, migration and 
disease, such action is urgent. 
 
The need for information exchange and understanding is a joint action. One of the most important 
advances of the past decade has been the implementation of trusted traveler programs (TTPs). The time 
has come to unify and expand the existing programs (Sentri and Nexus) so that a truly North American 
TTP can facilitate movement for frequent travelers.  It makes sense for Global Entry to become the 
standard for travel in the region and beyond, and the U.S. government should consider a more 
aggressive marketing campaign for the program. 
 
The FAST program (Fast and Secure Trade) is an initiative that also requires further investment. Most of 
North America’s trade moves by road, and making it easier for trusted truck drivers to move seamlessly 
across the region’s borders makes good economic sense. More companies should be encouraged to join 
the C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) program as it is the gateway to FAST. 
 
At the border itself it is vital that information exchange becomes a priority between authorities. A case 
in point is the challenge faced by Mexican border mayors who weekly receive thousands of Mexican and 
Central American deportees into their cities, commonly left there by U.S. authorities with little or no 
information about their background. This poses a serious threat to public order, to social security and 
health systems, and could easily be addressed by a simple exchange of information between federal 
authorities, who then pass on the information to their municipal counterparts. 
 
One of the most fruitful initiatives on the Canada-U.S. border has been the IBETs (Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams) program. The IBETs program is comprised of both Canadian and American law 
enforcement agencies:  
 Royal Canadian Mounted Police  (RCMP) 
 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) 
 US Customs and Border Protection/Office of Border Patrol (CBP/OBP) 
 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
 US Coast Guard (USCG).  
 
The partnership enables the five core law enforcement partners to work together for more efficient 
sharing of information and intelligence. There is great potential for increasing understanding and 
effectiveness on the U.S.-Mexico border through a similar program, particularly with regards to 
maritime enforcement.19 There may even be scope for making IBETs teams trilateral in nature so that 
Mexican officials can learn from the experience on the U.S.-Canada border. 
 
In 2012 Stephen Kaplan published The Revenge of Geography, in which he emphasized the enduring 
importance of geography and geo-politics in the modern world. In the case of our region, geography has 
become a huge competitive opportunity for all three NAFTA partners. Jointly implementing measures 
that allow us to take full advantage of that opportunity should now be a priority for our governments. 
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 AFTERWORD 
D. Rick Van Schoik 
When President Obama met with President Peña Nieto in early May of 2013, the tone of the dialogue 
between the two nations had changed dramatically from when the President Obama last met with then-
President Calderon.  Before the elections in Mexico and United States, the continental context and 
bilateral relationship was about how the two nations were going to make the continent and the border 
safer.  The focus was on fighting transnational crime organizations. 
We find both the context and content changed so that when the three leaders convene at the North 
American Leaders Summit later this year they can build upon making the continent and the borders 
more productive and the citizens more prosperous.  Surely new trade agreements to the east and west 
will enter the “trialogue” as they should as each nations and the whole of the continent realizes the 
benefits when we approach trans-oceanic trade from a common perspective.  Since each of us exports 
content from the others when we trade with the world, we all benefit.   
NAFTA can be reborn with all the promise that the original agreement stood for as we bring down more 
barriers to trade and as we continue to make North America the most competitive region in the world 
make place. 
The Trilateral Border Summit, the first of many, captured and herein forwards many of the best policy 
options to take advantage of this new perspective.               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
